Cross-Border Competition in the European Union: Public Procurement and the European Defence Equipment Market by Sandler, Susan R.
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 7 Issue 3 
January 2008 
Cross-Border Competition in the European Union: Public 
Procurement and the European Defence Equipment Market 
Susan R. Sandler 
European Union 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Susan R. Sandler, Cross-Border Competition in the European Union: Public Procurement and the European 
Defence Equipment Market, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 373 (2008), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
373 
Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 
 
VOLUME 7 NUMBER 3 2008
CROSS-BORDER COMPETITION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
AND THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT 
MARKET† 
SUSAN R. SANDLER∗ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 374 
I. BACKGROUND—THE PROCUREMENT DIMENSION.............................. 377 
II. THE LEGAL BASIS............................................................................... 387 
III. THE 2004 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES ................................ 389 
IV. A NOTE ON THRESHOLDS.................................................................. 392 
 
 
 † A previous version of this Article was submitted to the University of Leicester Faculty of 
Law (Leicester, UK), in January 2007 as a course requirement for the Degree of Master of Laws in 
European Union Commercial Law. Both European and American spellings for defense (“defence” and 
“defense”) are used in this Article as appropriate. 
 ∗ The author is an attorney licensed in the United States. She holds B.A. and J.D. degrees, as 
well as an L.L.M. in European Union Commercial Law (With Distinction). She has lived in Africa, 
Asia, Europe, the Middle East, North America, and the West Indies. Her twenty years of international 
law and business experience include positions as a corporate attorney in Japan; a lawyer and technical 
consultant to the U.S. Government on environment, governance, and private-sector reform projects 
overseas; and as Resident Attorney to the Human Rights Research and Education Centre at the 
University of Ottawa, Canada, advising on international law, human rights, democracy, and legal 
reform. In 2007, she worked for the European Commission Directorate-General for Enterprise and 
Industry’s International Affairs Unit in Brussels. She currently resides in the Middle East and is a 
consultant on European Union law and EU commercial initiatives in security, defense, and space 
policy.  
 The author acknowledges generous academic and professional support from Ms. Andrea 
Cochrane; Ms. Stacy Nelson Ferraro; Professor Errol Mendes; Wg Cdr Paul O’Neill; and all former 
colleagues at DG Enterprise and throughout the European Commission, especially Mr. Jean-Marie 
Avezou, Ms. Yolande de Becker, Mr. Philippe Jean, Mr. Tjien-Khoen Liem, Ms. Tina Mede, Ms. 
Stephanie Mitchell, and Ms. Laura Tarragona-Sáez. Very special thanks to Mr. Jordan Rohrlich, Mr. 
Noah Rohrlich, and Dr. Paul Rohrlich. 
 The author may be contacted at srsandler@gmail.com. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
374 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:373 
 
 
 
 
V. THE STAKES ....................................................................................... 394 
VI. CROSS-BORDER PROCUREMENT ....................................................... 396 
VII. DIRECT OR INDIRECT PROCUREMENT—THE DILEMMA OF 
OFFSETS ......................................................................................... 400 
VIII. COMMENTARY................................................................................ 403 
IX. THE UNIQUE CONTEXT OF DEFENSE................................................. 404 
X. THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE............................................................ 407 
XI. ARTICLE 296: PROTECTING ESSENTIAL SECURITY INTERESTS......... 416 
XII. THE IRONY OF 296 ........................................................................... 423 
XIII. THE INTERPRETATIVE COMMUNICATION ON ARTICLE 296 ........... 427 
XIV. THE 2007 DEFENCE PACKAGE—A FEW KEY POINTS.................... 431 
XV. STATE AID ....................................................................................... 436 
XVI. COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT—THE UK EXPERIENCE ................. 438 
XVII. DEFENSE 2007 AND BEYOND........................................................ 440 
XVIII. COMMENTARY: THE TREATY OF LISBON .................................... 444 
XIX. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 451 
 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, European Union (EU)1 Member States resisted 
competitive public procurement. Efforts to protect domestic industries 
resulted in anti-competitive procurement practices, distorted the Internal 
Market, compromised procurement integrity, and eroded confidence in 
public officials. Towards addressing these ills, the European Commission 
initiated procurement modernization, targeting, inter alia, the European 
defense industrial sector, a sector long known for the glaring absence of 
procurement integrity.  
Until recently, the great potential contribution of competition in the 
defense sector went unrealized, truncated by the general application of 
 
 
 1. Although it is common practice to use the terms European Union (EU) and European 
Community (EC) interchangeably, there is in fact a legal distinction. A detailed explanation may be 
found in Rafael Leal-Arcas, EU Legal Personality in Foreign Policy?, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 165 (2007). 
If the Treaty of Lisbon ultimately enters into force, the term “European Community” will disappear, 
eliminating this constant source of confusion. All references to the Community will be replaced by the 
“Union,” “European Union,” and “EU.” Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J (C 306) 2 [hereinafter 
“Lisbon Treaty”], available at http://europa.eu/Lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm. A detailed 
discussion of the Lisbon Treaty, also known as the Reform Treaty, is outside the scope of this Article 
due to its uncertain status, however, it is discussed infra, Part XVIII. A website has been established to 
facilitate access to Treaty information and current ratification status and news. See EUROPA-Treaty of 
Lisbon, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (last visited June 20, 2008) [hereinafter “Lisbon 
Website”]. 
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Article 296 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Article 
296).2 This legislation permitted Member States to derogate from 
competition rules by declaring specific transactions exempt from 
competition in order to protect sovereign interests. Member States invoked 
derogations with such frequency that a reported fifty percent of defense-
related procurements were excluded from the Community’s Internal 
Market. This shielded considerable economic activity from competition 
oversight on national security grounds,3 which in turn kept the economic 
benefits of such transactions out of the Internal Market’s bottom-line. The 
result was inefficient public spending, diminished economic opportunity, 
and, consequently, obstruction of EU economic objectives. Such 
conditions also facilitated corruption, especially in the defense industrial 
sector, where transactions were easily protected under the vaguely defined 
cloak of national security confidentiality. 
In 2004, new legislation was adopted to improve cross-border 
competition in public procurement.4 Simplified procedures were 
established to complement transparency, fairness, and non-discrimination 
initiatives and objectives. E-technology was introduced and has been 
incorporated to improve procedural consistency, ensure wider and 
immediate dissemination of procurement information, and track data. In 
addition, defense was expressly added to the Internal Market’s remit.  
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was another initiative launched 
in 2004 to coordinate defense activities. EDA members adopted a 
Voluntary Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, effective July 2006. 
In December 2006, an Interpretative Communication on Article 2965 was 
released. This initiative was expected to reduce misapplication of defense 
procurement derogations, and thus clarify and strengthen European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) authority over the application of Article 296. Yet it was 
recognized that the Communication was not enough and that targeted 
 
 
 2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, amended 
by Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Related Acts Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter “EC 
Treaty”], in which Article 223 was renumbered as Article 296. See EC Treaty art. 12 and Annex A 
(Tables of Equivalences Referred to in Article 12 of the Treaty of Amsterdam). Future references to 
Article 296 herein will include its previous numbering as Article 223. If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, 
the EC Treaty will be renamed “Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.” Lisbon Treaty art. 
2(1).  
 3. Press Release, European Defence Agency, EDA Welcomes European Commission Move on 
Defence Procurement Rules (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.eda.europa.eu/newsitem.aspx?id=29.  
 4. See infra notes 54–55. 
 5. Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the Field of 
Defence Procurement, COM (2006) 779 final (Dec. 7, 2006) [hereinafter “IC296”]. 
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legislation would still be necessary to guide and govern national 
procurement procedures for defense goods (arms, munitions, and war 
material) and services. 
From past practice, one might easily have projected that proposals for 
such legislation would never materialize. Thus it was welcome testimony 
to the resolve of Member States and relevant interested stakeholders to 
effect change when a “Defence Package” was adopted by the Commission 
on December 5, 2007.6 This “package” consisted of a Communication on 
defense industries,7 and two legislative proposals: one for a new defense 
procurement Directive8 and one for a Directive on intra-community 
defense transfers.9 Thus, just as the EDA materialized quickly, the EU is 
attempting other expeditious action to strengthen its defense procurement 
regime.  
The new legislation, however, will not be part of the EU’s acquis 
communitaire10 until the co-decision process is completed11 and the 
legislation is adopted by the European Council and Parliament.12 It is 
 
 
 6. A detailed analysis of the Defence Package is outside the scope of this Article, however, for 
key points, see infra Part XIV. The entire Package can be viewed on EUROPA, Enterprise and 
Industry, Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/defence/ 
eu_defence_policy.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2008). See infra note 19 for more information on 
Commission Directorates-General. 
 7. Commission Communication, A Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European 
Defence Industry, COM (2007) 764 final (Dec. 5, 2007) [hereinafter “2007 Defence 
Communication”].  
 8. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Coordination 
of Procedures for the Award of Certain Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public 
Service Contracts in the Fields of Defence and Security, COM (2007) 766 final (Dec. 5, 2007) 
[hereinafter “Defence Directive”]. 
 9. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Simplifying Terms and Conditions of Transfers of Defence-Related Products Within the Community, 
COM (2007) 765 final (Dec. 5, 2007) [hereinafter “Defence Transfer Directive”].  
 10. “The Community acquis is the body of common rights and obligations which bind all the 
Member States together within the European Union.” EUROPA’s Glossary, Definition of Community 
Acquis, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/community_acquis_en.htm (last visited June 10, 2008). 
Countries applying for EU membership must accept the Community acquis. Derogations can be 
granted, but only in exceptional circumstances and with limitations in scope. The applicant must 
transpose the acquis into its national legislation and implement it from the moment of accession. See 
id.  
 11. A detailed explanation of the co-decision process is outside the scope of this Article, 
however, a description is available on EUROPA Glossary, Definition of Co-decision Process, 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/codecision_procedure_en.htm (last visited June 7, 2008). A co-
decision guide can be found at EUROPA, Codecision Step-by-Step Guide, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
codecision/stepbystep/text/index_en.htm (last visited June 7, 2008). 
 12. See the legislative status of the two Directives on Europa’s Prelex (legislative tracking) 
webpages, http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=196507#389808 (last 
visited June 3, 2008), and http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=196506 
(last visited June 7, 2008). 
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difficult to predict how soon—if ever—this will occur and if so, whether 
Member States will willingly open their defense-related procurements to 
stronger scrutiny, or whether past practices intended to evade transparency 
principles will remain the norm.  
Notwithstanding the Defence Package’s uncertain fate, it is a welcome 
prospect; it is well-timed and consistent with Commission promises to 
address deficiencies in public procurement transparency and procedure in 
the area of defense. In that respect, it represents a credible initiative toward 
that objective and is a major step toward achieving a self-sustaining 
European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). In addition, even if it is 
not adopted under co-decision, experience suggests that Member States 
will rely on elements of the Package to guide decisions with respect to the 
development of EDEM.  
This Article first considers public procurement and competition, 
highlighting unique issues applicable to a competitive defense equipment 
market, the need for targeted guidance on defense procurement, and the 
application of Article 296. After setting the issue in context, consideration 
will be made of the evolution and the 2004 modernization of public 
procurement policy. Discussion thereafter will focus on the establishment 
of a competitive defense equipment market, Article 296, and the 
Commission’s 2006 Interpretative Communication on its application. The 
main points of the Defence Package will be identified. A commentary with 
respect to the Treaty of Lisbon is also included. The conclusion will 
address whether pending procurement initiatives are likely to enhance 
cross-border competition, particularly with regard to the defense sector. 
I. BACKGROUND—THE PROCUREMENT DIMENSION 
In 1957, six European nations13 agreed that a strong economic union 
would produce peace in perpetuity. Their agreement, The Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community, or Treaty of Rome (the 
Treaty), established the European Economic Community (EEC) to 
increase economic prosperity and create “an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe.”14 The EEC’s successor, now the twenty-seven-
 
 
 13. Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  
 14. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 
pmbl. (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Treaty of Rome” or the “EEC Treaty”]. The Treaty was signed 
March 25, 1957, and entered into force on January 1, 1958. For a history of integration, see PAUL 
CRAIG & GRÁININE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW, TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 13–53 (3d ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter “CRAIG & DE BÚRCA”]; ERIKA SZYZCZAK & ADAM CYGAN, UNDERSTANDING EU LAW 
1–143 (1st ed. 2005).  
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member European Union (EU),15 has become a Goliath of a bureaucracy 
with complex and overlapping economic and regulatory responsibilities 
for over 495 million Europeans.16  
The pulse of the EU is its Internal Market, which is the economic area 
within which Member States function as a single economic entity by 
facilitating the fundamental freedoms that govern internal movement from 
one Member State to another: free movement of people, goods, services, 
and capital.17 Such a market simplifies life for consumers and businesses, 
stimulates competition, reduces prices, and widens choices by facilitating 
the circulation of goods and services and allowing citizens to travel, work, 
and live in any other EU Member State they choose.18  
According to Mr. Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner of the Internal 
Market and Services Directorate-General (DG MARKT),19 “[a]n efficient 
Internal Market is essential for a prosperous economic future, for our jobs 
and our living standards. The way the Internal Market works affects what 
we pay for goods and services and how we trade in them.”20 The 
establishment of the Single Market21 on January 1, 1993, has resulted in 
“2.5 million jobs and 877 billion euros of extra prosperity.”22 
 
 
 15. EU/EC as discussed in Leal-Arcas, supra note 1. 
 16. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Population 
statistics cited infra Table 2 and note 123.  
 17. A detailed discussion of the fundamental freedoms may be found in CATHERINE BARNARD, 
THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS (1st ed. 2004).  
 18. EUROPA, European Commission, Internal Market, The EU Single Market, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/index_en.htm (follow link “General Policy Framework”) (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2008); the Internal Market Mission, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/mission_ 
en.htm (last visited June 8, 2008).  
 19. The European Commission’s operations and policies are coordinated among departments 
called Directorates-General (DGs). DG MARKT coordinates the Commission’s policy on the 
European Single Market “to ensure the free movement of people, goods, services and capital within 
the Union.” EUROPA, DG Internal Market & Services, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/ 
index_en.htm (last visited June 10, 2008). “Its central mission is to secure . . . greater European market 
integration and [remove] obstacles to the free movement of services and capital and to the freedom of 
establishment.” EUROPA, Commissioner Charlie McCreevy, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/ 
mccreevy/ portfolio_en.htm (last visited June 10, 2008). For a complete listing of all Commission 
DGs, see EUROPA, Directorates-General and Services of the Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
dgs_en.htm (last visited June 10, 2008). 
 20. Commissioner McCreevy Homepage, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mccreevy/ 
index_en.htm (last visited June 4, 2008). 
 21. The “Single Market” was the phrase used to describe the “Common Market” in the pre-
Single European Act stage of the EU. Following that Act, the term fell out of fashion and reference 
was then made to the “Internal Market” as currently defined in EC Treaty art. 14EC as “an area 
without internal frontiers” and incorporating the four freedoms. Another term which is often confused 
with the Internal and Single Markets is the “Common Market,” which is slightly wider in scope than 
the “Internal Market,” as it includes commercial policy. However, the ECJ seems not to have drawn 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/2
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Competition is the key to Internal Market success. It protects the 
Market by facilitating economic prosperity through “peace, security and 
respect for rights.”23 Competition challenges competitors to supply 
reasonably-priced products and services “which other people, other 
companies, and . . . nations want to buy.”24 This is achieved through 
“innovation,” the process of researching and developing (R&D) goods and 
services. Research converts money into knowledge; innovation converts 
knowledge into products.25  
Innovation thus becomes the linchpin of the Internal Market’s 
economic life-cycle; competition would not exist without it. The EU 
Presidency26 has wisely focused on the interrelationship between 
innovation and competition. Innovation was a priority under the Finnish 
Presidency in 200627 and was an integrated theme in the 18-Month 
Programme of the German, Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies.28  
 
 
any distinction between the internal and common markets, possibly because both include the four 
freedoms as their central core. E-mail from A.J. Cochrane, Assoc. Lecturer, University of Derby, UK, 
(Feb. 7, 2008) (on file with author). 
 22. EUROPA, DG Internal Market & Services, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/index_ 
en.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).  
 23. Neelie Kroes, European Comm’r for Competition, Building a Competitive Europe-
Competition Policy and Relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy (Feb. 7, 2005), available at EUROPA Press 
Releases, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do [hereinafter “RAPID”] (search complete database, 
reference “SPEECH/05/78”).  
 24. Id. 
 25. Neelie Kroes, European Comm’r for Competition, Innovation from a Business Perspective: 
the State Aid Aspects (Nov. 17, 2005), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do 
(search complete database, reference “SPEECH/05/703”).  
 26. Per EC Treaty art. 203EC, the Presidency of the Council of the European Union rotates every 
six months among Member State governments by a pre-agreed rotation decided until 2020. Each 
Presidency prepares an agenda and establishes priorities for its term. In accordance with a new 
procedure, Presidencies coordinate as “Trio Presidencies” or “troikas,” which refer to “the three 
Presidencies due to hold office during [a] given period” of succession, and the new Rules of Procedure 
that require them to develop, in coordination, eighteen-month work plans for their successive 
Presidency rotations. See Council Decision 2006/683, 2006 O.J. (L 285) 47 (Euratom), of 15 
September 2006, adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure, replacing Council Decision 2004/338, 
2004 O.J. (L 106) 22 (Euratom) 22 March 2004. See also the Rules of Procedure as last amended, 
Council Decision 2006/34, 2006 O.J. (L 22) 32 (Euratom) of 23 January 2006. For background on 
Institutions, see CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 14, at 54, 66. The order of the Presidencies may be 
found in Council Decision 2007/5, 2007 O.J. (L 1) 11 (Euratom), of 1 January 2007, determining the 
order in which the office of President of the Council shall be held.  
 27. See Finland’s EU Presidency website, http://www.eu2006.fi/en_GB/ or EUROPA, CORDIS, 
http://cordis.europa.eu/finland/presidency/home_en.html (last visited June 8, 2008). 
 28. See GERMAN PRESIDENCY, EUROPE—SUCCEEDING TOGETHER: PRESIDENCY PROGRAMME, 1 
JANUARY-30 JUNE 2007, http://www.eu2007.de/includes/Downloads/Praesidentschaftsprogramm/ 
EU_Presidency_Programme_final.pdf; 18-Month Programme of the German, Portuguese and 
Slovenian Presidencies, http://www.eu2007.pt/UE/VEN/Presidencia_Conselho/PriorPPUE (follow “18 
Month Programme” hyperlink); Portuguese Presidency of the Council: A Stronger Union for a Better 
World, July–December 2007, http://www.eu2007.pt/UE/VEN/Presidentcia_Conselho/PriorPPUE 
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France will hold the next EU Presidency for six months beginning July 
1, 2008.29 It is expected to focus primarily on defense, security, external 
relations, and the needs of EU citizens.30 France will work jointly with the 
Czech Republic and Sweden to establish a viable 18-Month Programme 
delineating the route on which the EU will embark between July 2008 and 
the end of 2009.31  
 
 
(follow “Priorities of the Portuguese Presidency (pdf format)” hyperlink); and the Portuguese 
Presidency website in general at http://www.eu2007.pt/UE/vEN/Presidencia_Conselho/PriorPPUE/ 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2008). See also EUbusiness, R&D and Innovation Service–Portuguese 
Presidency, http://www.eubusiness.com/Rd/research-portugal.55/ (last visited June 10, 2008); 
Slovenian Presidency, http://evropa.gov.si/en/ (last visited June 10, 2008); Programme and Priorities 
of the Slovenian Presidency, http://www.eu2008.si/en/The_Council_Presidency/Priorities_ 
Programmes/index.html (last visited June 10, 2008). Also see the Slovenian Presidency Program, 
which refers to “building an innovative and creative knowledge-based society,” as a leading priority 
under the launch of the new Lisbon Strategy Cycle. Slovenian Presidency Programme: Si.nergy for 
Europe, January–June 2008, 7, available at http://www.eu2008.si/includes/Downloads/misc/program/ 
Programme_en.pdf. 
 29. The French Presidency website will be fully operational around July 1, 2008. The French 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2008, http://www.ue2008.fr/index_en.html (last 
visited June 20, 2008). 
 30. Out of concern not to derail the Lisbon Treaty ratification, France attempted to keep a low 
profile with respect to its own 2008 Presidency objectives during the Slovenian Presidency. This 
strategy may have ultimately backfired as the small margin of victory by the Irish “no” camp was 
likely influenced by low voter turnout, which reportedly contributed to a rejection of the Treaty on 
June 12, 2008. Some felt that France intentionally withheld information on a defense “blueprint” so 
voters could not factor it into their voting decision. See Teresa Küchler, Irish ‘No’ Camp Says Paris 
Hiding Plans for EU Defence, June 11, 2008, available at http://euobserver.com/9/26305 (last visited 
June 15, 2008). 
 This Article went to print before the French Presidency began, but as the rotation date nears, 
French priorities are being identified. See France Seeks to Revitalise European Defence, 
EURACTIV.COM, June 6, 2008, http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/france-seeks-revitalise-european-
defence/article-173103?Ref=RSS; France Readies for “Heaviest Presidency in EU History,” 
EURACTIV.COM, June 2, 2008, http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/france-readies-heaviest-presidency 
-eu-history/article-172884. France Diplomatie reported the four French Presidency priorities as (1) 
energy-climate package and EU energy policy, (2) migration, (3) European security and defense, and 
(4) Common Agricultural Policy. French Minsitry of Foreign and European Affairs, Conference of the 
Committee Chairmen of the European Parliament (Strasbourg, May 20, 2008), 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/european-union_157/european-meetings_882/french-presidency-of-
the-european-union-second-half-2008_6090/conference-of-the-committee-chairmen-of-the-european-
parliament-20.05.08_11269.html; OPEN EUROPE, BRIEFING NOTE: THE FRENCH EU PRESIDENCY 
2008—WHAT TO EXPECT (Mar. 25, 2008), available at http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/ 
frenchpresidency.pdf (last visited June 10, 2008); France Outlines EU Presidency Priorities, 
EURACTIV.COM, Aug. 30, 2007, http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/france-outlines-eu-presidency-
priorities/article-166313; Honor Mahony, France Steals Slovenia’s EU Presidency Limelight, 
EUOBSERVER.COM, Jan. 14, 2008, http://euobserver.com/9/25452.  
 31. As of June 10, 2008, the troika’s program had not been officially released. Media sources 
identified troika priorities as “the development of the EU, the energy and climate policies, growth and 
employment, general economic issues, competitiveness, gender equality, research and innovations, 
health and consumers, culture, sustainable development, the environment, transport, agriculture and 
fishing, cohesion policy, freedom and security, and justice and external relations.” Czechs, French, 
Swedes Agree on EU Presidency Programme, ČESKÉ NOVINY, http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/news/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/2
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Innovation features prominently within the Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7),32 and is considered vital for successful implementation 
of the renewed Lisbon Strategy to place jobs and growth at the forefront of 
European political priorities.33 
Industry is responsible for innovation’s creative process34 as it is more 
easily adaptable to shifting consumer desires. Conversely, removing 
barriers that discourage innovation is the responsibility of public 
authorities.35 Industry assumes the financial risk inherent in R&D—the 
 
 
index_view.php?id=314921. See also Rob Cameron, Czech, French, Swedish Ministers Meet in 
Prague to Discuss Shared EU Agenda, May 27, 2008, http://www.radio.cz/en/article/104464 (last 
visited June 10, 2008). Most of these items will be addressed despite the Lisbon Treaty rejection. 
 32. See generally CORDIS, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/home_en.html (follow links to 
“Cooperation, Capacities, People and/or Ideas”). See also CORDIS, Understand FP7, The Main 
Objectives of FP7: Specific Programmes, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/understand_en.html. (last visited 
June 3, 2008); EUROPA, Innovation Policy in Europe, especially Innovation Policy Framework at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/innovation/index_en.htm#1; Commission Communication, Towards an 
Increased Contribution from Standardisation to Innovation in Europe, COM (2008) 133 final (Mar. 
11, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/standards_policy/standardisation_innovation/ 
doc/com_2008_133_en.pdf; Commission Recommendation on the Management of Intellectual 
Property in Knowledge Transfer Activities, and Code of Practice for Universities and Other Public 
Research Organizations, COM (2008) 1329 (Apr. 10, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-
research/pdf/ip_recommendation_en.pdf.  
 33. See, e.g., Commission Communication, Implementing the Renewed Lisbon Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs: “A Year of Delivery,” COM (2006) 816 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/1206_annual_report_en.pdf (annex available at http://ec. 
europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/1206_annual_report_annexe_en.pdf). One must not underestimate the 
utility and importance of innovation to EU operations and future policy. See EUROPA Information 
Society, Mastering ICTs [Information and Communication Technologies] to Promote Innovation, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/research/index_en.htm (“[W]hile the ICT sector is itself worth 
6–8% of the EU’s GDP, ICTs are much more important than that figure suggests, playing a key role in 
everything from promoting innovation throughout the economy to meeting the demographic challenge 
of an aging society.”). See EUROPEAN COMMISSION INFORMATION SOCIETY AND MEDIA 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET: A COMPENDIUM OF EUROPEAN PROJECTS 
ON ICT RESEARCH SUPPORTED BY THE EU 7TH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME FOR RTD (May 28, 2008); 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfm?item_id=1537 (last visited 
June 3, 2008) (presenting seventy public-private partnership projects—worth nearly €300 million of 
EU research investment, with an additional €200 million from academia and industry—addressing the 
key challenges for the development of the Future Internet). See also Memorandum, Lisbon Strategy 
for Growth and Jobs: Frequently Asked Questions—Background (Dec. 10, 2007); available at RAPID, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, reference “MEMO/07/557”). 
 34. See generally Commission Communication, Putting Knowledge into Practice: A Broad-
Based Innovation Strategy for the EU, COM (2006) 502 final (Sept. 13, 2006). See also Progress 
Report (Mar. 2008) on the Broad-Based Innovation Strategy, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enterprise/innovation/doc/bbi_strategy_progress_report_march_2008.pdf. 
 35. Id. at 12. The critical role played by public authorities in removing barriers is not to be 
overlooked when factoring in the “take-up” of new products to market. Initiatives to promote new 
technology must also balance and support more traditional innovation. Note the establishment of the 
new European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) on March 11, 2008. The EIT’s recently 
activated website can be viewed at EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/eit/mission_en.htm. For explanatory 
background, see Unlocking Europe’s Potential for Innovation: EP Vote Gives Green Light to the 
European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) (Mar. 11, 2008), available at RAPID, 
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production of tempting products and services without any guaranteed 
return on the investment cost that must be expended in the development of 
innovation.  
Consumers perform a role as well. In fact, they are the ultimate 
“producers” of competition. Consumer preferences and acquisition choices 
stimulate innovation. Thus “acquisition” is the objective for both sides, 
and a clear benchmark by which to measure innovative success. From the 
industrial perspective, acquisition is an objective. Attracting, convincing 
(conceivably the point at which acquisition of a good or service occurs), 
and retaining customers become not only key objectives but pillars that 
strengthen the competitive environment and create the economic incentive 
to innovate.  
EU Member States are insatiable consumers acquiring their many 
goods and services in great and growing part through public procurement. 
Public procurement as a process is meant to ensure that many different 
entities of all sizes receive equal treatment during the tender process to 
supply goods and services. Procurement itself is based on fundamental 
principles of competition36 and it is a key driver of EU innovation.37 An 
example of the important status that the Commission bestows on the 
relationship between innovation and public procurement is the 
Commission’s newly minted 2007 Guide On Dealing with Innovative 
Solutions in Public Procurement, 10 Elements of Good Practice,38 which 
is basically a guide comprising good practices focusing on the integration 
of technology requirements into tendering procedures. Since public 
procurement represents over thirty percent of Member States’ budget 
expenditures and has as its objectives the efficient acquisition of supplies, 
services, and public works “on the best possible terms,”39 “public 
 
 
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, reference “IP/08/414,”) and 
Memorandum, The EIT: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (Mar. 11, 2008), available at RAPID, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, reference “MEMO/08/153”). “The 
Community contribution to the EIT will amount to €308.7 million for the 2008–2013 period.” 
European Institute of Innovation and Technology, Frequently Asked Questions on the EIT, at FAQ #5, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/eit/faq_en.htm. 
 36. EUROPA, Public Procurement: Introduction, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l22007. 
htm. 
 37. COM (2006) 502, supra note 34, at 11–13, 17, which recognizes procurement as an 
innovation stimulant and a particularly high political priority of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and 
Jobs. 
 38. PRO INNO EUROPE, GUIDE ON DEALING WITH INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS IN PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT, 10 ELEMENTS OF GOOD PRACTICE (2007) (Commission Staff Working Document, 
2007) [hereinafter “The 2007 Guide”], available at http://www.proinno-europe.eu/doc/procurement_ 
manuscript.pdf. 
 39. MARTIN TRYBUS, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
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purchasers must become ‘intelligent customers’ who plan what to buy, 
how to buy it and who will buy it.”40 The Guide will facilitate the process.  
The Commission continues to reinforce the notion of “[p]ublic 
procurement [as] a key-driver for innovation in Europe.”41 In May 2008, a 
public consultation was launched “on the establishment of procurement 
networks to stimulate innovation in key areas identified under the Lead 
Market Initiative.”42  
The aforementioned objectives for strengthening procurement are 
realistic provided that the procurement process is characterized by 
integrity. Procurement integrity is lacking, however, when Member States 
conspire to create a closed procurement environment by guarding their 
vested economic or political interests and restricting access to procurement 
opportunities, thus avoiding competition.  
Closed procurement environments reward local producers by favoring 
them in procurement awards and rewarding them with the business this 
generates. Such a special status gives local producers preferred access to a 
system that does not require them to compete or abide by rules of fairness 
and transparency of procedure required of bidders who play by the book in 
an open environment. Such preferential treatment creates a disincentive for 
those preferred parties who cease to innovate, invite, or compete in foreign 
tenders. It thus stunts the process, restricting natural market development. 
Without any market incentives, prices exceed competitive levels.43 A 
healthy competitive environment prevents the entrenchment of vested 
interests by increasing available choices, reducing prices, facilitating 
 
 
(OECD), NEW SIGMA STUDIES ON PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE EU OF 27 (Update Mar. 12, 2006), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/6/36361218.pdf [hereinafter “OECD/SIGMA”] (last visited June 3, 
2008).  
 40. COM (2006) 502, supra note 34, at 11. See also The 2007 Guide, supra note 38, at 9. 
 41. See PRO INNO Europe, a new initiative of the Directorate General Enterprise and Industry 
intended to become the focal point for innovation policy analysis, learning and development in 
Europe, http://www.proinno-europe.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=nwev.NewsReader&news=2155&lang= 
EN&ParentID=90&topicID=239. 
 42. See European Commission Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, Establishing 
Public Procurement Networks in Support of the Lead Market Initiative (May 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/leadmarket/doc/lmi_consultation_final22may2008.pdf.  
 43. Innovation and competition convergences are discussed in innumerable sources. See 
generally id.; supra note 33; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, A REPORT ON THE FUNCTION OF PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT MARKETS IN THE EU: BENEFITS FROM THE APPLICATION OF EU DIRECTIVES AND 
CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE (EC) EC 6 (Feb. 3, 2004) [hereinafter “2004 PR”], EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/does/public-proc-market-final-report_en.pdf; 
Amended Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and the Council Concerning the 7th 
Framework Programme of the European Community for Research, Technological Development and 
Demonstration Activities (2007–2013), at 25, COM (2006) 364 final (June 28, 2006).  
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innovation, and creating competitors. “Without competitors, there is no 
competition. End of story.”44  
EU procurement has not been viewed as cost-effective, value-based, or 
transparent.45 Historically, corruption and domestic favoritism triggered 
multiple governance problems and shielded redundant, inefficient, and 
obsolete industries from the oversight of EU competition authorities, a 
situation hardly conducive to sustainable economic prosperity.46 The 
resulting economic distortion held the market hostage to discriminatory 
and nationalistic behavior, obstructed liberalization, increased the cost of 
procurement, and constructively discouraged innovation. Non-competitive 
tenders stunted the development of European firms at home—even though 
these firms were otherwise competitive on world markets.47  
Member States indulged and exploited national biases in letting tenders 
and granting awards in order to block foreigners’ access to local 
contracting opportunities, thus impeding trade.48 They abused the Treaty 
by taking advantage of provisions such as Article 30EC, which permits 
“prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit 
justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security.”49 
Its use resulted in the circumvention of free movement principles 
notwithstanding that “[s]uch prohibitions or restrictions shall not, 
 
 
 44. Memorandum, Questions and Answers—Order of the President of the Court of First Instance 
in Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft Corp. v. European Commission (Dec. 22, 2004), available at RAPID, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, reference “MEMO/04/305”).  
 45. Sue Arrowsmith, The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From Framework 
to Common Code? 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 337, 357–58 (2006). Transparency in procurement 
encompasses publicity for opportunities, procedural steps, rules, award and selection criteria, decision 
making, and the means to verify enforcement. Id. Transparency in procurement is also said to 
encompass establishing stable, predictable procurement procedures subject to external oversight and 
control. Konkurrensverket [Swedish Competition Authority], Competition in Sweden 2004, 88,  
available at http://www.konkurrensverket.se/t/IframePage_1687.aspx. 
 46. Corruption is often mentioned in public procurement contexts. See 2004 legislation 
discussion infra Part III. Organized crime and corruption within the context of state failures has long 
been considered a threat to European security and defense interests. See, e.g., UK House of Commons 
(UKHC), EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2003 12–13 (June 8, 2006), available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-032.pdf. See also Regina Wilson, 
Dominie Scott & Mark Pyman, Transparency International (UK), The Extent of Single Sourcing and 
Attendant Corruption Risk in Defence Procurement: A First Look, ‘Public Procurement,’ Conference 
presentation at the University of Nottingham (June 19–20, 2006), available at http://www. 
transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2006/defence_sector (scroll down to “Links and Further 
Reading”). Note the reference to corruption in the new Defence Directive supra note 8, Explanatory 
Memorandum, ¶ 41, at 17.  
 47. Supra note 36.  
 48. Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 339. 
 49. EC Treaty art. 30. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/2
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however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States.”50 
In the 1990s, the Commission initiated improvements to counter these 
weaknesses. However, replacing the status quo with a transparent and 
competitive procurement regime was not a scenario warmly embraced by 
Member States; in fact, they resisted.  
This was particularly true in defense procurement, where derogations 
to Internal Market rules were invoked with impunity under Article 296 
based on vague associations with essential security interests. Valuable 
procurements were awarded subject to national contract authorities’ 
preferences to do business with privileged, pre-selected entities.51 Vast 
sums of euros moved outside Internal Market controls—in blatant 
contravention of the Treaty—producing a parallel defense market by 
cloaking improper practices through declarations that an acquisition or 
activity was essential to national security.52  
In 2004, after “a decade of extensive technological and commercial 
development” and improvements in providing public services,53 Council 
Directives 2004/17/EC54 and 2004/18/EC55 were adopted to modify and 
 
 
 50. See comment infra note 385. “[R]ules enacted by Member States which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as 
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions,” Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. 
Dassonville 1974 E.C.R. 837, ¶ 5; Case C-367/89, Criminal Proceedings Against Aimé Richardt and 
Les Accessoires scientifiques SNC, 1991 E.C.R. I-4621; see also id. ¶¶ 19–26 and operative part. See 
generally id., Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 8 May 1991, as well as the 
Judgment of the Court of 4 October 1991.  
 51. See Wilson, supra note 46, at 4. 
 52. Defense will be discussed infra Parts IX–X. 
 53. OECD/SIGMA, supra note 39. 
 54. Council Directive 2004/17, Coordinating the Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating 
in the Water, Energy, Transport and Postal Services Sectors, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 1 (EC) [hereinafter 
“2004/17/EC”]. 
 55. Council Directive 2004/18, On the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public 
Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114 (EC) 
[hereinafter “2004/18/EC”]. Both 2004/18/EC and 2004/17/EC were subsequently amended with 
procurement integrity in mind. See Council Directive 2005/51, Amending Annex XX to 2004/17/EC 
and Annex VIII to 2004/18/EC on Public Procurement, Concerning the Format for Publication of 
Notices Intended for Official Publications of the European Communities 2005 O.J. (L 257) 127 (EC); 
Council Directive 2005/75, 2005 O.J. (L 323) 55 (EC), of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(correcting 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts, 
Public Supply Contracts, and Public Service Contracts); Commission Regulation 2083/2005, 
Amending 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in Respect to 
Their Application Thresholds for the Procedures for the Award of Contracts 2005 O.J. (L 333) 28 (EC) 
(and 2006 O.J. (L 321) 381); Commission Regulation 1422/2007, Amending 2004/17/EC and 
2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in Respect to Their Application Thresholds 
for the Procedures for the Award of Contracts, 2007 O.J. (L 317) 34 (EC), available at EUROPA, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:317:SOM:EN:HTML (last visited June 10, 2008) 
[hereinafter “Threshold Regulation”]; Information from European Union Institutions and Bodies 2007 
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simplify the legal framework for procurement56 and to offer scope for 
innovation-oriented tendering.57 Defense procurement was specifically 
included in the Internal Market agenda under Article 10 of Directive 
2004/18/EC, subject to the application of Article 296.58 Mandatory 
transparency measures were added, requiring advertising of procurement 
notices above certain thresholds. The ECJ received clearer authority. 
Internet technology would be increasingly used, reducing procurement 
costs by, inter alia, improving regulatory conditions and easing 
administrative procedures, another renewed Lisbon goal.59 A mechanism 
was needed to provide more oversight and compensate parties harmed by 
unfair awards. To effect this, a public procurement Remedies Directive60 
entered into force on January 9, 2008, to improve the effectiveness of 
review procedures concerning the awarding of public contracts. Member 
States have until December 20, 2009, to transpose it into national law.61 
 
 
O.J. (C 301) 1 of 13 December 2007 (Corresponding Values of the Thresholds of Directives 
2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council); as corrected on 20 
December 2007 in 2007 O.J. (C 310) 37 by Corrigendum to Corresponding Values of the Thresholds 
of Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council; and 
Council Directive 2006/97 2006 O.J. (L 363) 107 (EC), Adapting Certain Directives in the Field of 
Free Movement of Goods, by Reason of the Accession of Bulgaria and Romania. A particularly 
noteworthy move towards strengthening transparency and facilitating procurement—in particular, 
electronic procurement—was Commission Regulation 213/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 74) 1, Amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 2195/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common 
Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) and 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on Public Procurement Procedures, as Regards the Revision of the CPV [hereinafter “CPV 
Regulation”], available at EUROPA http://eur-lex.europa.ed/LexUrlServ/LexunServ.do?uri-oj:L: 
2008:074:0001:0375:EN:PDF.  
 56. Id. 
 57. COM (2006) 502, supra note 34, at 11.  
 58. 2004/18/EC, supra note 55, art. 10. Article 14 of the Directive is also relevant but the focus 
herein is Article 10. See infra note 336.  
 59. See COM (2006) 816, supra note 33, at 5–6, 10–11. See also A Strategic Review of Better 
Regulation in the European Union, at 5 COM (2006) 689 final (Nov. 14, 2006). 
 60. European Parliament & Council Directive 2007/66/EC, Amending Council Directives 
89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with Regard to Improving the Effectiveness of Review Procedures 
Concerning the Award of Public Contracts. O.J. (L 335) 31.  
 61. A detailed discussion of the history of the Remedies Directive is outside the scope of this 
Article, however, it has two main features: (1) it provides for a “standstill period” of at least ten days 
to be observed before a contract can be finalized, and (2) it grants authority to national courts to set 
aside tender awards that did not respect applicable procurement procedures. Id. The entire legislative 
history of the Remedies Directive can be reviewed at the website of the European Parliament’s 
Legislative Observatory, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=2&procnum= 
COD/2006/0066. See also EUROPA, Revision of the Public Procurement Remedies Directives, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/remedies/remedies_en.htm (last visited June 
10, 2008); Public Procurement: Commission Welcomes Adoption of Directive Improving Rights of 
Rejected Bidders (Nov. 15, 2007), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search 
complete database, reference “IP/07/1700”) (last visited June 4, 2008). 
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The 2004 legislation is in force and improvements are already evident. 
Initiatives—such as the 2006 Interpretative Communication on the 
Application of Article 29662 and the adoption of a Commission Regulation 
on a Common Procurement Vocabulary on November 28, 200763—
continue to emerge. These, along with the proposed Defence Directive, 
suggest that a roadmap for developing initiatives in this area is a work-in-
progress, and the path to success involves addressing procurement as a 
process, formalizing a general vocabulary, and then developing specific 
initiatives to strengthen cross-border competition throughout the economic 
sectors in which the procurement regime will operate. 
II. THE LEGAL BASIS 
The legal basis for procurement currently includes the Treaty, ECJ case 
law, and the 2004 Public Procurement Directives and subsequent 
amendments. Procurement’s primary legal basis rests on fundamental 
principles of free movement codified in Article 12EC,64 which prohibits 
discrimination on grounds of nationality, a fundamental freedom.65 While 
procurement discrimination is not per se prohibited, Member State 
industries receive Treaty protection from discrimination and other 
barriers.66 In addition, Article 28EC67 prohibits restrictions on imports and 
all charges having equivalent effect, Article 43EC68 allows freedom of 
establishment, and Article 49EC69 prohibits discrimination or restrictions 
in services.70  
The ECJ confirmed in Fabricom SA v. État belge,71 that equal 
treatment lies at the heart of the Procurement Directives.72 Gregory S. 
Hayken observed that equal treatment principles protect competition “by 
creating a framework in which a European contractor can compete for 
 
 
 62. IC296, supra note 5. 
 63. See CPV Regulation, supra note 55.  
 64. EC Treaty art. 12. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Gregory S. Hayken, Comparative Study: The Evolution of Organisational Conflicts of 
Interest Law in Europe and the United States, P.P.L.R., 2006, 3, 137–50, 142–43; Arrowsmith, supra 
note 45, at 339. 
 67. EC Treaty art. 28. 
 68. EC Treaty art. 43. 
 69. EC Treaty art. 49. 
 70. Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 339–40. See also Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH & 
Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG, 2000 E.C.R. I-10745, summary, ¶ 60, operative part ¶ 2.  
 71. Joined Cases C-21 & 34/03, 2005 E.C.R. I-1559 (Mar. 3, 2005). 
 72. Id. ¶ 26; see also Case C-243/89, Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark (“Storebaelt”) 1993 
E.C.R. 3353, ¶ 33. 
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work in a neighboring [Member State] without fear of discrimination and 
without being subject to unjustified restrictions on access.”73 He 
persuasively suggests that equal treatment must apply within the context 
of procurement, and that this descends directly from the 1957 Treaty’s 
original goal of economic unity.74  
For decades after 1957, the procurement regime lacked oversight. Prior 
to the enactment of procurement legislation in 1971, only 2% of public 
procurements were awarded outside the tender-issuing Member State.75 
The figure rose to 10% by 1998, but currently, when the tradable nature of 
procured goods is considered, cross-border import penetration in public 
procurement markets appears similar to inter-industry import penetration 
overall.76 The legislation underwent multiple revisions over the next 
twenty-five years77 as the EU strived to attract participants to a 
competitive tendering framework. Yet by 1998, public procurement did 
not meet expectations.78 The Commission vowed to simplify the legal 
framework and bring the process into the electronic age.79  
Throughout the 1990s, the Commission’s aim behind the original 
legislation was to create a framework in which Member States could 
autonomously operate using their own procurement rules. The trend 
however, has shifted away from fragmented Member State autonomy 
toward a common system.80 Efforts continued to amend the public works, 
supplies, and services Directives,81 and telecommunications and utilities 
Directives82 to obtain clearer procedural guidance.83 In 2000, the 
 
 
 73. Hayken, supra note 66, at 143. 
 74. Id. at 141. 
 75. Defence Transfer Directive, supra note 9.  
 76. E-mail from Mr. R. Wakeling, European Commission, to author (Nov. 21, 2006) (on file with 
author). See also UK HOUSE OF LORDS (UKHL), Current Developments in European Defence Policy 
(First Report of Session 2006–2007) 10 (2007), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/Id200607/ 
Idselect/Ideucom/17/17.pdf. 
 77. Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 340. 
 78. Commission, Internal Market Scoreboard, Single Market: First Scoreboard Highlights 
Strengths and Weaknesses, ed. 1 (Nov. 1997), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/search 
Action.do (search complete database, reference “IP/97/1017”). 
 79. Public Procurement in the EU, at 1, 7, COM (1998) 143 final (Mar. 11, 1998). It appears that 
the Commission is in fact moving toward this objective as illustrated by the recent adoption of the 
CVP Regulation, supra note 55, on 28 November 2007. 
 80. Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 338. See generally id. at 352–53.  
 81. Council Directive 92/50, Relating to the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public 
Service Contracts 1992 O.J. (L 209) 1 (EEC); Council Directive 93/36, Coordinating Procedures for 
the Award of Public Supply Contracts 1993 O.J. (L 199) 1 (EEC); Council Directive 93/37, 
Concerning the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts 1993 O.J. (L 
199) 54 (EEC); European Parliament and Council Directive 97/52, 1997 O.J. (L 328) 1 (EC), 
97/52/EC amended Directives 92/50, 93/36 and 93/37. 
 82. Council Directive 93/38, Coordinating the Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in 
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Commission proposed a consolidation of then-existing multiple secondary 
legislation, which finally occurred in 2004 after four years of legislative 
squabbling.84  
III. THE 2004 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES 
On April 30, 2004, procurement was officially reduced to two 
controlling laws: Directives 2004/17 and 2004/18 (the 2004 Directives).85 
Though implementation was scheduled for January 31, 2006, compliance 
remains incomplete.86  
The 2004 legislation sought to increase competition through 
transparency and non-discrimination in procurement practices.87 It aimed 
to achieve better value-for-money through a system rooted in free 
movement of goods and services, the removal of barriers, simplified 
procedures, well-publicized procurement opportunities, and awards based 
on economic criteria.  
The 2004 Directives incorporated the Commission’s 1996 Green Paper 
on Public Procurement88 and the 1998 Commission Communication.89 
They were also integral to the Commission’s 2000 Work Programme, 
which pledged to modernize legislation to complete the Internal Market 
and implement economic reform.90  
The 2004 legislation intended to consolidate, simplify, and clarify 
existing Directives; improve procurement administration by emphasizing 
non-discrimination and electronic procurement mechanisms;91 set forth 
 
 
the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors 1993 O.J. (L 199) 84 (EEC); European 
Parliament and Council Directive 98/4, 1998 O.J. (L 101) 1 (EC), amending Directive 93/38. 
 83. For the Directives’ history until the 2004 modernization, see SUE ARROWSMITH, THE LAW OF 
PUBLIC AND UTILITIES PROCUREMENT (2d ed. 2005).  
 84. Sue Arrowsmith, An Assessment of the New Legislative Package on Public Procurement, 41 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1277, 1278–80 (2004).  
 85. See supra notes 54–55.  
 86. As of February 28, 2008, the status of implementation measures of the Member States 
regarding Directives 2004/17, 2004/18, and 2005/51 is that all the Member States have notified 
implementation measures for all the above Directives. However, the notifications of Portugal for each 
of the Directives are still under examination of the Commission’s services as are the notifications of 
Belgium for Directives 2004/17 and 2004/18. E-mail from Jari Kallio, European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Internal Market & Services, to author (Feb. 28, 2008) (on file with author). 
 87. 2004/18/EC, supra note 55, pmbl. § 2, arts. 2 and 3; 2004/17/EC, supra note 54, pmbl. § 9 
and art. 10.  
 88. Commission Green Paper, Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way 
Forward, COM (1996) 583 final (Nov. 27, 1996).  
 89. See supra note 79. 
 90. Christopher H. Bovis, The New Public Procurement Regime of the European Union: A 
Critical Analysis of Policy, Law and Jurisprudence, 30 EUR. L. REV. 607, 607 (2005). 
 91. Electronic mechanisms are mentioned throughout the 2004 Directives. See, e.g., 2004/18/EC, 
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different award procedures;92 introduce a competitive dialogue procedure 
between public authorities and bidders, allowing more flexibility to 
address contract conditions prior to tender;93 improve transparency (by 
ensuring contract activities and awards are conducted pursuant to objective 
criteria);94 and publish offers and successful awards95 so entities could 
review successful bids to improve their own future tenders. Transparency 
would reduce corruption96 by discouraging organized crime.  
Knowledgeable commentators have previously addressed the 
mechanics of the 2004 Directives, expressing concern that legislative 
reforms will not achieve simplification due to poorly drafted “clarifying” 
measures and complex provisions, which will delay the establishment of 
legal certainty.97 Within the context of flexibility, the growth and 
importance of public-private partnerships98 is discussed, as is the 
competitive dialogue, which permits procuring entities and those tendering 
to collaborate on certain aspects of contract requirements. For example, 
Sue Arrowsmith has concluded that flexibility is illusory; the reforms are 
merely tighter restrictions on current allowances that will, in practice, 
constrain Member States and move the system closer to common rules.99 
Christopher H. Bovis predicted that the competitive dialogue would only 
facilitate confusion, “compromising the competitiveness and integrity of 
the procedure”100 thus leaving the process vulnerable to the very 
manipulation it is supposed to prevent. 
The “dynamic purchasing system,” introduced to streamline 
procurement of standard purchases, did not impress Arrowsmith, who 
 
 
supra note 55, pmbl. §§ 12–15, 35, 37–38, and arts. 33, 35–36; 2004/17/EC, supra note 54, §§ 20–23, 
46–47, pmbl. and arts. 5–6, 11.  
 92. A discussion of the procedures (open, restricted, and negotiated) is outside the scope of this 
Article.  
 93. For award procedures, see generally Bovis, supra note 90, especially at 613–17. 
 94. See, e.g., 2004/18/EC, supra note 55, pmbl. §§ 40, 46; 2004/17/EC, supra note 54, pmbl. 
§§ 41, 55; and art. 53.  
 95. 2004/17/EC, supra note 54; 2004/18/EC, supra note 56, at ch. VI. 
 96. 2004/18/EC, supra note 55, pmbl. § 43, and art. 45; 2004/17/EC, supra note 54, pmbl. § 54. 
 97. Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 345; Bovis, supra note 90, at 629. 
 98. “IPPP are undertakings jointly held by public and private partners and are usually set up to 
provide services for the public, in particular at the local level.” Public Procurement: Commission 
Issues Guidance on Setting up Institutionalised Public-Private Partnerships (Feb. 18, 2008), available 
at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, reference “IP/08/252”). 
On Feb. 5, 2008, an Interpretative Communication was adopted on the founding of Institutionalised 
Public-Private Partnerships (IPPP), reflecting “the Commission’s commitment to provide legal 
guidance in the area of services of general interest as expressed in the Communication on services of 
general interest, including social services of general interest of 20 November 2007.” Current rules 
subject PPPs to varying Member State interpretations.  
 99. Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 359–65. 
 100. Bovis, supra note 90, at 614. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] CROSS-BORDER COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 391 
 
 
 
 
thought it procedurally cumbersome and likely to reduce rather than 
improve flexibility,101 so it would not be frequently used.102 Nor was 
Arrowsmith enthusiastic about e-procurement, predicting that Member 
States would have problems regulating electronic controls, which would 
adversely affect competition due to heavy compliance burdens for 
complex technical requirements.103 Phillip Rees considered e-procurement 
beneficial, and though he agreed with Arrowsmith that serious problems 
with data integrity and security remain unresolved, his overall forecast was 
more optimistic.104  
The upside of e-procurement is that it will revolutionize the entire 
process, permit efficient advertising of procurement and awards, facilitate 
data collection, and reduce transaction costs. A major downside is that the 
changeover to electronic systems that require high-tech upkeep is 
expensive. Thus FP7 will address integration and standardization of 
technology that could benefit procurement, especially e-procurement.105 
Solutions, however, will be costly.  
Whatever the cost, it is both necessary and worthwhile. Hayken’s thesis 
that research is industry-driven and will bond the EU to the private sector 
as institutions increasingly rely on it for technology solutions106 is 
realistic; it is economically pragmatic to leverage industry research 
whenever possible. Research, innovation, competition, public-private 
partnerships, procurement regulation, and e-procurement are essential to 
complete procurement modernization. Security and data issues will 
eventually be resolved. Therefore, the downsides of e-procurement will 
not outweigh its long-term capacity to enhance access, procedural 
 
 
 101. Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 361–62. 
 102. Sue Arrowsmith, Dynamic Purchasing Systems Under the New EC Procurement Directives—
A Not So Dynamic Concept, P.P.L.R., 2006, 1, 16–29. See id. at 18, 28–30. 
 103. Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 360. 
 104. Id. See also Phillip Rees, Once the E-procurement Process is Mastered, All Other E-
contracting Will Be a Breeze, C.T.L.R. 2006, 12(1), 1–4.  
 105. EUROPA, CORDIS, http://cordis.europa.eu/en/home.html (last visited June 6, 2008). Recent 
e-procurement initiatives are noted in Cyprus, Finland, Hungary and Slovakia. See COM (2006) 186, 
supra note 33, Annex at 33. Once again, it is clear that the new CPV Regulation, supra note 55, is a 
movement toward standardization that will benefit the Internal Market and facilitate the use of e-
procurement. See European Commission, Electronic Public Procurement, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/publicprocurement/e-procurement_en.htm (scroll down to “Feasibility Studies”). 
 106. Hayken, supra note 66, at 149. See also id. at 147–48. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
392 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:373 
 
 
 
 
flexibility, data collection, and transparency. It will improve the regime 
overall.107  
IV. A NOTE ON THRESHOLDS 
The 2004 Directives were meant to apply to public contracts above 
certain thresholds, as shown in Table 1.108 A broader scope is intended, 
however.  
TABLE 1: THRESHOLDS EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2008 
Procurement 
Directive 
Thresholds 
Public 
Works  
Supply Contracts (two 
thresholds depending on 
whether the contracting 
authority is a non-
central or central 
government authority, 
respectively) 
Public Services Contracts 
(two thresholds depending 
on whether the contracting 
authority is a non-central or 
central government 
authority, respectively) 
Public Entities 
 
€5,150,000 
(2008)109 
 
€133,000 (2008)110  
€206,000 (2008)  
€133,000 (2008)111 
€206,000 (2008) 
Utilities same €412,000 (2008)112 
 
€412,000 (2008)113 
 
Source: European Commission 
 
 
 107. In fact, anecdotal evidence already points to increasing reliance on e-procurement, and the 
improvement of quantity and quality of information over the past year from continual monitoring of 
the Commission’s SIMAP website, Gateway to European Public Procurement, which “provides access 
to most important information about public procurement in Europe,” http://simap.europa.eu/ 
index_en.html (last visited June 6, 2008). See more on SIMAP infra, at p. 397 and supra note 136. 
 108. The Table depicts new thresholds entered into force from January 1, 2008. See Threshold 
Regulation as amended, supra note 55.  
 109. The 2007 threshold was €5,278,000. Id. art. 2(a). 
 110. In 2008, thresholds decreased from €137,000 and €211,000 respectively from 2007 levels, 
depending on the contracting authority. Id. arts. 1(a) and 1(b). 
 111. Id. 
 112. The 2008 threshold reflects a decrease from €422,000 in 2007. Id. art. 1(a). 
 113. Id. 
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In August 2006, the Commission released an Interpretative 
Communication on low value contracts,114 which represent the majority of 
EU procurements (over ninety percent in some Member States115). The 
Communication sets forth that the ECJ’s standard for awarding public 
contracts is derived from the Treaty, and Member States are on notice that 
they may not circumnavigate transparency and non-discrimination 
principles by using contracts below the Directives’ established 
thresholds.116  
Therefore, while the 2004 legislation was adopted to improve 
transparency in procurement, close loopholes that had allowed 
discriminatory practices, and regulate procedures for awarding major 
public contracts in Member States,117 the ECJ will monitor lower-value 
contracts and take action—regardless of amount—on suspicion that large 
contracts have been intentionally fragmented in order to avoid thresholds. 
Moreover, the threshold for contract amounts decreased as of January 1, 
2008.118  
In summary, the legal basis for public procurement remains complex 
and must be considered subject to its dual legal levels: national law and 
the 2004 Directives.119 Member States may only promulgate national 
procurement laws to the extent that the Directives are not violated.120 
Siding with Arrowsmith, the 2004 Directives may not offer immediate 
relief in the form of simplicity and legal certainty in the procurement 
regime. Furthermore, additional procurement strengthening measures are 
necessary to implement the Lisbon Strategy and meet other EU 
objectives.121 However, ECJ oversight will facilitate procedural 
predictability, even if the result moves the process more toward a 
Community approach.  
 
 
 114. Commission Interpretative Communication, Community Law Applicable to Contract Awards 
Not or Not Fully Subject to the Provisions of the Public Procurement Directives, 2006 O.J. (C 179) 2. 
 115. Public Procurement: Commission Issues Guidance on How to Award Low-Value Contracts 
Fairly (July 24, 2006), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete 
database, reference “IP/06/1053”).  
 116. See supra note 114, at 179/3. 
 117. See Hayken, supra note 66, at 143.  
 118. See supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text. 
 119. Hayken, supra note 66, at 143. 
 120. Id.  
 121. COM (2006) 502, supra note 34, at 12; see COM (2006) 816, supra note 33, at 6, 10 
(referencing “smart procurement”), Annex at 27, 33. 
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V. THE STAKES 
Annually, public procurement sends billions of euros surging through 
the EU economy. However, precise figures remain elusive, and are likely 
higher than those reflected in statistical reports. For illustrative purposes, 
Table 2 is included below to highlight EU economic and procurement 
stakes. 
TABLE 2: ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Procurement Indicators 1994 1996 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 
# of EU Member States122 12  15  15 25 25 25 27 
Population (millions)123 348 373 380 459 461  464 495 
GDP (ECU or Euros) at 
current market prices124 
6.55 
trillion 
(ECU) 
6.77 
trillion 
(ECU)  
€9.35 
trillion 
€10.45 
trillion 
€10.85 
trillion 
€11.52 
trillion 
€12.3 
trillion 
% GDP attributable to 
procurement awards by 
utilities125 
11.2  11 16  16 16  16.3 16.3 (f)
 
 
 122. The twelve Member States in 1994 were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden joined by 1996. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in 2004. Romania and Bulgaria joined January 1, 2007. 
 123. See EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/history/1990-1999/index_en.htm (last visited June 6, 
2008). 1994 population figures, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/38/35267227.pdf; 1996–2007 figures, EUROPA’s Eurostat 
population tables, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (follow “Population and Social Conditions” 
hyperlink; then follow “Tables” hyperlink; then follow “Population” hyperlink; then follow “Total 
Population” hyperlink); Press Release, Eurostat, EU and Euro Area Enlargement on 1 January 2007 
(Dec. 1, 2006), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, 
reference “STAT/06/167”) (last visited June 6, 2008). 
 124. Green Paper, supra note 88 (see 1994 & 1996 GDP data). Remaining data from Eurostat 
2006–2007 Yearbook, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (follow link “Eurostat Yearbook” hyperlink; 
then follow “The Economy” hyperlink; then follow “National Accounts” hyperlink; then follow “GDP 
at Current Prices” hyperlink), and Press Release, Eurostat’s Euro-Indicators, Second Estimate for the 
Third Quarter of 2006 (Jan. 11, 2007), RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search 
complete database reference “STAT/07/5”) (reporting EU25 & EU27 Q3 GDP rose 0.6% from Q2). 
According to Euro-Indicators Press Release, First Estimates for the Third Quarter of 2007 (Nov. 30, 
2007), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, 
reference “STAT/07/164”), EU27 GDP grew by 0.8% from the previous quarter in 2007. “Compared 
with the third quarter of 2006, seasonally adjusted GDP rose by 2.7% in the euro area and by 2.9% in 
the EU27, after +2.5% and +2.8% respectively for the previous quarter.” Id. Comparing GDP changes 
between the Euro area and the EU27 is outside the scope of this Article. These figures are meant only 
for illustrative purposes to show growth trends in the value of procurement. 
 125. D. Redonnet & N. Bohan, E.U. Procurement Legislation: Does the Emperor Have Clothes? 
An Examination of the New Empirical Evidence, P.P.L.R. 1997, 4, 141–73, at 141; COM (98) 143, 
supra note 79, at 1. OECD/SIGMA, Sigma Policy Brief No. 3: Public Procurement (Dec. 1997), 
http://www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/47/20/35070324.htm, estimated Member States’ procurement at 
25–30% of public expenditure. Per 2004 PR, supra note 43, at 4, 16.3% was a stable figure for eight 
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Procurement Indicators 1994 1996 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Public procurement 
advertised in the Official 
Journal (as a % of total 
public procurement and as 
a % of GDP)126 
1.27 1.53 2.61 2.69 
(EU15) 
2.65 
(EU25) 
2.93  3.27 Not 
avail. 
Monetary value of 
procurement  
.72 
trillion 
(ECU) 
 1.08 
trillion 
(ECU) 
€1.50 
trillion 
€1.67 
trillion 
€1.74 
trillion 
€1.88 
trillion 
€2.00 
trillion 
(f) 
(f) = Data forecasted from sources: Various (e.g., OECD, Eurostat) 
 Over thirty percent of Member State public expenditures are allocated 
to purchase public necessities.127 Public expenditure therefore represents 
considerable economic clout, which will only strengthen as new Member 
States’ economies become more mature and the States themselves become 
more integrated within the Internal Market.128 The 2004 Directives are 
already useful guidance for these new Member States as they develop 
their individual systems and discharge their Treaty obligations concerning 
public procurement. Lithuania, for example, already implemented new 
measures in 2006 using public procurement as a catalyst for innovation.129  
 
 
years and is still used. Some EUROPA webpages have replaced 16% with 16.3%. See, e.g., 
http://europa.eu/publicprocurement/index_en.htm (last visited June 6, 2008); http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/publicprocurement/index_en.htm (last visited June 6, 2008). Therefore, 16.3% is used 
in Table 2 for 2006, and for 2007 forecasting. A discussion of individual Member State procurement is 
outside the scope of this Article, but see SIMAP website, National Procurement Databases and 
Tenders Electronic Daily (TED—see more on TED, infra at p. 397, and supra note 136), 
http://simap.europa.eu/supplier/national-procurement-databases_en.html (last visited June 6, 2008). 
See also SIGMA Paper No. 40, Central Public Procurement Structures and Capacity in Member 
States of the European Union, GOV/SIGMA (2007) 4 (Mar. 30, 2007); SIGMA Paper No. 41, Public 
Procurement Review and Remedies Systems in the European Union, GOV/SIGMA 5 (2007) (Apr. 6, 
2007). 
 126. See Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (follow “Economy and finance” hyperlink; then 
follow “Data” hyperlink; then follow “Government Statistics” hyperlink; then follow “Other 
Government Indicators” hyperlink; then follow “Value of Public Procurement Advertised (as a % of 
GDP)” hyperlink). Note: Enlargement from EU15 to EU25 occurred mid-year on May 1, 2004. See 
GDP 2006 Statistics Through 3Q 2007, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init= 
1&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=na010 (last visited June 4, 2008). 
 127. TRYBUS, supra note 39, at 1. The 30% allocation figure has remained constant since 1997. 
The EU27 is currently being studied.  
 128. While the economic impact resulting from activity in the new Member States is unknown 
(especially concerning collective security and defense activities), it is noteworthy that they are moving 
quickly to join the Eurozone. Slovenia introduced the euro on January 1, 2007; Cyprus and Malta 
adopted the currency on January 1, 2008. Slovakia is expected to join the Eurozone on Jan. 1, 2009. 
See EUROPA http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/the_euro/index_en.htm?cs_mid=2946 (last visited 
June 20, 2008). See Commission Communication, Sixth Report on the Practical Preparations for the 
Future Enlargement of the Euro Area, COM (2007) 756 final (Nov. 27, 2007). 
 129. COM (2006) 816, supra note 33, Annex at 28. 
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With rising EU GDP, economic efficiency will depend in part on a fair 
and transparent procurement framework to spread commercial 
opportunities among the widest range of entities. Procurement 
announcements, tenders, awards, and sanctions must be conducted 
consistent with free movement principles to encourage transparency. 
Without transparency, taxpayers’ losses are substantial.  
Hayken recognized that European agencies will depend on the private 
sector for contemporary solutions “in today’s technology-driven economy, 
where expertise and cutting-edge technology is often found more cheaply, 
more advanced, and in abundance in the commercial market” and that they 
will “take advantage of the private sector’s resources.”130 He further 
credits the Directives’ use of anti-discrimination principles to transform a 
loose association into an economic union.131 Contracting entities must be 
encouraged to work cross-border, dealing with different governments to 
generate economic interdependency and allow Europe to declare 
successful unification.132  
VI. CROSS-BORDER PROCUREMENT 
The significance of and need for cross-border public procurement 
legislation was apparent in the mid-1990s, when 110,000 contracting 
entities were letting contracts go above procurement thresholds without 
regulatory oversight.133 This figure is surely higher today, as markets are 
being pushed open and the EU Institutions are expanding their oversight 
with respect to the procurement process regardless of thresholds. Given 
new member accessions, EU GDP growth, the increase in procurement 
monitoring and activity, the Commission’s recent defense procurement 
Interpretative Communication,134 and proposed Defence Directives, as 
well as recent ECJ rulings with regard to thresholds,135 Member States 
would be imprudent to disregard the guidance offered by the 2004 
Directives, regardless of the intended procurement activity or the tender 
amount that will be proposed.  
 
 
 130. Hayken, supra note 66, at 149. See also COM (2006) 502, supra note 34, at 16. 
 131. Hayken, supra note 66, at 149. 
 132. Id. Hayken predicted that the status quo will guide the short-term due to the difficulty of 
identifying new unbiased contractors, especially in sophisticated or technical procurement contexts. Id. 
See also Defence Director, Sustainable Procurement Task Force, Procuring the Future, 4–7 (2005) 
[hereinafter “Defence Director”].  
 133. Redonnet, supra note 125, at 141.  
 134. IC296, supra note 5. 
 135. Commission Interpretative Communication, supra note 114.  
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Recent initiatives are clearly producing benefits. Table 2 shows that 
contract award notices (above thresholds) are more frequently published. 
Other initiatives, such as the Commission’s SIMAP Project,136 are 
developing the information infrastructure to support effective European 
public procurement by encouraging best practices in using electronic 
technology for procurement procedures. SIMAP’s aim is to provide 
accurate information on EU procurement opportunities and ensure the 
widest distribution among potential suppliers. The Project will eventually 
encompass the full spectrum of the procurement process.  
E-technology represents the future of EU procurement and increasing 
reliance on electronic procedures is evident. Consider that procurement 
notices are no longer available in printed format. The Tenders Electronic 
Daily (TED) is now the source for electronic versions of notices published 
in the Supplement to the Official Journal (O.J. S.) offering current 
procurement information on various types of EU procurement contracts.137 
In addition, the European Public Procurement Network (PPN) offers a co-
operative network of experts who promote problem-solving in cross-
border cases relating to public procurement and assist European 
companies with cross-border procurement procedures.138  
All aforementioned initiatives signal undeniable progress. The adoption 
of the 2004 Directives was credited with increased cross-border 
competition resulting in price convergence and price reduction.139 Public 
authorities now pay at least thirty percent less for goods and services.140 
 
 
 136. A detailed description of SIMAP is outside the scope of this Article. In summary, SIMAP is 
the Commission’s “Gateway to European Public Procurement.” The SIMAP “portal” was created to 
facilitate the procurement process electronically, is updated regularly, and may be accessed free of 
charge. It contains links to a full range of useful information for prospective bidders, including the 
latest European legislation on public procurement; codes and thresholds used in public procurement; 
official standard forms for sending notices to be published in the Supplement to the Official Journal 
(O.J. S.) as laid down in the European Directives; and links to national procurement databases, 
Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) (where tender notices are published), “e-notices” used to prepare 
public procurement announcements for publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, and 
“e-senders” to facilitate the submission of tender announcements. SIMAP, http://simap.europa.eu/ 
index_en.html (last visited June 6, 2008). 
 137. TED, http://simap.europa.eu/supplier/opportunities-in-europe_en.html (follow “TED 
website” hyperlink) (last visited June 6, 2008). 
 138. PPN (UK) Home, http://publicprocurementnetwork.org. PPN members are Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. See http://publicprocurementnetwork.org/c0.htm (last visited June 
10, 2008). The Commission, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, the European Investment Bank, and the 
OECD are observers. Id. 
 139. 2004 PR, supra note 43, at 2. 
 140. Id. at 2, 15, 24. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
398 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:373 
 
 
 
 
Considering that the study from which the savings figure was taken pre-
dated the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, and the fact that implementation of 
the 2004 legislative package is barely underway, further gains are easily 
envisaged.  
It will take time to gather and analyze viable market data to determine 
its impact on the Internal Market. One significant factor is that not all 
Member States have accurate procurement statistics, either historical or 
current, to report. In 2006, for example, Sweden was still using data from 
1998 and acknowledged that it had “no fully comprehensive statistics on 
public purchasing.”141  
Another factor is that some procurement stereotypes are credibly 
challenged. For example, in a 2004 survey, UK businesses reported their 
cross-border procurement experiences. Surprisingly, discrimination was 
not considered a public procurement problem; it was too difficult to 
prove.142 Where it did occur, it was unlikely to be challenged because 
tendering firms were more concerned with maintaining lasting 
relationships with public authorities.143 In addition, it was difficult to 
distinguish discrimination from normal problems inherent in doing 
business abroad.144 Discrimination was confused with cultural factors such 
as consumer preferences, which “no amount of regulatory harmonization 
will change.”145 Such confusion produces “gray areas” favoring local 
suppliers due to: close historical relations between the government and the 
supplier, false competition to drive down bidding costs when there is no 
intention to award contracts to a foreign supplier, splitting contracts into 
smaller tenders to avoid thresholds, and unique issues of defense.146  
Other problems concern conflicts between the 2004 legislation and 
national laws. Sweden,147 which supports procurement liberalization and 
based its Public Procurement Act on the 2004 Directives, is examining 
competitive changes to its procurement regime and is taking action in 
cases in which certain accepted national practices contravened the 
 
 
 141. Konkurrensverket, supra note 45, at 88. 
 142. UK OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT COMMERCE, INVESTIGATING UK BUSINESS EXPERIENCES OF 
COMPETING FOR PUBLIC CONTRACTS IN OTHER EU COUNTRIES 23 (Nov. 2004) (prepared by Alan 
Wood) [hereinafter “Wood”]. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 24. 
 145. Id. at 21. 
 146. Id. at 25–29. For a discussion of issues unique to the defense sector, see infra Part IX.  
 147. Sweden represents a good example, especially given its position as a top arms producer. See 
Frequently Asked Questions—New Commission Initiatives on More Open and Efficient Defence 
Procurement (Dec. 6, 2005), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search 
complete database, reference “MEMO/05/467”).  
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Directives.148 For example, Sweden allows public authorities to award 
contracts to their own production entities in situations similar to internal 
purchases—not technically legal under the 2004 Directives. The situation, 
comparable to an interrupted procurement, might result in damages for 
unsuccessful bidders. The Swedish Supreme Court then denied the tender 
firm the right to sue for costs of bid preparations, while the ECJ contrarily 
provides a cause of action.149 Thus, Sweden could not bring its 
procurement system in line with the EU’s until its Procurement Act was 
amended.  
Sweden resolved this inconsistency in 2007 when it successfully 
transposed 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC into two Swedish laws.150 Now, 
under Swedish procurement laws effective January 1, 2008, an 
unsuccessful tenderer has the right to sue for damages.151 From September 
1, 2007, Sweden placed its Competition Authority, rather than its Public 
Procurement Board, in charge of overseeing the application of the Public 
Procurement Act, and adopted a new strategy: “Welfare through well-
functioning markets.”152 The strategy addresses the issue of remedies and 
makes it clear that the Community path is the only one intended for 
Sweden.153 It will be interesting to see how Sweden will apply its new 
laws in light of its 2007 Competition Report released January 2008, stating 
that with respect to Swedish Procurement, “[t]hings are moving in the 
wrong direction.”154 
Notwithstanding the negative findings of this report, it is illustrative of 
the success of the 2004 liberalization—especially with respect to 
 
 
 148. Konkurrensverket, note 45, at 88. 
 149. Id. at 87–91, 93–94 and 109. Case C-92/00, Hospital Ingenieure Krankenhaustechnik 
Planungs-Gesellschaft mbH v. Stadt Wien, 2002 E.C.R. I-05553, summary ¶ 2. See also id. ¶¶ 42, 48, 
55, 64, 68, operative parts 1–3.  
 150. Lag om offentlig upphandling (Public sector) (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2007:1091) 
(Swed.); Lag om upphandling inom områdena vatten, energi, transporter och posttjänster (Svensk 
författningssamling [SFS] 2007:1092) (Swed.). 
 151. Under procurement law, but NOT Swedish competition law. Id. Personal Communication 
with Ammar Khan, Föredragande, Avdelning för offentlig upphandling (Feb. 13, 2008), regarding Lag 
(2007:1091) and Lag (2007:1092). 
 152. The Strategy of the Swedish Competition Authority and Its Direction for Procurement Issue 1 
(Sept. 2007) Dnr 488/2007, available at http://www.kkv.se/upload/Filer/ENG/Publications/ 
strategidok_eng.pdf. 
 153. Id. § 2.3 (providing for “means to demand compensatory damages via the public court.”). See 
also id. § 2.4. 
 154. Press Release, Swedish Competition Authority, Swedish Competition Authority on Public 
Procurement: “Things Are Moving in the Wrong Direction” (Jan. 9, 2008), http://www.kkv.se (follow 
“Press” hyperlink; then follow “Press releases” hyperlink). See also Konkurrensverkets rapportserie 
2007:4, 2008-01-09 Kohkurrensen & Svenge 2007 (available only in Swedish), http://www.kkv.se/ 
upload/Filer/Trycksaker/Rapporter/rap_2007-4.pdf. 
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transparency—in that countries like Sweden are not only scrutinizing their 
procurement regimes to identify and remove anti-competitive barriers and 
other obstacles, but they are also willing to publicize negative reports 
expeditiously.  
VII. DIRECT OR INDIRECT PROCUREMENT—THE DILEMMA OF OFFSETS 
Cross-border procurement is either “direct,” meaning that firms in one 
Member State bid for contracts in another, or “indirect,” meaning that an 
entity in one Member State bids for contracts through another entity—
such as a subsidiary—that is already established in the country in which 
the bid is taking place.155  
Historically, indirect procurement has been far more successful than 
direct procurement. This is especially true in the defense sector, where 
successful direct procurements are often secured using “offset” 
arrangements, which makes it more politically acceptable for a country to 
purchase sensitive and costly goods from a foreign supplier. Though a 
detailed discussion of offsets is not intended herein,156 offsets are an 
important consideration with respect to their economic and social 
implications in procurement, as well as their more direct application as a 
competition obstacle in creating an open market with respect to defense 
procurement.157  
The role of offsets is being reconsidered in Europe—by the 
Commission, the EDA, and the industry. The Commission has addressed 
them within the context of Article 296,158 and in the new Defence 
Package.159 In addition, the EDA has recently completed a comprehensive 
report on offsets.160 The United States is also concerned, as indicated in its 
own governmental report on offsets. Thus, one must be mindful of the 
 
 
 155. 2004 PR, supra note 43, at 8.  
 156. The intention is to flag the offset issue and identify current authority and recent research on 
the issue.  
 157. See generally Commission Green Paper on Defence Procurement, COM (2004) 608 final 
(Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter “Green Paper on Defence Procurement”]. See also id. § 2.3, at 5, § 3.2, at 
7. The Commission preferred the idea of gradual elimination of offsets when discussing a new legal 
instrument. Id. at 11. The 2007 Defence Communication states that “the ultimate aim is to create the 
market conditions, and the European DTIB structure, in which the practice will no longer be needed.” 
2007 Defence Communication, supra note 7, at 7.  
 158. IC296, supra note 5, at 8. See also infra note 345. 
 159. 2007 Defence Communication, supra note 7, at 7.  
 160. See generally E. ANDERS ERIKSSON ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF 06-DIM-022, STUDY ON THE 
EFFECTS OF OFFSETS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY AND MARKET (July 
12, 2007) [hereinafter “EDA Offset Report”] (report funded by the EDA). 
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importance of offsets within the context of U.S.-EU defense relations.161 
This issue is far from settled.  
Briefly, offsets are contractual conditions that link a foreign supplier to 
an economic condition that benefits the domestic industry of the 
prospective purchaser. They take many forms. They can be related to 
investments, requiring a foreign supplier to invest a certain percentage of 
the contract amount in the purchasing country; they can be tied to 
production, requiring the foreign entity to produce or assemble the product 
in the purchasing nation using a local subsidiary or a local 
subcontractor.162 Offsets can also be swap agreements, in which the parties 
agree to make a specified amount of purchases from each other’s 
suppliers, or they can be a pre-condition, a “pre-offset” requiring an 
investment to be made before a purchase agreement is concluded.163  
While one could argue that there are social benefits to domestic 
markets with offsets, the problem is that they mask the economic impact 
of direct procurements, and dilute transparency, especially when one 
considers that the value of an offset can be equal to or greater than one 
hundred percent of a contract’s order value. This creates a certain level of 
market distortion (or the appearance thereof).164  
Without offsets, direct procurement is not as successful as indirect 
procurement, as offset research indicates that the monetary value of offset 
agreements can be high. Though some have argued that these amounts are 
exaggerated,165 there are many examples to suggest that the amounts are in 
fact realistic. Recall the 1995 British Army procurement for the Apache 
AH Mk 1 Helicopter, a modified version of the WAH-64 Westland 
Apache Longbow Helicopters used by the U.S. Army. The AH Mk 1 
Programme was a project worth billions of pounds. The first helicopters 
entered into service in 2000, and a reported “50% of the components and 
 
 
 161. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, 
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES AND ECONOMIC SECURITY, OFFSETS IN DEFENCE TRADE (Dec. 
2007) (Twelfth Study Conducted Pursuant to Section 309 of the Defence Production Act of 1950, as 
amended); Appendix H: Interagency Team Progress Report on Consultation with Foreign Nations on 
Limiting the Adverse Effects of Offsets in Defence Procurement. See also id. at 139.  
 162. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Parliament’s Role in 
Defence Procurement 5 (Sept. 2006). 
 163. Id. See also EDA Offset Report, supra note 160. While the authors state in their summary 
that that the high amount of offsets is somewhat exaggerated, they admit that their offset data was 
“patchy and partly inconsistent,” id. at 3, underscoring the difficulty in obtaining data on this issue 
(and making it difficult to know to what extent offset amounts may be exaggerated) even when one 
knows where to look for it. Regardless, the fact that offsets influence procurement is undisputed and 
an important economic issue.  
 164. Green Paper on Defence Procurement, supra note 157, at 5. 
 165. EDA Offset Report, supra note 160, at 23. 
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ground support systems were to be built under license in the UK.”166 Even 
though the number of units was later reduced to 67,167 the economic 
impact is still significant. This underscores that the issue of offsets 
requires careful consideration if the procurement regime, especially with 
respect to cross-border procurements, is to be improved.  
In a 2004 report, the Commission considered cross-border procurement 
to be inadequate.168 However, notwithstanding that the indicators used in 
that report were gathered in 2002, they were sufficient to draw helpful 
conclusions. Fifty-four percent of all surveyed firms bid exclusively in 
their home markets; 46% of the surveyed firms participated in cross-
border procurement.169 Most firms bid through a subsidiary. Looking at 
the 46% active cross-border figures: 15% conducted direct procurement at 
home and abroad (without a subsidiary); 9% conducted domestic and 
foreign procurement directly and indirectly; 9% bid domestically and 
abroad using a subsidiary; 2% bid only on foreign contracts, directly or 
through a subsidiary; and 11% were foreign subsidiaries bidding 
exclusively in their domestic locale.170 Therefore, the use of subsidiaries 
was decisively a good strategy.171  
The relationship between local market integration and successful cross-
border public procurement is apparent, and local integration is necessary 
for many reasons. These include cultural and consumer preferences, which 
cannot be ignored when devising market strategies. Local business 
practices and language must also be considered, studied, and respected. 
Offsets must be examined and, if offered, must be arranged with respect to 
these variables. Yet overall, it appears that integration is most efficiently 
accomplished by establishing a local subsidiary, or through joint-ventures, 
distribution arrangements, or subcontracting to an established domestic 
firm.172  
 
 
 166. UK Army Website, Attack Helicopter FAQ, http://www2.army.mod.uk/aht/index.htm (last 
visited June 10, 2008) [hereinafter “UK Army FAQ”]; UK Army Homepage, http://www2.army. 
mod.uk/aht/faq_s.htm (last visited June 10, 2008).  
 167. UK Army FAQ, supra note 166. 
 168. 2004 PR, supra note 43, at 9. 
 169. Id. at 11. 
 170. Id.  
 171. However, one must still be mindful of the role of offsets when evaluating the utility of 
subsidiaries.  
 172. Wood, supra note 142, at 47–51; 2004 PR, supra note 43, at 9.  
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VIII. COMMENTARY 
The 2004 Directives’ influence on cross-border procurement should 
reward the taxpayer handsomely as their cost savings are potentially 
enormous. In 2004, estimates indicated that if Member States saved 10% 
of procurement expenditures, some State deficits would become surpluses, 
and not a single Eurozone Member State would run a deficit breaking 3%. 
Ten percent was actually considered a conservative savings.173 In fact, the 
UK expects to save £21.5 billion annually by 2007-2008 through efficient 
public sector spending.174  
Yet, Alan Wood provides strong evidence that the 2004 Directives are 
not a panacea since many undertakings did not find procurement rules to 
be overly problematic. Respondents to Wood’s survey referred to the rules 
as “enablers,” and though helpful, they were not “a magic solution for 
achieving a unified EU marketplace.”175 Therefore, one can logically 
support the premise that change will come from other sources, perhaps 
less from the new procurement regime and more through litigation and 
jurisprudence.176 However, that is not to say that the Commission will be 
idle with regard to promoting change intended to influence and upgrade 
the process. Quite the contrary. A clear example of this was the 2007 
Procurement Guide, which aimed at promoting procurement as an 
innovation driver.177  
The Treaty’s fundamental freedoms thus become that much more 
relevant to the overall goal of achieving a competitive and unified Internal 
Market. Members of industry believe that improvements to the public 
procurement regime are most likely to occur by encouraging sound 
business strategies rather than specifically-targeted procurement 
initiatives. Efforts should therefore include developing best business 
practices, cultivating political will,178 and strengthening industrial policy, 
 
 
 173. 2004 PR, supra note 43, at 5–6 n.6 (note that statistics from DG Internal Market were from 
2002). 
 174. UK Office of Government Commerce (OGC), Procurement, http://www.ogc.gov.uk/ 
procurement.asp (last visited June 6, 2008). 
 175. Wood, supra note 142, at 17–20. 
 176. Bovis, supra note 90, at 631. 
 177. COM (2006) 502, supra note 34, at 12, 17; COM (2006) 816 Annex, supra note 33, at 27. 
See also The 2007 Guide, supra note 38. For more discussion of the 2007 Procurement Guide, see 
supra pp. 382–83. Many initiatives are mentioned throughout this Article. The Defence Package 
reflects movement toward a stronger procurement regime. Activities such as the public consultation 
currently underway via the Commission’s Innovation Policy are also indicative of greater attention. 
See European Commission, Public Procurement, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/public 
procurement/index_en. htm. 
 178. Wood, supra note 142, at 31. 
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especially where industries rely significantly on support from sub-
contractors and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).179 The key to 
building cross-border competition is to align with a target market, 
establish foothold strategies to infiltrate, and integrate local markets by 
establishing domestic presence through, inter alia, subsidiaries.180 This is 
especially true in the unique context of defense, where successful cross-
border competition requires both an understanding of the historical aspects 
of procurement and sensitive national sovereignty issues concerning 
defense and national security.  
IX. THE UNIQUE CONTEXT OF DEFENSE 
Historically, the EU was established as an economic entity, but 
Member State national security remains fundamentally entwined with 
Treaty commercial objectives and cannot be disregarded.181 The Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) established a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), “which might in time lead to a common defence.”182 
Removing European defense from the U.S.-dominated “NATO 
monopoly,”183 however, was a long-debated process due to Member 
States’ unwillingness to cede defense sovereignty.184  
At the 1999 European Council, Member States officially announced 
that the EU would have “the necessary means and capabilities” for a 
common European security and defense policy to take “autonomous 
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use 
them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” 
 
 
 179. SMEs are outside the scope of this Article, but feature prominently in 
innovation/procurement issues. The Commission seeks to improve SME access to procurement 
opportunities and ease administrative burdens that plague SMEs and limit their Internal Market 
participation. See COM (2006) 816, supra note 33, at 3–4, 6, 10, and Annex at 21, 23, 27, 33, 36, 37–
38; COM (2006) 689, supra note 59. See generally id. at 7.  
 180. COM (2006) 816, supra note 33, Annex at 34–35. 
 181. Martin Trybus, Case Comment on the Application of the E.C. Treaty to Armament, 25 E.L. 
REV. 663, 663 (2002).  
 182. The Treaty on European Union art. B, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253 
[hereinafter “TEU”]. Detailed discussion of CFSP is outside the scope of this Article. Note that the 
TEU will be amended if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1.  
 183. NATO stands for North Atlantic Treaty Organization. European Union Institute for 
Securities Studies (EUISS), ESDP: An Overview 1 (Apr. 16, 2004) (prepared by Jean-Yves Haine), 
http://www.eupt-kosovo.eu/training/material/docs/esdp/reading_material/ESDP_an_overview_by_JY_ 
Haine_ISS.pdf (last visited June 7, 2008).  
 184. ESDP has actually been in “gestation” for fifty years. See generally DEFENDING EUROPE: 
THE EU, NATO AND THE QUEST FOR EUROPEAN AUTONOMY 221 (Jolyon Howarth & John T.S. 
Keeler eds., 2003) (ESDP definition). See also Andrew Cox, The Future of European Defence Policy: 
The Case for a Centralised Procurement Agency, P.P.L.R. 1994, 2, 65–86, 76.  
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without prejudice to actions by NATO.185 With that, the European defense 
identity became “a European security and defence policy” (ESDP).186  
An ESDP requires a competitive defense industry,187 to be established 
through a European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) to strengthen 
industrial competitiveness, allocate defense resources efficiently, and 
develop military capabilities.188 EDEM was complementary to EU Internal 
Market needs, “including the Lisbon targets” and a common approach to 
dynamic industry “to sustain and increase its prosperity while meeting its 
wider social, environmental and international ambitions.”189 A sustainable 
and dynamic EDEM required effective procurement mechanisms to 
facilitate cross-border commercial and economic opportunities.190  
Further, EDEM would allow national governments to procure 
necessities to meet physical protection requirements and pursue the 
national interest of the State both internally and in relation to their Treaty 
responsibilities to protect the Community.191 Although a majority of 
Europeans support a common defense policy,192 Member State 
governments have historically failed to develop competitive defense 
 
 
 185. Joint Declaration on European Defense, issued at the British-French Summit, St. Malo, 
December 3–4, 1998, ¶ 2, available at http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration 
%20Text.html. For background on the development of security and defense policy, see Press Release, 
European Council, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Declaration of the European 
Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence (June 3, 1999), 
http://www.basicint.org/europe/ESDP/0699-PR_EUdefpol.htm (last visited June 7, 2008). 
 186. Detailed discussion of ESDP is outside the scope of this Article. See generally Haine, supra 
note 183, at 1–4. Though technically speaking, the European defense identity was a NATO model 
while ESDP was the EU equivalent. NATO Handbook (2001), available at http://www.nato.int/ 
docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm (last visited June 6, 2008).  
 187. EUROPA, DG Enterprise and Industry, Defence Industries (May 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enterprise/defence/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).  
 188. Commission Communication, The Challenges Facing the European Defence-Related 
Industry: A Contribution for Action at European Level, 4 COM (96) 10 final (Jan. 24, 1996). See also 
Aris Georgopoulos, The Commission’s Green Paper on Defence Procurement, P.P.L.R 2005, 2, 
NA34-38, 34.  
 189. European Defence—Industrial and Market Issues Towards an EU Defence Equipment 
Policy, COM (2003) 113 final 7 (Mar. 11, 2003) (emphasis added).  
 190. EUROPEAN UNION INST. FOR SECURITIES STUDIES (EUISS), Occasional Paper 57, THE 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 3, 11–16 (Apr. 2005) 
(prepared by Wolfgang Wagner).  
 191. Trybus, supra note 181. 
 192. Eurobarometer, Support for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Is Reinforced, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/notes/csf_pesc_papr03_en.pdf (last visited June 10, 2008).  
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procurement,193 an interesting contrast between what citizens want and 
what their governments will accept.194 
Defense procurement refers lato sensu to acquisition by defense sector 
authorities of goods and services needed to perform their duties, ranging 
from paperclips, furniture, and cleaning services, to tanks, submarines, and 
aircraft.195 Stricto sensu, it is the acquisition of armaments: “hard defense” 
items intended strictly for war-like purposes.196 Dual-use items, in 
contrast, are goods, software, and technology with both civilian and 
military applications.197  
While “hard defense” items are easily identified with respect to their 
potential use, new technology is far more complicated; much of the 
innovation produced today can be manufactured and designated as dual-
use items.198 In the context of technology associated with defense 
procurement, this dual nature creates problems for Member States, 
especially concerning the application of Article 296.199 Therefore, the path 
to EDEM is constantly muddied by overlapping security, defense, and 
socio-economic factors, including competition objectives, maintaining 
security of supply,200 and the drive to achieve technological advantage 
over competitors as authorities consider “the wider diffusion of military 
and some commercial technologies in the name of national defence.”201  
 
 
 193. COM (2003) 113, supra note 189, at 3.  
 194. The UK increased web communications in 2007 and will further improve public outreach, 
believing both are useful tools to monitor public interest on defense matters. UKHC, DEFENCE 
COMMITTEE, THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE IN 2005 AND 2006 (Fifth Report of Session 2006–2007) 
H.C. 233, 15, 22 (Jan. 22, 2007). Furthermore, the report mentions the UKHC’s intention to review 
NATO’s role in “UK and European defence, and whether NATO has a viable long-term future.” Id. at 
21. 
 195. Dr. Aris Georgopoulos, Cicero Foundation, Lecturer in European Law at the University of 
Dundee, European Defence Procurement Integration: How to Handle Article 296 EC (Dec. 2005). 
 196. Id. 
 197. COM (2003) 113, supra note 189, at 15 (citing Setting up a Community Regime for the 
Control of Exports of Dual-Use Items and Technology, Regulation 1334/2000, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 
159) 1). 
 198. European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry, Intra-Community Transfers of Defence 
Products: Final Report of the Study, Assessment of Community Initiatives Related to Intra-community 
Transfers of Defence Products 11 (2005) [hereinafter “UNISYS”] (final report released Feb. 2007).  
 199. For a discussion of the application of Article 296, see infra Parts XI–XIII. 
 200. The supply chain is critical to EDEM, but security of supply is outside the scope of this 
Article. The EDA Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain was approved May 15, 2006, to improve 
transparency and competitive procurement opportunities, when Article 296 is invoked, at the second- 
and third-tier sub-contracting levels. Aris Georgopoulos, The EDA, The New Code of Best Practice in 
the Supply Chain, P.P.L.R. 2006, 5, NA145-149, 148.  
 201. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS), EUROPEAN DEFENSE 
INTEGRATION: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES 74 (Oct. 2005). See also 
Wagner supra note 190, at 11; Eurobarometer, supra note 192. Some sources suggest that European 
support for CFSP/ESDP is stronger in contexts of conflict-prevention, mediation, and humanitarian 
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X. THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE  
In the larger picture, “[w]orld military expenditure is estimated to have 
been $1339 billion in 2007—a real-terms increase of 6 per cent over 2006 
[$1204 billion] and of 45 per cent since 1998.”202 
Cumulatively, EU Member States comprise the second largest military 
force in the world, with 2.4 million troops and civilians.203 Consequently, 
EU operational and procurement needs are enormous and long-lasting in 
the defense sector. Note, for example, that “[e]quipment often consists of 
new systems which incorporate both military and civilian technologies . . . 
[with] long life cycle[s]: the time between the expression of an operational 
need and the end of a system’s life may be as long as 50 years.”204 Thus it 
is not difficult to see that a well-functioning defense economy with “spin-
 
 
aid—social, not defense—contexts). EUROPEAN UNION @ UNITED NATIONS, KEEPING THE PEACE AND 
PREVENTING CONFLICT (May 1, 2004), available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/documents/ 
infopack/en/EU-UNBrochure-5_en.pdf (last visited June 29, 2008). For more information on conflict 
prevention, see id. at 5 and Jim Cloos, EU-UN Co-operation on Crisis Management, ESDP Newsletter 
#3, Jan. 2007, at 15, available at http://consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDP_3_final.pdf 
(concentrating “on crisis management, one of the most important and promising areas of EU-UN co-
operation”). See generally Wagner, supra note 190 (concerning public support of ESDP).  
 202. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Recent Trends in Military 
Expenditure, http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_trends.html; Petter Stålenheim, Catalina 
Perdomo & Elisabeth Sköns, SIPRI, SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (2008), at 10, available at http://www.sipri.org/contents/editors/YB08 
(download “Yearbook summary” and follow link to “5. Military expenditure”) (last visited June 10, 
2008) [hereinafter “SIPRIYB2008”]. In 2007, “[t]he USA’s military spending accounted for 45 per 
cent of the world total . . . followed by the UK, China, France and Japan, with 4–5 per cent each.” Id. 
Note that from 2006 to 2007, China surpassed France and Japan. Compare id. with Petter Stålenheim, 
Catalina Perdomo & Elisabeth Sköns, SIPRI, SIPRI YEARBOOK 2007: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT 
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, (2007) at 11, available at http://yearbook2007.sipri.org/ (download 
“Yearbook summary”). “China has increased its military spending threefold in real terms during the 
past decade. However, due to its rapid economic growth, the economic burden of military spending is 
still moderate, at 2.1 per cent of GDP.” SIPRIYB2008 at 11. In 2007 15 countries with the highest 
military expenditure accounted for 83 percent of total world military expenditure. Id. 
Military spending is rising rapidly in the South Caucasus . . . [and] [t]he number of countries 
that increased their military spending in 2007 was higher than in recent years. The factors 
driving increases in world military spending include countries’ foreign policy objectives, real 
or perceived threats, armed conflict and policies to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping 
operations, combined with the availability of economic resources.  
Id. 
 203. EUROPA, European Defence Agency (EDA), http://www.eda.europa.eu/Default.aspx 
(follow “Defence Facts” hyperlink) (last visited June 7, 2008), European Defence Expenditures for 
2005 [hereinafter “EDE2005-20/11/2006”], National Defence Expenditures for 2005 [hereinafter 
“NDE2005-24/01/2007”], European Defence Expenditures for 2006 [hereinafter “EDE2006-
19/11/2007”], and National Defence Expenditures for 2006 [hereinafter “NDE2006-21/12/2007”]. 
 204. Green Paper on Defence Procurement, supra note 157, at 5.  
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off” benefits of technology development, employment, and exports would 
lend a significant boost toward Lisbon Strategy goals.205  
Tracking European defense spending for purposes of establishing a 
baseline for budgetary projections and defense and security needs is far 
more complicated in light of the dynamic nature of the EU’s institutional 
framework, and the concept of economic unity which joins together EU 
Member State economies. Tracking defense spending trends is a recent 
occurrence. In fact, the EDA’s comprehensive data on defense 
expenditures for its participating Member States, published for 2006, was 
only the second such collection.206 Slowly, the various stakeholders are 
gathering the tools that will be necessary and useful for the future, and 
data collection is a critical starting point to ensure the availability of 
consistent, reliable, and accessible defense expenditure figures. 
The EDA, though providing a caveat to the reliability of its defense 
statistics, reported that in 2005 the 24 EDA participating Member States 
(pMS) spent €193 billion on defense, constituting 1.81% of their 
combined €10.6 trillion economies.207 In 2006, two additional Member 
States became EDA participants. The total defense expenditures for 2006 
in those 26 EDA participating Member States208 was reported at €201 
billion, 1.78% of the GDP of their combined €11.3 trillion economies, and 
3.80% of defense expenditure as a percentage of government 
expenditure.209  
Furthermore, the top six defense spenders among EDA participants in 
2006 were (in rank order): the UK (€47.31 billion), France (€43.46 
billion), Germany (€30.36 billion), Italy (€26.63 billion), Spain (€11.51 
billion), and the Netherlands (€8.15 billion).210 In 2006, total defense 
procurement was estimated at €29.1 billion.211 The top EDA defense-
procuring countries (in rank order) were: the UK (€7.513 billion) France 
 
 
 205. See Commission Communication, Security Research: The Next Steps, at 3, 7, 10 COM 
(2004) 590 final (Sept. 7, 2004). 
 206. EDA, supra note 203. 
 207. EDE2005-20/11/2006 and NDE2005-24/01/2007, supra note 203.  
 208. All Member States except Denmark are EDA pMSs (participating Member States). See EDA, 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/Default.aspx (last visited June 10, 2008). 
 209. NDE2006-21/12/2007, supra note 203, at 3–5 (Tables: European Defence Spending in 2006, 
European Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP in 2006, and European Defence Expenditure 
as a Percentage of Total Government Expenditure in 2006).  
 210. Id. at 3 (Table: European Defence Spending in 2006). 
 211. EDE2006-19/11/2007, supra note 203, at 7 (Table: Collaboration-Defence Equipment 
Procurement). 
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(€6.321 billion), Germany (€3.698 billion), Spain (€2.343 billion), Italy 
(€2.099 billion), and Greece (€1.5 billion).212  
Though these figures are meant to be illustrative only—and 
disregarding any statistical variations in reporting—the defense market’s 
value to the EU economy is highly significant and growing. Yet it is 
important to consider that most European defense economic activities 
occur in six major arms-producing countries: the UK, France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, and Sweden, which accounted for 85% of EU defense 
spending and 90% of EU industrial capability.213 All but Sweden are 
among the world’s top fifteen defense spenders.214 The UK ranked second 
after the United States, accounting for 5% of global military spending.215  
In the UK for example, defense generates “high-value employment, 
technology innovation and exports.”216 In 2006, the defense sector 
accounted for nearly £16 billion of expenditures and employed 310,000 
persons.217 It represented 3% of the UK’s manufacturing output.218 “The 
 
 
 212. NDE2006-21/12/2007, supra note 203, at 11 (Table: European Defence Equipment 
Procurement in 2006).  
 213. Commission Communication, Results of the Consultation Launched by the Green Paper on 
Defence Procurement and on the Future Commission Initiatives, COM (2005) 626 final 2 (Dec. 6, 
2005); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 147; see NDE2006-21/12/2007, supra note 203. 
Although it is important to note which countries have the highest levels of defense expenditure but do 
not rank as the highest in terms of arms production, as indicated at supra notes 209 and 210 and 
accompanying text. The new Defence Communication reconfirms, as of its release in December 2007, 
that “[a]lthough defence production is concentrated in six Member States (Germany, Spain, France, 
Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom), companies producing ancillary equipment and systems can be 
found all over Europe. However, on average, Member States spend almost 85% of their equipment 
budget domestically.” COM (2007) 764 final, supra note 7, at 4.  
 214. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The 15 Major Spender Countries 
in 2007, http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf (last visited June 10, 
2008) (listing the fifteen countries with the highest military expenditure in 2007). 
 215. Id. See also UK Defence Statistics (UKDS) 2007, http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/ukds/ 
2007/c1/sec5intro.html (last visited June 6, 2008). 
 216. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (UKMOD), DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY (2002) (Paper No. 5), 
at 7.  
 217. UKDS, UK Defence Statistics 2007 (2007), http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/ukds/2007/ 
ukds.html (follow hyperlinks to “Chapter 1, Finance”, then “Introduction,” and “Industry and 
Employment—Notes and Key Trends”). “In 2006/07, the MOD spent some [£] 16.0 billion with UK 
Industry.” Id. at Intro. “Estimated employment in UK industry and commerce dependent on MOD 
expenditure and defence exports remained constant at around 310,000.” Id at Industry and 
Employment—Notes and Key Trends. For more detailed employment statistics, see id. and follow the 
link to “Chapter 1”, then “Table 1.10—Estimated UK Employment Dependent on MOD Expenditure 
and Defence Exports” (last visited June 6, 2008). See also UKMoD, Defence Contracts Bulletin, 
http://www.contracts.mod.uk/introduction/index.shtml (stating that “[the UK]MoD spends over £16 
billion annually on a wide range of products and services, making it the number one customer for UK 
industry,” and that “[i]n 2006, the MoD placed over 27,000 contracts in order to satisfy the 
requirements of its worldwide operations and the needs of its 250,000 service personnel”).  
 218. Defence Director, supra note 132, at 4. The statistics here are for illustrative purposes only. 
The numbers vary among sources reviewed. This source states that in 2004, the industry employed 
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UK’s defence manufacturing sector alone generates annual exports worth 
around £5 billion and sustains an estimated 50,000 jobs.”219 Defense 
equipment procurement in 2005–2006 accounted for £5.9 billion.220 In 
December 2006, the UK’s Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) 
reportedly managed 500 equipment projects valued at £75 billion.221 The 
European aerospace and defense sector, which covers over 2,000 
aeronautics, space, and defense companies; 80,000 related Member State 
suppliers; and over 600,000 employees, reported turnover exceeding €110 
billion.222 While the majority of European defense spending officially 
occurs in six Member States, free movement assures that an untracked 
multitude of SMEs and sub-contractors generate business throughout the 
EU. Their contributions should become evident as e-tracking methods 
become more integrated and reliable, and if cross-border subsidiaries and 
procurement partnerships become more the norm.  
At present, however, European defense is still characterized by huge 
economic and political inefficiencies. Among the political inefficiencies is 
corruption. Several analyses noted that defense is especially vulnerable to 
corruption due to excessive secrecy of its technical and commercial 
aspects under national security justifications. A 2002 study attributed 50% 
of all bribery complaints to the defense sector,223 making it the second 
most corrupt international sector after public works/construction.224  
 
 
340,000, and defense exports from the UK were $8.2 billion (USD)—second only to the United States. 
See also Lord Bach, Parliamentary Under Sec. of State, UKMoD, Defence Contracts Bulletin Feature 
Report, Defence Globalisation Presents Opportunity for UK (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://www. 
contracts.mod.uk/dc/pdfs/V1e24/LordBachfeature.pdf (last visited June 29, 2008).  
 219. Press Release, UK Trade & Investment (UKTI), New UK Trade & Investment Defence & 
Security Organisation (Apr. 1, 2008), available at http://www.newsroom.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/ 
index.asp?PageID=2&PressReleaseID=944 (last visited June 29, 2008) (“UKTI is the UK 
Government’s international business development organisation, supporting businesses seeking to 
establish in the UK and helping UK companies grow internationally.”). 
 220. UKHC, DEFENCE COMMITTEE, DEFENCE PROCUREMENT 2006: FIRST REPORT OF SESSION 
2006–07, 5 (Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ 
cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/56/56.pdf. See also DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AGENCY, ANNUAL 
REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2005–06, H.C. (2005–06) 1164, 21.  
 221. DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AGENCY, supra note 220. In April 2007, the Defence Procurement 
Agency and the Defence Logistics Organisation merged to form Defence Equipment and Support 
(DE&S) with a staff of “29,000 and a budget of £16 billion—43% of the [UK] defence budget.” 
UKHC, DEFENCE COMMITTEE, DEFENCE EQUIPMENT 2008, TENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2007–08, 3 
(Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/ 
295/295.pdf (last visited June 29, 2008). See generally id. for current information on UK procurement 
programs and trends.  
 222. AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION OF EUROPE (ASD), ANNUAL REVIEW 
2005, 8, http://asd-europe.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 223. TRADE PROMOTION CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE, THE NATIONAL EXPORT STRATEGY: 
WORKING FOR AMERICA 11 (2000), http://ita.doc.gov/media/nesonline.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 224. Transparency Int’l (TI), Bribe Payers Index 2002, http://www.transparency.org/global_ 
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Bribery is responsible for wasteful military expenditure225 accounting 
for approximately 15% of total weapons acquisition spending.226 It also 
compromises procurement integrity and makes citizens suspicious about 
procurement activity. One of every two citizens believes that corruption 
influences procurement awards.227 Fifty-four percent of citizens attribute 
most corruption to organized crime.228 Seventy-six percent of citizens 
believe cross-border and organized crime should be addressed by 
enhancing policies at the EU-level.229 As the distribution of goods is 
directly linked to defense policy—defense protects economic 
infrastructure as necessary for free movement of goods and services230—
EU initiatives targeting corruption will have a positive impact on the 
larger economy. 
Key among the economic inefficiencies of the defense sector are 
protectionist industrial policies such as subjective Member State 
declarations of sole-source contracting needs and seemingly boundless 
extensions of “national interests” in questionable defense deals. A prime 
example is the 2006 agreement between UK defense giant BAE Systems 
and Saudi Arabia for the Saudi purchase of seventy-two Tornado and 
 
 
priorities/public_contracting/key_sectors/arms_trade (follow “2002 Bribe Payers Index” hyperlink; 
then follow “bpi 2002” hyperlink; then follow “complete report BPI 2002” hyperlink) (last visited 
June 10, 2008). It is still a contemporary headliner globally. See Ran Dagoni, Bribery Probe 
Jeopardizes $2b India Defense Deal, GLOBES ONLINE (June 5, 2008), available at http://www.globes. 
co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000349184&fid=942, and the recent scandals involving BAE 
Systems (discussed infra notes 231–40 and accompanying text). See also David Gow, EADS Recovery 
Blown off Course, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Apr. 3, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/ 
2008/apr/03/theairlineindustry1; Nicola Clark & Katrin Bennhold, Charges of Insider Trading at 
EADS Stir Outrage, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE ONLINE, Oct. 4, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ 
2007/10/04/business/eads.php. 
 225. See generally Sanjeev Gupta, Luz de Mello & Raju Sharan, Corruption and Military 
Spending (International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper No. 00/23, 2000).  
 226. Id. at 4 & n.6. In 2006, two anti-corruption initiatives were noteworthy. First, the Defence 
Manufacturers Association (DMA) and the Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC) formed 
the UK Defence Industries Anti-Corruption Forum. See Joint Press Release, DMA-SBAC, UK 
Defence Industry Makes Commitment to Anti-Corruption Objectives (July 13, 2006), available at 
http://www.sbac.co.uk/community/cms/content/preview/news_item_view.asp?i=11436&t=0 (last 
visited June 10, 2008). Second, ASD created an international industry working group to cover 
European defense companies’ national defense associations. See Press Release, ASD, European 
Aerospace and Defence Industry Takes the Fight Against Competition to the Next Level (July 14, 
2006).  
 227. Eurobarometer, Opinions on Organised, Cross-Border Crime and Corruption 8 (Mar. 2006) 
(special Eurobarometer), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_245_sum_en.pdf (last 
visited June 10, 2008).  
 228. Id. at 12. 
 229. Id.  
 230. See ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, SECURITY RESEARCH IN EUROPE—REPLY 
TO THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL 5 (June 19, 2006) (Document A/1931). 
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thirty Hawk warplanes worth an estimated £43 billion to BAE.231 UK 
fraud investigators from Britain’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) were 
looking into allegations of bribery and slush-fund spending on the 
project—including alleged luxury car perks—meant to facilitate the 
deal.232 However, in December 2006, the SFO Director halted the 
investigation claiming that the non-competitive and secretive deal was 
vital to UK national interests233 (notwithstanding its curious 
circumstances). At the time, Tony Blair justified the closure of the case, 
stating that an investigation “would lead to . . . the complete wreckage of a 
relationship that is of fundamental importance of [sic] the security of this 
country, to the state of the Middle East, and to our relationship with 
countries in the Middle East.”234 Yet reports suggested some measure of 
credibility to allegations that the agreement, dating back to 1985 in its 
various phases, resulted in an alleged £1 billion of kickbacks to Saudi 
Prince Bander, a former Ambassador to the United States.235  
Yet the case continues. The termination of the BAE investigation 
attracted international public attention, proving that even a sovereign 
declaration of “national interest” to prevent “wreckage of a relationship”236 
was insufficient to shield a suspect defense procurement from public 
accountability.  
The OECD’s Working Group on Bribery, the United States Department 
of Justice, and the British courts are now investigating the circumstances 
of Al Yamamah,237 so, ironically, the United States has input into the 
scope of “national interests” in EU defense procurement.238 On April 10, 
 
 
 231. David Leigh & Rob Evans, BAE Accused of Secretly Paying £1bn to Saudi Prince, THE 
GUARDIAN, June 7, 2007, available at http://guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/07/bae1. The deal, known 
as the Al Yamamah arms deal, had several phases and dated back to 1985. Id. BAE is the “third largest 
global defence company.” BAE Systems, Fact Sheets, http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/ 
FactSheets/index.htm. 
 232. Numerous sources have reported the history and details of Al Yamamah. See, e.g., 
UNICORN (United Against Corruption), BAE and the Al Yamamah Arms Contract with Saudi 
Arabia, http://www.againstcorruption.org/briberycase.asp?id=781.  
 233. See UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) http://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/2006_2007/ 
sectionone_02.asp (scroll down to “BAe Systems plc”). 
 234. Blair: BAE Investigation Would Have ‘Wrecked’ UK, POLITICS.CO.UK, June 13, 2007, 
available at http://www.politics.co.uk/news/foreign-policy/middle-east/middle-east/blair-bae- 
investigation-would-have-wrecked-uk-$474784.htm (last visited June 6, 2008). 
 235. Id. See UNICORN, supra note 232. 
 236. See supra note 234.  
 237. OECD, OECD to Conduct a Further Examination of UK Efforts Against Bribery, Mar. 14, 
2007, http://www.oecd.org (follow “News Releases” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).  
 238. See Associated Press, BAE Says U.S. is Investigating Dealings with Saudi Arabia, INT’L 
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 26, 2007; BBC News, US to Probe BAE Over Corruption, June 26, 2007, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6239918.stm (last visited Apr. 5, 2008); Court to 
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2008, the UK High Court ruled that “the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) acted 
unlawfully by dropping the corruption inquiry.”239 The issue has been 
appealed to the House of Lords, Britain’s highest court.240 Right or wrong, 
the incident flags the political subjectivity with which the limits of 
“national interests” are determined. The public outcry over the matter 
demonstrates that the citizen is becoming more influential and demands 
for accountability will be recognized.  
Other defense inefficiencies are glaring. The EDA estimated that in 
2006, European countries spent 55% of their total defense expenditures on 
personnel and 21.6% on operations and maintenance, a category that 
includes crisis management operations, known to consume huge defense 
budgetary resources.241 With investment at 19.4% in 2006, and only 4% in 
an “Other” expenditures category from which to shift any funds to 
capability development, there is limited potential to increase investment.242  
Thus, although the head of EDA and High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, as well as the EDA 
Steering Board have been supportive of collaborative ways to encourage 
members to spend more, spend better, and spend together on defense, it is 
difficult to “translate these words into deeds.”243  
However, in November 2007, the EDA established benchmarks as a 
preliminary step towards increasing levels of defense spending and 
encouraging collaborative spending initiatives.244 The results will be 
 
 
Study BAE Fraud Decision, BBC.COM, Nov. 9, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
business/7086997.stm (last visited June 10, 2008). 
 239. UK Wrong to Halt Saudi Arms Probe, BBC.COM, Apr. 10, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/business/7339231.stm. 
 240. For the current status, see various recent articles at UNICORN, supra note 232.  
 241. EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY, EDA BULLETIN 7 (Jan. 2008) (issue 7) [hereinafter “EDA 
2008 Bulletin”]. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 7. These popular and oft-cited comments were originally attributed to a speech given by 
Javier Solana. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign & Security Policy & 
Head of EDA, Speech at the EDA R&T Conference, Research and Technology: An Imperative for 
European Defence (Brussels, Feb. 9, 2006) [hereinafter “Solana Speech”]. 
 244. EDA Bulletin, supra note 241, at 3. There are some examples of collaborative spending such 
as the A400M Programme, whereby eight European air forces cooperated for a new generation 
military airlifter. However, this has recently been delayed again. See Airbus Military, A Partnership 
Without Precedent, http://www.airbusmilitary.com/commitment.html (last visited June 7, 2008). See 
also Airbus Military Press News, http://www.airbusmilitary.com/press.html, from which one can get a 
clear idea of the logistical difficulties and huge expense inherent in such a collaboration. See Airbus 
Military, A Single-Phase Programme, http://www.airbusmilitary.com/programme.html (last visited 
June 7, 2008) for an interactive diagram of the strategic work-share among the eight participants. It is 
also worth noting that in the UK House of Lords, Lord Hamilton of Epsom cited the historic disaster 
associated with collaborative procurement projects, stating that the Eurofighter Typhoon was plagued 
by notorious cost overruns and delays. European Union Committee 34th Report of Session 2006–2007, 
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monitored on a collective basis, and not based on results in individual 
Member States. Therefore, the odds that the participating states will, as a 
group, reach the benchmarks are considerably higher. 
TABLE 3: EDA DEFENSE SPENDING BENCHMARKS TO BOOST THE EU’S 
MILITARY COHERENCE 
EDA initiative Benchmark % to 
attain by EDA 
Members 
% spent in 2006 
by EDA 
Members 
Defense R&T245 2% of total defense 
expenditure 
1.2% 
European collaborative 
R&T 
20% of defense R&T 
expenditure 
10% 
Equipment procurement 20% of total defense 
expenditure 
19% 
European collaborative 
equipment procurement. 
35% of equipment 
procurement 
21% 
Source: EDA November 2007246 
Then of course there are inefficiencies prevalent at NATO, where 
exorbitant sums are also spent on defense personnel. The cost of personnel 
in proportion to the total NATO defense budgets has been staggering: on 
average, from 2005 through 2007, NATO’s European members spent over 
55% of their annual defense budgets on personnel.247 Belgium, Italy, 
 
 
Current Developments in European Defence Policy, HL Paper 161, 2 (Q8) (Aug. 6, 2007) [hereinafter 
“HL Paper 161”]. While Lord Drayson agreed to some extent, he reminded the Committee that the 
Eurofighter Typhoon went operational in July 2007, so he considered it a success, stating that cost 
cannot be the sole factor in collaborative associations: “[T]he nature of the threats that we face and the 
complexity and scale on costs of the technological solutions to meet them necessitate these 
collaborations.” Id. at 3 (Q8). See also comments, infra note 311. For more official references to the 
A400M status, see HC 295, supra note 221, at 41–43, for evidence, e.g., from Q107 and throughout on 
the A400M issues. This entire report contains excellent discussion on multiple defense projects and 
issues.  
 245. R&D and R&T are not the same. “R&D: Any R&D programmes up to the point where 
expenditure for production of equipment starts to be incurred. R&T (Subset of R&D): expenditure for 
basic research, applied research and technology demonstration for defence purposes.” See EDA, 
European Defence Expenditure in 2006, http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=35&id=286 
(see “European Defence Expenditure Data—Reform”).  
 246. EDA Bulletin, supra note 241, at 8. 
 247. NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence, Table 5: 
Distribution of Total Defence Expenditures by Category (Dec. 20, 2007), http://www.nato.int/docu/ 
pr/2007/p07-141.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
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Greece and Portugal spent over 70%.248 Luxembourg had previously been 
in this group, but its spending on personnel decreased from 75.3% in 2005, 
to 60.9% in 2007,249 still an extraordinary sum. Regarding equipment 
expenditures, NATO’s European Members spent 15 to 18% during the 
same 2005–2007 time-frame,250 reflecting near-stagnant spending levels 
on hard defense needs.251  
The negative impact of these factors is apparent from defense spending 
figures from the EDA showing that in 2005, of an estimated €193 billion 
spent by twenty-four participating Member States on defense, only 4.7% 
was spent on research and development and only 13.7% was spent on 
defense procurement.252 In 2006, the (now) twenty-six participating 
Member States’ defense spending rose to an estimated €201 billion, with 
R&D at 4.8%, and defense equipment procurement at 14.6%.253 
As a percentage of GDP, defense spending was flat since 1995, having 
decreased from a pre-Cold War 3.5% to currently less than 2% in nominal 
terms, and even more in real purchasing value.254 From 2005 to 2006, 
defense spending declined 0.6% from €192.9 billion to €191.7 billion,255 
but rose by €8 billion in 2006256—still insufficient given that current levels 
of defense spending do not represent an adequate and viable commitment 
to ameliorating the situation. Experts suggest national defense budgets 
should reallocate 25% to research and new weapons acquisition, and no 
more than 40% to personnel.257 Such reallocation would represent defense 
commitments, increase procurement activity, and bolster the market.258  
Unfortunately, the prognosis for massive reallocation is bleak and 
EDEM will remain in flux without a necessary financial boost. However, 
Member States will not increase defense budgets at the expense of 
looming socio-economic crises, such as the care of their aging 
populations259 or high levels of unemployment. Any effort to put defense 
 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See EDE2005-20/11/2006, supra note 203. 
 252. Id. at Table: Defence Spending Breakdown in 2005. The statistics reflect the importance of 
defense to the EU economy. Improvements to defense industry market functionality, especially 
concerning transparency issues and common procurement policy, will produce legal certainty—a 
necessity to attract private investment.  
 253. EDE2006-19/11/2007, supra note 203, at 4 (Table: Defence Investment in 2006). 
 254. CSIS, supra note 201, at 21. 
 255. EDE2005-20/11/2006, supra note 203 at Table: European Defence Expenditure: 2005–2006.  
 256. EDE2005-19/11/2007, supra note 203. 
 257. CSIS, supra note 201, at 9.  
 258. Id. at 30–32.  
 259. Id. at 23. 
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spending ahead of that which is required to maintain the EU citizens’ 
strong social safety net would be highly unpopular politically, as 
evidenced by Ireland’s recent Lisbon Treaty “no” vote of June 12, 2008, 
which was attributed in part to the implied prospect of Ireland having to 
contribute more towards defense objectives.260 Such efforts could even 
trigger violence.261  
Yet the present situation neither enhances Lisbon objectives, nor 
addresses EU defense vulnerabilities. Therefore, Member States must 
make tough choices to reallocate funding and find ways to commit to 
ESDP; embrace their defense responsibilities; and improve their R&D 
capacities through industrial consolidation partnering and transparent, 
accessible, and non-discriminatory cross-border procurement.  
XI. ARTICLE 296: PROTECTING ESSENTIAL SECURITY INTERESTS 
Defense contracts now fall within the Internal Market under Article 10 
of Directive 2004/18, “subject to Article 296.”262 Pursuant to Article 
296(1)(a), a Member State transaction may derogate from Single Market 
 
 
 260. See Küchler, supra note 30. 
 261. In Europe, targeting a reduction in social benefits in order to raise defense R&D is risky. 
Considerable clout is yielded by EU citizens who benefit from generous social protections. Consider 
that approximately 100,000 people out of 500,000 million were able to obstruct the Lisbon Treaty’s 
ratification. “[O]fficial figures . . . revealed that 53.4% of voters had rejected the document, while 
46.6% voted in favour—a difference of 109,164 voters.” Henry McDonald & Allegra Stratton, Irish 
Voters Reject EU Treaty, GUARDIAN ONLINE, June 13, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/ 
jun/13/ireland?gusrc=rss&feed=networkfront. Consider the French, who in 2007 experienced 
widespread violence and sustained billions in economic damage as a result of labor strikes, when the 
government attempted to reduce retirement benefits for public employees in 2007. The previous year, 
in 2006, riots resulted from a new labor law concerning the Contrat Premiere Embauche (CPE), Law 
No. 2006-396 of Mar. 31, 2006, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of 
France] (French youth labor law including terms defining the First Employment Contract, “contrat 
premiere embauche” (CPE)). The law granted employers more flexibility to hire and fire employees 
under age 26. Country-wide protests resulted in an end to the law, thus reflecting that society was more 
inclined to protect non-productive, non-motivated, or incompetent young workers. See, e.g., Molly 
Moore, French Students Hit Streets to Protest New Labor Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2006, at A13, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/16/AR2006031601 
908.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008); Bernard Salanié, The Riots in France: An Economist’s View, 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, June 11, 2006, available at http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Salanie/ 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2008).  
 262. See Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 369–70. See generally Martin Trybus, Defence 
Procurement: The New Public Sector Directive and Beyond, P.P.L.R. 2004, 4, 198–210, for a 
discussion of the Directives prior to 2004/18/EC with respect to defense, the subsequent shift in scope 
with 2004/18/EC, problems with Internal Market coverage, and interpretation concerning defense 
items. It is important at this juncture to monitor the new Defence Package, see supra notes 8 and 9, as 
it moves through the EU’s legislative Co-Decision process, see supra note 12, however, at this point it 
is premature to consider it authoritative over defense contracts to the same extent as Article 10 of 
2004/18/EC. 
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disclosure requirements if such disclosure would be contrary to “the 
essential interests of its security.”263 Article 296(1)(b) permits necessary 
measures to protect “the essential interests of its security” connected to 
“production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such 
measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the 
common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically 
military purposes.”264  
The Treaty always recognized special commercial aspects of 
armaments and defense. In 1957, it specifically included Article 296 to 
balance Treaty commercial objectives with Member State security 
interests concerning armaments exports, defense industrial mergers, 
defense procurement, state aid, and defense competition.265 Article 296 
was intended to protect Member States’ legitimate security interests based 
on objective evaluation criteria. However, inconsistent interpretation has 
allowed Member States to invoke it at will, resulting in the exclusion of an 
estimated fifty percent of procurements from cross-border competition 
rules.266 Thus Article 296 has become a matter of considerable contention 
to Competition and Industry authorities.  
In 1958, the Council composed a list (the List) to define the scope of 
Article 296(1)(b). The List identified fifteen categories of hard defense 
equipment to which it would apply. The List included, inter alia, 
traditional warfare equipment, such as: rifles, bombs, ammunition, tanks, 
explosives, aircraft, and electronic equipment.267  
The List was never officially published in the Official Journal and has 
never been revised,268 so it had questionable value as a tool for interpreting 
the Treaty.269 Modern political influences, innovations in technology, and 
EDEM initiatives dictated its review in light of the changing nature of 
security and defense.  
The “manpower-intensive, platform-heavy and predictable doctrine” 
conflicts of the 1950s are outdated; current conflicts require 
“sophisticated, rapid and precise military solutions.”270 Arguably, the 
 
 
 263. EC Treaty, art. 296(1)(a). 
 264. EC Treaty, art. 296(1)(b). 
 265. Trybus, supra note 181, at 663.  
 266. See CSIS, EUROPEAN DEFENSE INTEGRATION: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN STRATEGY AND 
CAPABILITIES, CONFERENCE REPORT 10 (Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://www.forum-europe.com/ 
publication/SoD_CSISNDAEuropeanDefenceIntegration.pdf (last visited June 10, 2008). See also 
EDA Press Release, supra note 3. 
 267. Council Decision 298/58 of 15 April 1958 (not published). 
 268. The Council has authority to do so under Article 296(2). EC Treaty, art. 296(2). 
 269. Green Paper on Defence Procurement, supra note 157, at 5–7.  
 270. UKMoD, DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY, supra note 216, at 7.  
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changing world order and rapid advances associated with contemporary 
defense could not have been foreseen in 1958. Thus, the question of the 
List’s applicability to contemporary equipment procurement is a valid one.  
The List has been both controversial and confusing. Although it is 
circulating in the public domain, some Member States have treated it 
confidentially while others distributed it openly.271 It was published in 
academic journals, but the extreme translation variations among authors 
resulted in the circulation of many inconsistent versions. These 
distribution inconsistencies allowed for commonplace abuses since Article 
296 exemptions could be easily taken for equipment not meant to be 
exempted.272 Though the Council eventually released the List in 2001,273 it 
was neither complete, compared to others in the public domain, nor was it 
an official publication. It was not, therefore, considered authoritative.274  
The utility of today’s defense and security equipment needs must be 
queried. Consider General Sir Rupert Smith’s discussion of the “art” of 
war and of the evolution from industrial (i.e., traditional) warfare to a new 
paradigm of “war amongst the people.”275 Traditional war no longer exists. 
Today’s battles have no defined battlefields and no “armies;” they take 
place anywhere, anytime.276 The problem, however, is that politicians and 
generals continue to configure their forces along conventional lines, which 
is not effective and will not produce a victory.277  
Smith does not, however, specifically support changing warfare’s 
traditional tools. His logic is thought-provoking as he suggests changes to 
strategies and the characterization of the utility of war’s tools against 
psychological concepts like terrorism.278 Delving into the measure of 
force, he reminds his audience that even with the most advanced 
technology, it is ultimately a human who operates the systems, platforms, 
and weapons.279 He feels that the defense community must understand the 
shifting paradigm of force. He advocates a “revolution in our thinking,” 
 
 
 271. Martin Trybus, The List of Hard Defence Products Under Article 296 EC, P.P.L.R. 2003, 2, 
NA15-21.  
 272. Id. 
 273. Response to Written Question E-1324/01 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council, O.J. (C 
364) E, 85-86 (Dec. 20, 2001) (Order 255/58 of 12/04/1958).  
 274. Trybus, supra note 271. See also UNISYS, supra note 198, at 8–11. 
 275. RUPERT SMITH, THE UTILITY OF FORCE: THE ART OF WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 5 (2005) 
[hereinafter “Smith”]. 
 276. Id. at 3–6. See also Rupert Smith, Personal Presentation at the Residence Palace in Brussels 
(Jan. 19, 2006) (book launch for THE UTILITY OF FORCE).  
 277. Smith, supra note 276, at 6. 
 278. Id. at 270–71. 
 279. Id. at 241–42. See also id. chs. 5–8, Conclusion.  
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that “force” must be considered a political, and not just military, 
phenomenon.280  
Until recently, procurement needs were also based on industrial 
warfare logic—an identifiable threat, to be matched in order to be 
defeated.281 Yet this is no longer the case. It is unlikely that a strategic 
shift to diplomatic and political activism, such as military support to 
humanitarian crises—not historically a military strong-suit—could address 
contemporary warfare’s purposes without solutions more reliant on 
technology, competition, and dual-use procurements than heretofore.282 
Returning to the List, it is questionable whether the List can cover such 
a fundamental strategic shift guided by human subjectivity. On one hand, 
using the List in 2008 to guide Article 296 derogations initially appears to 
be a misapplication of seemingly stale guidance. Were nations to identify 
sensitive technologies currently protecting Smith’s virtual borders, 
Member State security could be compromised. On the other hand, siding 
with Martin Trybus, the List remains current because its general language 
can easily accommodate new defense technologies, as well as Smith’s new 
paradigm. The Council must also go further; though Trybus acknowledges 
that the List’s 2001 semi-disclosure has diminished Article 296 abuses, 
good governance demands that an official List be published to halt a 
“bizarre erosion of secrecy.”283  
One can understand why the application of Article 296 has been 
problematic. Member States as “Creators and Lords of the Treaties,” 
vehemently opposed Community jurisdiction over any matter remotely 
connected to defense.284 Article 296 allowed Member States to give 
preference to domestic suppliers, avoid competition, and even protect 
unprofitable firms, keeping them artificially alive by state aid at the 
expense of more profitable EU-wide undertakings.285 The need for change 
has been emphasized by innumerable authorities as justification for 
targeted initiatives among defense-sector stakeholders.286 Though ECJ 
 
 
 280. Id. at 375. 
 281. See id. at 212–13. 
 282. This is one area in which the EU has a positive story to tell—its civilian crisis management 
capability is better able to address Rupert Smith’s war amongst the people because it brings together 
skills that tackle the causes of conflict. 
 283. Trybus, supra note 271, NA21. Note too that the approval of the Defence Directive would be 
a major step towards halting the “erosion.” Defence Directive, supra note 8, art I. 
 284. Trybus, supra note 181, at 664.  
 285. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COST OF NON-EUROPE IN THE AREA OF SECURITY AND 
DEFENCE 7 (June 19, 2006), http://www.conversion-center.org/publications/other/study_for_ep/bicc_ 
study_for_ep.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 286. See, e.g., Security and Defence Agenda (SDA), www.securitydefenceagenda.org (last visited 
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case law existed,287 the overly generous interpretation of “essential 
interests” fueled the debate and featured prominently in the 2006 
Interpretative Communication on Article 296.288  
Article 296’s application has changed little over the years. With weak 
political will towards a common application, Member States readily 
invoked it, arguing that existing export and intellectual property 
protections were inadequate to protect sensitive technologies. The 
resulting national monopolies and domestic industrial protection structures 
were presented as the only means to ensure national security of supply.  
Although defense-industrial mergers and joint procurement programs 
are increasing, national procurement bias continues to hamper EDEM, and 
Europeans reap few economic advantages from their national defense 
markets.289 In addition, the juste retour workshare approach—in which 
countries invest in multinational programs only to the extent they receive 
workshare equal to the amount of the investment—fragments programs 
politically, causing cost, schedule, and coordination problems.290 Directive 
2004/18/EC narrowed the potential scope of bias somewhat; however, it 
 
 
Apr. 5, 2008). See id. at “Activities” and “Publications” for 2005–2006 and reports of speakers from 
defense sectors of the EU, both national and international levels, who advocated for defense change 
and the necessity of partnership between DG-Competition and EDEM stakeholders.  
 287. See, e.g., Case C-414/97, Commission v. Spain, 1999 E.C.R. I-5585; Case C-222/84, 
Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R. 1651. 
 288. For a discussion of this Interpretative Communication, see infra Parts XII–XIII. 
 289. BAE has been increasingly buying into the U.S. market, arguably turning its back on the 
European market. In 2007, it purchased Armor Holdings, which is known for production of vehicle 
armor systems, military helicopter seating systems, aircraft and land vehicle safety systems, and a 
broad range of protective equipment for military personnel. Armor Holdings—BAE Systems, 
http://production.investis.com/armorholdings/ (last visited June 10, 2008). The BAE strategy paid off. 
In December 2007, an agreement was announced between BAE and the U.S. Military to modify the 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, a deal worth $709 million. Press Release, BAE Systems, BAE Systems 
Awarded $709.4 Million Contract to Reset Bradley Fighting Vehicles (Dec. 6, 2007), 
http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/autoGen_10711616107.html (last visited 
June 10, 2008). Other lucrative contracts quickly followed. See, e.g., the following BAE Systems press 
releases, all available at BAE Newsroom, http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/ 
index.htm (last visited June 10, 2008): BAE Systems Awarded First F-35 Production Contract, (Jan. 
16, 2008); BAE Systems Awarded $42 Million Air Force Contract for Updated Air Planning System 
(Jan. 31, 2008); BAE Systems Awarded $28 Million U.S. Air Force Contract to Provide Radar 
Warning Receivers for C-130j Transports (Jan. 30, 2008); BAE Systems Wins $242 Million U.S. 
Navy Enterprise Platform Integration Contract to Support New Construction Ships (Feb. 14, 2008); 
BAE Systems Receives $132 Million U.S. Army Production Contract for Medium Mine Protected 
Vehicles (Apr. 2 2008); BAE Systems Receives $1.65 Billion Contract for Family of Medium Tactical 
Vehicles (June 3, 2008).  
 290. CSIS, supra note 201, at 72 n.4, 74–75; Green Paper on Defence Procurement, supra note 
157, at 4, 8. 
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still did not adequately address defense needs as it was not intended as a 
“suitable instrument for the procurement of armaments.”291  
Defense tendering procedures are ill-defined and inappropriate for 
sensitive technology or research contracts.292 Security of information is an 
example in which open tendering procedures, requiring publication in the 
Official Journal, could compromise confidentiality requirements. 
Alternatively, award selection criteria based solely on technical, 
economical, and financial aspects are ill-suited to defense contracts. Issues 
concerning security of supply, confidentiality, and emergency situations 
have not been adequately addressed. Finally, “the rules on technical 
specifications, time limits, and follow-up contracts have also been 
inappropriate.”293 Such inadequacies have sustained a dysfunctional 
defense market unable to fully realize EDEM, largely because strong 
guidance for Article 296 has been unavailable.  
The major procurement problem with reference to Article 296 lies in 
addressing dual-use items in the context of essentiality. Tank 
procurements would be undeniably “essential” to any Member State and 
easily excluded under Article 296 since a tank’s usage outside a defense 
context is unlikely. Yet other examples are not as clear, so the question of 
“essential” procurements does not invite a uniform response.  
Consider “essential” within the productive capacity limitations of 
Cyprus which imports virtually all defense needs, and thus invites a 
broader consideration of “essential” under Article 296.294 Furthermore, 
some equipment may be used differently for defense versus security 
contexts. In addition, terrorists now attack with non-traditional means 
which were not previously considered weapons.295 Thus it is necessary to 
carefully consider the equipment to be used and the context in which it is 
to be used. The interoperability of EU forces would also be enhanced if 
 
 
 291. Trybus, supra note 262, at 203. 
 292. Tendering procedures are outside the scope of this Article, however the negotiated procedure 
with prior publication is considered the best method for defense procurement. The use of the 
negotiated procedure without prior publication is used when the defense interest concerns security of 
information, security of supply, or complex cases requiring a tested reliable contractor. See SPANISH 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ANSWERS TO GREEN PAPER, DEFENCE PROCUREMENT 3 (Mar. 14, 2005) 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library (follow “Public Procurement” 
hyperlink; then follow “Defence Procurement” hyperlink; then follow “Member states and third 
countries” hyperlink; then follow “Spain” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 5, 2008) [hereinafter “SPANISH 
MOD ANSWERS]. 
 293. COM (2005) 626, supra note 213, at 5. 
 294. Tiny Cyprus’s defense expenditure per capita in 2006 was higher than Germany’s—in fact, it 
was higher than that of over half of EDA pMSs. See NDE2006-21/12/2007, supra note 203, at 6 
(Table: European Defence Expenditure Per Capita in 2006). 
 295. UNISYS, supra note 198, at 11. 
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they cooperated more fully or were willing to buy each other’s 
equipment.296 
Changes to Europe’s defense procurement regime are evolving to 
address unique attributes of sovereign security and deficient public 
procurement procedures. Mechanisms to manage hard defense 
procurements are being created and strengthened at a rapid pace. 
The European Defence Agency was created in 2004297 to handle 
procurements where Article 296 has a clear application. While a detailed 
EDA discussion is outside the scope of this Article,298 its four tasks are 
noteworthy:299 to develop defense capabilities in crisis management,300 to 
promote and enhance European armaments cooperation,301 to establish 
EDEM,302 and to enhance research.303 Overall, it will facilitate EU defense 
by providing contractual services for collaborative research projects 
through the identification of common military requirements. EDA 
procedures are meant to complement EDEM transparency initiatives and 
open up tender opportunities throughout Europe.  
One specific EDA defense procurement initiative worth mention is the 
Voluntary Code of Conduct (CoC) in Defence Procurement signed in 
November 2005 to integrate Europe’s defense industry.304 It is a non-
binding agreement among signatory members of the EDA to effect 
procurements based on transparency.305 The subscribing EDA Member 
States (sMS)306 will offer fair and equal cross-border defense procurement 
 
 
 296. The Lisbon Treaty, supra note 1, would expand certain responsibilities such as the Petersberg 
Tasks, described infra note 463, to more dangerous missions. Survivability of the troops is 
increasingly important and would be aided by higher interoperability and cooperation.  
 297. See Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP, on the Establishment of the European Defence 
Agency, 2004 O.J. (L 245).  
 298. For EDA historical development, see Martin Trybus, The New European Defence Agency: A 
Contribution to a Common European Security and Defence Policy and a Challenge to the Acquis? 43 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 667 (2006), and Aris Georgopoulos, Defence Procurement and EU Law, 20 
E.L. REV. 559, 559–64 (2005). For a comprehensive and updated discussion of the EDA, see generally 
Stacy Ferraro, The European Defence Agency: Facilitating Defense Reform or Forming Fortress 
Europe?, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 549 (2007).  
 299. Council Joint Action, supra note 297, art. 5. 
 300. Id. art. 5(3)(3.1).  
 301. Id. art. 5(3)(3.2).  
 302. Id. art. 5(3)(3.3). 
 303. Id. art. 5(3)(3.4). 
 304. EDA, The Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem. 
aspx?area=Organisation&id=154 (last visited June 8, 2008). 
 305. Id. 
 306. According to the EDA website as of April 2008, all EU Member States except Bulgaria and 
Romania have committed to the CoC, though they may join at a later date. Denmark, a general ESDP 
opt-out, is not an EDA pMS. EDA, The Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, http://www.eda. 
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opportunities by publishing tenders on the EDA’s new Electronic Bulletin 
Board (EBB) from July 1, 2006. This will facilitate a cross-border EDEM 
using e-technology to gather procurement data and monitor justifications 
for Article 296 derogations.307  
In November 2007, the EDA released a one year status report on the 
Code of Conduct. The report reflects a healthy monitoring system, 
increased transparency, and a growth in government contract 
opportunities: 
As of 1st September 2007, 15 of the 24 sMS have published more 
than 227 contract opportunities with a total value cautiously 
estimated at around €10 billion Euros . . . 26 Contract Award 
Notices with competition for a total value of €156M, two being to 
suppliers in other European countries and 16 awarded to small and 
medium enterprises. While the numbers are still to [sic] low to draw 
conclusions, we would expect more cross-border awards, but it 
should be noted that, there is, on the other hand, still limited cross-
border bidding by industry.308 
Such mechanisms are valuable market tools to establish Article 296 
precedent in parallel with initiatives to monitor and maximize defense 
spending. Unless specifically excluded, subscribing Member States’ 
contracts above one million euros that fall within Article 296 must be open 
to cross-border procurement.  
XII. THE IRONY OF 296 
This Article, however, considers defense procurement when the 
conditions for the application of Article 296 are unclear. In the early days 
of the EEC, a protective exemption for national defense or security 
procurements may have seemed logical, in fact necessary. Emerging from 
war, nations justifiably protected their vulnerable economies by resisting 
multilateral defense procurement. The drive to create and protect domestic 
employment and economic growth was no less an incentive to apply 
Article 296 broadly. However, the exemption must be reappraised, 
especially in light of dual-use technological innovations and a shifting 
 
 
europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=organisation&id=154 (follow “Code of Conduct” hyperlink; then 
follow “Key Facts” hyperlink) (last visited June 8, 2008). 
 307. For parliamentary commentary on UK perception of EDA and EBB, see UKHL, Current 
Developments in European Defence Policy, supra note 76, at 5–10. 
 308. EDA, A Successful First Year of Operation of the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement 
(Nov. 2007), http://www.eda.europa.eu/EbbNewsLetter/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).  
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emphasis on interoperability. To these ends, FP7 will address the extent to 
which private-to-public technology transfer of dual-use intellectual 
property rights in an “essential interest” context can remain with 
companies pursuant to a defense or security-related procurement.  
The dual-use context raises interesting examples. Consider the level of 
sophistication and development costs of technology initiatives, such as 
secure communication that could assist both military forces as well as 
civilian police faced with global terrorism, or Armed Robotic Vehicles 
that provide safer explosive ordnance disposal capabilities.309 Moreover, 
software development for military Communications, Command, Control, 
Intelligence (C3I or, with the addition of Computers, C4I) is essential to 
win wars. It must be protected. General Thomas Power once said, 
“Communications is synonymous with command. If I don’t have 
communications, the only weapon I have is my desk—I can’t throw it very 
far, and it’s not very lethal.”310  
ESDP success requires getting technology from concept to battlefield, a 
process that has become so sophisticated and expensive that development 
is most affordable when sourced internationally through joint procurement 
arrangements. Fundamental technological advancements today are rarely 
achieved by one state alone due to development cost factors. Buyers want 
the best technology and value-for-money, the latter of which is more about 
quality than about acquisition at the cheapest price. Ironically, such a 
system makes confidentiality vulnerable in a public procurement context.  
Airbus is a leading example of Europe’s technological competitiveness, 
which if properly leveraged can erode over-dependence on domestic 
defense. Yet, it appears that present defense decisions have been taken 
with an overwhelming dearth of insight into the economic realities of 
technological innovation, amid inconsistent and shifting levels of political 
will. While the finalization of a multinational agreement sounds 
progressive, the reality of execution is fraught with logistical and financial 
problems,311 seriously impacting burden-sharing agreements.  
Consider the Airbus A400M, Europe’s largest military project, which 
has been plagued by ongoing delays—on top of those announced in 
October 2007—at a cost of billions of euros.312  
 
 
 309. See Ian Kemp, Robot Wars, ARMADA INT’L, Aug./Sept. 2005, http://www.armada.ch/05-
4/article-full.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).  
 310. Power on the Side, TIME, Feb. 16, 1959, available at www.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,894207-2,00.html (last visited June 10, 2008).  
 311. See Airbus Military, supra note 244. See also supra Part X. 
 312. Airbus Military, supra note 244. Though static testing on the structure has begun, delays will 
continue. See EADS Starts Static Testing of a Complete A400M Structure (Mar. 13, 2008), 
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While it can be argued that the collaborative process is the only way to 
shoulder the huge expenses associated with huge defense development 
projects, when one of the original parties withdraws, the implications for 
remaining nations can be serious. The UK’s withdrawal from the TRIGAT 
anti-tank missile program, for example, resulted in massive losses to the 
UK and delays in program delivery, as time and resources were spent 
trying to keep the industrial alliance together.313 There was also the 
Maritime Frigate—Project Horizon, from which the UK withdrew.314 This 
was mentioned with reference to effective CFSP, that:  
[M]erger of European defence industries is an essential 
underpinning for an effective CFSP is valid but one that carries 
dangers. The failure of the Horizon frigate project after three years 
of negotiations provides a pessimistic portent of things to come, 
especially since this follows hot on the heels of the controversial 
acquisition by BAe of GEC’s Marconi defence interests which 
allegedly set back the prospects for a European Aerospace Industry. 
The EU is therefore faced with two choices: either seek economies 
of scale through co-development within Europe or through 
transatlantic fora or; second, rely increasingly on the US for the 
next generation of hi-tech weapons.315 
 
 
http://www.eads.net/1024/en/pressdb/pressdb/EADS/20080313_eads_a400m_static_tests.html. The 
company could face financial penalties. EADS Chief Says “Execution Risks” Remain on New Aircraft 
Programs A380, A400M, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE ONLINE, May 26, 2008, http://www.iht.com/ 
articles/ap/2008/05/26/business/EU-FIN-Netherlands-EADS.php (stating that delays have cost €1.2 – 
1.4 billion (up to US$2 billion) in penalties and charges). See also EADS Tells European Arms Agency 
It Will Delay First Airbus A400M Flight—Report, FORBES.COM, June 4, 2008, http://www.forbes. 
com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2008/06/04/afx5078334.html (last visited June 6, 2008). See 
CORRECTED—Germany Says Considers [sic] Fines for A400M Delays, REUTERSUK, Jan. 7, 2008, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/ UK_SMALLCAPSRPT/idUKBAT00200920080107 (last visited Apr. 5, 
2008); EADS CEO Dismisses Fears on Orders, A400M Delay, REUTERSUK, Jan. 7, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/company News/idUSPAC00907320080107 (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 313. UKHL, Defence Committee, 3 Consolidated Departmental Resource Accounts (Second 
Report of Session 2006–2007), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/ 
cmdfence/57/5706.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). See also Lord Hamilton’s comments, supra note 
244 (describing the disasters of collaborative procurement and citing to the UK’s pullout from the 
Eurofighter and the TRIGAT).  
 314. The UKMoD issued a summary of lessons learned from collaborative defense procurement 
ventures. See UKMoD, SELECTComm. on Defence, Tenth Report, Written Evidence, available at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdefence/528/528we11. 
htm (scroll down to “Lessons Learned from Project Horizon”). 
 315. DR. SIMON DUKE, FROM AMSTERDAM TO KOSOVO: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF CFSP 12 
(citing Alexander Nicoll, National Differences Scupper Frigate Project, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1999 at 
1), available at www.eipa.eu/files/repository/eipascope/scop99_2_1.pdf.  
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If one contrasts the American and European research cultures, one sees 
that in the United States, technology trends move from the military to the 
civilian sector,316 where research costs are often underwritten by the 
government and later recouped by contractors as permitted through 
cooperative agreements. Developers exploit technology thereafter, subject 
to contractual restrictions. This arrangement facilitates the creation of 
cutting-edge defense technology—thus achieving cutting-edge defense—
while feeding technology to downstream civilian applications.  
In contrast, European defense research funding remains fragmented 
and unfocused—abetted by Article 296. It is as if Jean-Baptiste Colbert, 
Louis XIV’s Finance Minister, still influences the European mindset, 
prescribing a neo-mercantilist defense structure, which attempts to retain 
maximum production within the sovereignty of the State. The modern 
realities of overlaps—such as high development costs and rapid 
technological obsolescence—require that protectionist defense 
procurement mechanisms yield to the realities of economies of scale, and 
the need to amortize per copy R&D.  
The irony of Article 296 is this: it legitimates antiquated thinking that 
domestically derived technology provides the best defense capability. This 
is a naïve strategy: no European country can assume full competence in all 
technologies; Member State pockets are simply not deep enough.  
A contemporary example is ITER,317 the joint international nuclear 
fusion energy development project signed November 21, 2006, by China, 
the EU, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, and the United States. The estimated 
project cost of €12 billion represented “a victory over the strategies of 
supremacy that so marked the last century. The victory of humanity’s 
interest as a whole.”318  
This epic project has implications for energy, defense, and security that 
transcend any border and underscore the benefits and investment 
opportunities available through economic partnering, at the EU or global 
level. It appears that ITER already enjoys a reputation for collaborative 
success. The EU has recently established a website for “The European 
Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy—
 
 
 316. The Internet and GPS are two commonplace examples.  
 317. “ITER” means “the way” in Latin. A former usage, International Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor, has been discontinued, but see The ITER Project, http://www.iter.org/a/index_ 
nav_1.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).  
 318. Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, ITER Signing Speech (Nov. 21, 2006), 
http://fire.pppl.gov/iter_sign_Chirac_112106.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). The ITER Organization 
was legally established November 7, 2007. See ITER, http://www.iter.org/a/index_nav_6.htm (follow 
“ITER Headquarters Agreement Signed” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
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‘Fusion for Energy,’”319 which reflects a number of recent developments. 
On January 31, 2008, “Fusion for Energy published its first two Calls for 
Expression of Interest on behalf of ITER addressed to specialized 
companies: one for Cabling and Jacketing of TF Conductor Performance 
Samples, and one for Tritium Transport Packages.”320  
For EU defense, the common goal is EDEM, which some say cannot be 
established until Article 296 is abolished.321 Perhaps it could be argued 
that, practically speaking, Article 296 has become merely an artifact of a 
transitional period and must now be relegated to the footnotes of EU 
history. Certainly it is counter-intuitive in light of the Lisbon Agenda’s 
goal to create the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world by 2010. Yet, it is difficult to balance that argument 
with the inconsistent signals from the UK-Saudi example,322 or the recent 
€93 million “strategic military purchase” of Army trucks by the Czech 
military awarded non-competitively to Tatra.323 If Article 296 is invoked, 
and a justification is supplied, who is the first-level judge and where is the 
objective assessment? What is clear is that use of Article 296 must be 
refined and confined. 
XIII. THE INTERPRETATIVE COMMUNICATION ON ARTICLE 296 
Member States have long dodged Treaty oversight of defense 
procurement because of ill-defined criteria for Article 296 applications, 
and because previous procurement frameworks did not address unique 
defense procurement characteristics. Procurement rules were easily 
ignored, even when Article 296 was clearly inapplicable. In 2005, a 
Commission Communication on future initiatives in defense procurement 
proposed: (1) an Interpretative Communication on Article 296, and (2) a 
new defense Directive adapted to the specificities of the defense sector 
concerning the application of Article 296.324  
 
 
 319. See generally Fusion for Energy, http://fusionforenergy.europa.eu/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). 
 320. Id. (under heading “First Calls for Expression of Interest Launched on behalf of ITER”). 
 321. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 285, at 41.  
 322. See supra notes 231–40.  
 323. Czechs Order New Army Trucks, DEFENSENEWS.COM, Dec. 15, 2006, available at 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2426538&C=europe. See also Czech Republic Ministry of 
Defence, Contract for TATRA Trucks Signed (Dec. 15, 2006), http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php? 
id=8401. 
 324. COM (2005) 626, supra note 213, at 9–10. See generally Green Paper on Defence 
Procurement, supra note 157. 
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On December 7, 2006, the Commission released its promised 
Interpretative Communication on Article 296325 to balance defense and 
security against fundamental community principles and objectives, to 
prevent misuse and to ensure that Treaty derogations are limited 
exceptions in which essential security interests are truly at stake.326  
The Communication confirmed the authority of ECJ case law in 
matters of defense procurement.327 The Court will decide whether 
derogations have been properly invoked,328 an effect that has crossed 
community pillars and strengthened Bovis’s prediction that procurement 
will become a litigator’s paradise.329  
Looking first at the Communication’s reinforcement of Commission v. 
Spain,330 which disallowed tax exemptions requested under Article 296 by 
holding that Spain’s intended use went beyond the narrow scope intended 
by the provision331 that Article 296 will “deal with exceptional and clearly 
defined cases;” therefore, the field of interpretation will be narrow.332 This 
language, however, is uninspiring and offers no clarity for narrowing the 
interpretation.  
The key feature is that the Communication opens the List’s field of 
application to “the evolving character of technology and procurement.”333 
The generic language extends the List to “future developments,” and 
extends Article 296(1)(b) to the “procurement of services and works 
directly related to the goods included in the [1958] list, as well as modern, 
capability-focused acquisition methods. . . .”334 Exemptions would be 
permitted for items designed, developed, and produced specifically for 
 
 
 325. IC296, supra note 5. See also Frequently Asked Questions on Interpretative Communication 
on Defence Procurement (Dec. 7, 2006), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do 
(search complete database, reference “MEMO/06/468”); Public Procurement: New Commission 
Guidelines on Defence Contracts (Dec. 7, 2006), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
searchAction.do (search complete database, reference “IP/06/1703”); Press Release, EDA, EDA 
Welcomes European Commission Clarification on EU Defence Procurement (Dec. 7, 2006), 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/newsitem.aspx?id=55 (last visited Apr. 6. 2008).  
 326. IC296, supra note 5, at 5. 
 327. Id. at 4. 
 328. Id. at 3. 
 329. See Bovis, supra note 90, at 63. The TEU, supra note 182, created the European Union based 
on a three-pillar policy model: Pillar I—the European Communities, Pillar II—Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), and Pillar III—Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Id. Titles 
I, V, VI. Article 47 TEU protects the ECJ’s right to preserve the acquis communitaire in relation to 
policy Pillars II and III.  
 330. C-414/97, 1999 E.C.R. I-5585. 
 331. Id. at summary, ¶¶ 21–24. 
 332. See IC296, supra note 5, at 5 (quoting C-414/97, Comm’n v. Spain, 1999 E.C.R. I-5585). 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
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military purposes,335 yet tenders for non-military security purposes, by 
contrast, are excluded under Article 14336 of 2004/18/EC.337 Dual-use 
goods will be covered by Article 296(1)(a) if there is a question of national 
security information.338 Once again however, the protection accorded does 
not clarify distinctions between security and defense needs. 
The Commission and the ECJ intend to halt automatic application of 
Article 296.339 Returning to Spain, the days of implied or unsubstantiated 
reference to national interests to avoid competitive procurement are over. 
Article 298EC is the check-and-balance for “unfettered” application of 
Article 296.340 Spain therefore remains good law,341 and will be enforced 
as justifications for derogations must now be clearly articulated.  
Perhaps it could be argued that the Interpretative Communication could 
have gone further to define Article 296 in relation to the List. Yet siding 
with Trybus, this is unnecessary. The reaffirmation of ECJ case law 
acknowledges that Article 296 has been a runaway train that must be 
stopped. The broad language of the List easily covers future developments 
of defense equipment,342 and its contemporary application is thus 
confirmed. “National” interests (such as the tax in Spain) and “essential” 
interests relating to security are quite different. The Commission warns 
Member States not to abuse their flexibility when defining their essential 
interests for purposes of justifying Treaty exemptions; merely designating 
equipment as military in character and presuming eligibility for the 
exemption will not suffice.343 The ECJ will hold Member States 
accountable for attempting to go beyond the limits of the derogation.344 
Member States and the Commission have acknowledged public opinion 
and seek common convergence of multiple national security regimes 
 
 
 335. Case T-26/01, Fiocchi Munizioni SpA v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-3951, ¶¶ 59, 61. 
 336. Article 14 stipulates:  
This Directive shall not apply to public contracts when they are declared to be secret, when 
their performance must be accompanied by special security measures in accordance with the 
laws, regulations or administrative provisions in force in the Member State concerned, or 
when the protection of the essential interests of that Member State so requires. 
2004/18/EC, supra note 55, art. 14. 
 337. IC296, supra note 5, at 6 n.10. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 6 n.11 and accompanying text (citing Case C-273/97, Sirdar v. The Army Board and 
Sec’y of State for Defence, 1999 E.C.R. I-7403, ¶¶ 15–16; Case C-285/98, Kreil v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, 2000 E.C.R. I-69, ¶ 16; Case C-186/01, Dory v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2003 
E.C.R. I-2479, ¶¶ 30–31). 
 340. Id. at 6. 
 341. Id. at 7 (citing Case C-414/97, Commission v. Spain, 1999 E.C.R. I-5585, ¶ 22 n.14). 
 342. Trybus, supra note 271. 
 343. IC296, supra note 5, at 7. 
 344. Id. at 7 n.16 (citing Spain, ¶ 22). 
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toward an ESDP. The Commission advises Member States to consider: (1) 
the “essential” security interest concerned, (2) the connection between the 
security interest and the procurement, and (3) the unique reasons that a 
specific tender should occur outside the Procurement Directive.345  
The Communication also mentions offsets, warning that offsets are a 
possible indirect market distortion346—a curious inclusion. Certainly, 
Member States are wise to consider offsets, for example, when they may 
preserve an element of the industrial base. However, the Communication’s 
reference to offsets offered no new insight that might persuade offsets’ 
critics that they are anything other than a real distortion potential and an 
act of political fiat with arguable economic logic.  
The final part of the Communication admonishes Member States that 
the Commission expects cooperation with Article 296 compliance 
investigations.347 Again, the pillars overlap as the Commission reasserts 
itself as guardian of the Treaty, and reminds Member States that, 
“defense” subject matter notwithstanding, they will be required to provide 
specific information on defense tenders and requests for exemption from 
the Procurement Directive.348  
The Communication is weakest in addressing measures to be taken for 
non-compliance. To examine possible remedies or bring the case before 
the ECJ349 offers nothing new. That the Commission will consider the 
specific sensitivity of the sector when evaluating infringements is also an 
intangible that will be difficult to interpret and apply. In some ways, given 
 
 
 345. Id. at 8. 
 346. Id. See also comments, supra Part VII. The Commission’s Press Release for the 2007 
Defence Package had this to say about offsets: 
 Offsets are a complex issue. They are politically controversial, economically 
questionable and legally problematic.  
 Offsets usually entail discrimination by their very nature and therefore stand in direct 
contrast to the Treaty. Consequently, the procurement Directive can neither allow nor regulate 
them. On the other hand, offset practices differ so much that any attempt to forbid them 
explicitly in the Directive would face serious definition problems. It is therefore preferable to 
leave it up to Member States to make sure that possible offset requirements stay in line with 
the rules of the Directive and the Treaty.  
 This is particularly important since offsets, in particular civil offsets, are legally 
problematic also when they are required for contracts which are exempted under Article 296. 
Offsets are thus an issue which goes beyond the Directive and must be dealt with in a broader 
context. 
Press Release, Commission Proposes Enhancing Openness and Transparency in EU Defence Markets 
(Dec. 5, 2007), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, 
reference “MEMO/07/547”) [hereinafter “MEMO/07/547”]. 
 347. IC296, supra note 5, at 8–9; MEMO/07/547, supra note 346. 
 348. Id. at 8–9 (Case 82/03, Comm’n v. Italian Republic, 2004 E.C.R. I-6635, ¶ 15). 
 349. IC296, supra note 5, at 9. 
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the pre-release publicity, the new Interpretative Communication was 
disappointing for its lack of clarity and assertiveness. Nonetheless, it 
provided valuable guidance and will have positive consequences in 
reducing automatic exclusions and increasing procurement and dual-use 
dialogue. It serves as a reminder to the Member States that the ECJ will 
play a vital role, even in non-ceded sovereign areas. It also provided a 
window into the Commission’s intentions for its newest defense 
initiative—the Defence Package of 2007.  
XIV. THE 2007 DEFENCE PACKAGE—A FEW KEY POINTS  
In addition to the Interpretative Communication discussed in the 
previous section, in December 2007, the Commission delivered on its 
other promised initiative and tabled a Defence Package, which contains, 
inter alia, a proposal for the promised Defence Directive referred to in the 
Commission Communication of 2005.350  
While a discussion of the entire Package is outside the scope of this 
Article (and it is pre-mature to analyze and judge the impact of the 
Package and the specific Directives proposed since they are still in the 
early stages of co-decision351—a process which could take several years), 
it is important to mention the stated purpose of the two proposed 
Directives and to mention the key provisions set forth with respect to 
procurement. It is also important to note concerns with respect to the 
legislation so that the Package may be evaluated critically and in the most 
informed manner.  
Overall, the Package represents the Commission’s and the Member 
States’ earnest first steps towards a new approach to correct deficiencies in 
EU defense procurement. The Communication speaks to “the special 
character of the industry and its unique relationship with governments,” 
while pointing out that there are many untapped opportunities to ensure 
that Member States receive value for money, along with efficient and 
effective capabilities to support ESDP.352 It offers the Package as one 
policy “to improve the functioning of the internal market for defence 
products . . . .”353 It also intends for the new legislation to “contribute to 
the progressive establishment of a European Defence Equipment Market 
 
 
 350. COM (2005) 626, supra note 213, at 7–10. 
 351. See supra notes 6, 12 and accompanying text. 
 352. 2007 Defence Communication, supra note 7, at 3. 
 353. Id. at 6. 
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(EDEM); where suppliers established in one Member State can serve, 
without restrictions, all Member States.”354  
The aim of the two Directives as set forth in the 2007 Defence 
Communication is described as follows: 
The proposal for a directive on intra-EU transfers of defence 
products will facilitate transfers by eliminating unnecessary 
paperwork. EU Governments procuring from suppliers established 
in another Member State will see their security of supply improved. 
By significantly reducing licence application costs, and by allowing 
system integrators to open their supply chains in more predictable 
conditions, the new rules will increase opportunities for competitive 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) to supply components 
or sub-systems thereby contributing to making the European market 
more dynamic.  
 The proposed Directive on defence procurement will enhance 
openness and competitiveness of defence markets in the EU taking 
into account specific features, such as security of supply and 
security of information. It will reduce the regulatory patchwork in 
this field. It will increase competition and transparency and so aid 
SMEs to find, and bid for, sub-contracts. By providing new rules 
applicable to the procurement of arms, munitions and war material 
and to certain sensitive non-military security items, this initiative 
should further limit the use of Article 296 to exceptional cases as 
stipulated by the Court of Justice and build upon earlier steps taken 
by the Commission [COM (2006) 779] and the EDA to encourage 
greater openness of defence markets.355 
While the entire Package represents an important milestone, it is the 
Defence Procurement Directive that is paramount as it is meant to open 
procurement opportunities and become an instrument covering 
procurement of sensitive items. Its use over time will establish 
transactional reliability, a measure of guidance, and a framework within 
which Member States can guard their essential security interests—using 
rules that consider specific defense needs such as security of information 
and the need for flexible procurement mechanisms356—while still 
observing the market principles of the Treaty.  
 
 
 354. Id.  
 355. Id.  
 356. Defence Directive, supra note 8, at 3. 
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The 2007 Defence Directive has three key provisions. The first covers 
contracting procedures, which are outside the scope of this Article but are 
mentioned anyway:357 
[T]he negotiated procedure with publication of a contract notice is 
authorised without the need for specific justification in order to 
allow the flexibility required to award sensitive defence and security 
contracts. The restricted procedure and the competitive dialogue 
may also be used. The open procedure, however, which involves 
distributing the specifications to any economic operator that wants 
to see them, was felt to be inappropriate in view of the 
confidentiality and security of information requirements attached to 
these contracts.358 
The second deals with security of supply: “[T]he specific needs of the 
Member States with respect to security of supply for sensitive public 
contracts in the fields of defence and security justify specific provisions, 
in terms of both contractual requirements and the criteria for selecting 
candidates.”359 
The third deals with security of information: “[S]imilarly, the often 
confidential nature of the information relating to sensitive public defence 
and security contracts calls for safeguards applying to the award 
procedure itself, the criteria for selecting candidates and the contractual 
requirements imposed by the contracting authorities.”360  
It is clear that the Commission seeks to rectify deficiencies of 
2004/18/EC by creating legislation that is suited to the needs of security 
and defense, while taking care not to tread on the Member States’ 
sovereignty. However, there are still some important issues that may 
preclude a speedy co-decision in favor of the legislation.  
Yet important stakeholders are still skeptical of the Directive and 
intend to lobby diligently as the legislation moves through the EU 
approval process.  
The UK House of Commons questioned “whether the benefits of the 
Directive are outweighed” by such concerns as: (1) the deletion of the 
“security and secrecy” exemption; (2) how to prevent the ECJ from 
crossing the line into determining essentials for Member State national 
security; (3) the deletion of the national security exemption; (4) the 
 
 
 357. See supra Part III. See also supra notes 90, 292. 
 358. Defence Directive, supra note 8, at 7. See also id. at 36–39, ch. IV, arts. 17–20. 
 359. Id. at 7. See also id. at 35, ch. III, art. 15. 
 360. Id. at 7. See also id. at 34–35, ch. III, art. 14. 
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erosion of the use of certain Treaty provisions (covering the legitimate use 
of Articles 30, 39, 46, and 55) over time; and (5) whether it is premature to 
include security and the lack of a solid definition for “security” may be 
problematic.361  
The Report concludes that there are risks inherent in the proposal as 
written, and amendments are needed to avoid the “likely erosion of the 
existing safeguards under the EC Treaty which may be the result of this 
proposal.”362 In addition, there were concerns with the ambiguity of 
terminology concerning sensitive information and issues over defining 
“terrorism” and “criminal organisation”363 in an EC instrument, since 
some thought such matters should be under the scope of the EU Treaty. 
Other areas which were considered questionable were issues concerning 
the exclusion of some contracts awarded in third countries,364 “whether the 
proposed Directive should have any application where the contract is 
awarded in a country outside the European Union,”365 and “the degree to 
which extra-territorial jurisdiction is intended by this provision.”366  
One stakeholder, the Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC), 
the UK’s national trade association representing companies supplying civil 
air transport, defense, homeland security, and space, has concerns. SBAC 
rightfully observes that this is “new territory for the Commission.”367 
SBAC questions whether the Directive would really result in a “level 
playing field for all.”368 SBAC’s chief concern was that defense R&D 
should be excluded from the Directive in no uncertain terms, because to 
include it would undermine both the creation of high value-added 
employment and intellectual property rights (IPR).369 This was felt to 
endanger the technological and industrial base of Europe’s defense sector, 
which SBAC predicts will decline as companies are discouraged from EU 
R&D investment.370 Including R&D would be contrary to “European 
defence ministers’ stated ambition and should be of particular concern to 
 
 
 361. UKHC, SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN SCRUTINY, DEFENCE AND SECURITY 
PROCUREMENT THIRTEENTH REPORT, SESSION 2007–08 (Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://www. 
parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmeuleg/16xi/1608.htm. 
 362. Id. ¶  6.18. 
 363. Id. ¶  6.19. 
 364. Id. ¶  6.20. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Press Release, SBAC, SBAC Comment on EU Defence Package (Dec. 5, 2007), available at 
http://www.sbac.co.uk/community/cms/content/preview/news_item_view.asp?i=17700&t=0 (last 
visited June 8, 2008). 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
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the UK (given that Britain accounts for about 40% of the EU’s total 
defence R&D spend [sic]).”371  
SBAC raises an important point, and a sticky one at that, as noted in a 
recent House of Lords Report,372 wherein the participants reflected on the 
importance of an established industrial base concluding that the UK 
defense policy prioritizes that “the defence need comes first,” and that the 
strategy  
is not driven by the convenience of the manufacturers [or] the 
Ministry of Defence . . . [but] by the need for the ultimate users, the 
military, to have an industry which is going to serve what they want 
and, therefore, they have got to have some planning flow of orders. 
In that context, what is the point of Britain being independent?373  
The report cited the need to move past national duplication in 
procurement R&D.374 It also reminds the participants that it is all about 
choices and a pragmatic approach to working with other Member States; 
the way forward with respect to progress is through “a high-level 
aspirational document that sets out principles, but gives a framework for 
industry to deliver against those principles and for projects to be looked at 
through the framework that the strategy sets out . . . .”375  
On first glance, the Defence Directive appears to meet this objective. 
Furthermore, the UK Ministry of Defence (UKMoD) has gone on record 
that it gave serious consideration to defense procurement in light of 
domestic industrial strategy loss, and with respect to overlapping security 
of supply and technology innovation issues.376 It concluded that having a 
closed market as a default is inefficient; competition is the only way to 
achieve and maintain value-for-money acquisitions.377 And while the 
Defence Package hardly provides absolute answers, and still leaves many 
questions unanswered, such as “whether nonmilitary security equipment 
should also fall within the scope of the directive, . . . [as] it would make 
sense to do so [since] defence and security equipment are similar,” yet 
Member States are still reluctant to integrate security products.378 In any 
 
 
 371. Id. 
 372. HL Paper 161, supra note 244. 
 373. Id. at 5. 
 374. Id. at 6. 
 375. Id. 
 376. UKMoD, DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY, supra note 216, at 11–13. See also infra note 402. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Internal Market, Broad Support for Common European Defence Market in the European 
Parliament, SLOVENIAN PRESIDENCY UPDATE (Ass’n of Employers of Slovenia (ZDS)), 6th ed., Apr. 
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case, every step forward adds some clarity. As Trybus recently noted to 
the European Parliament, clarity “makes it more difficult to ignore 
Community law.”379 
In any case, the process is just commencing,380 and it will be interesting 
to monitor the critiques from other stakeholders as they digest the Package 
and speculate about its impact on the industrial base, and to EDEM as a 
whole. 
XV. STATE AID 
Given Member States’ concerns about sovereignty, establishing an 
operational connection between defense as a security activity and the 
“business” of defining and procuring defense needs within the scope of the 
Internal Market was challenging.381 The Lisbon Agenda “stagnated into a 
mid-life crisis,” and the Commission attempted to revive it throughout 
2005, sidestepping sensitive competition issues and industrial policies.382 
State aid policy was an important input. Effective competition policy 
development encompassed non-economic facets to be “wrestl[ed] . . . 
away from the prerogatives of States” to combat “inherent and intrinsically 
negative and protectionist outcomes of national industrial policy.”383 Thus 
state aid, never far from a discussion on defense procurement, was a 
necessary evil in the struggle to balance open markets with industrial 
development. Competition became the figurative battering-ram to widen 
EU industrial strategy, including in defense, with no apologies from the 
Executive for its weapon of choice.  
Of particular concern to the notion of “essential interests” under Article 
296 is the application of state aid, covered under Articles 87-89EC.384 
State aid interacts uniquely with defense procurement because of the close 
relationship between the state and the defense sector, and the likelihood 
 
 
21, 2008, at 10–11, available at http://www.bdi-online.de/download/ZDS_Newsletter_6.pdf (last 
visited June 17, 2008). 
 379. Martin Trybus, Dir., Inst. of Eur. Law, Birmingham Univ., Presentation to the European 
Parliament, Defence Package: Rationalising the European Defence Market—Risks and Benefits (June 
2, 2008), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/hearingsCom.do?language 
=EN&body=IMCO (last visited June 17, 2008). 
 380. According to the Package’s Parliamentary Procedure File, its first reading is scheduled for 
Nov. 18, 2008. See Parliamentary “Forecasts” at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id= 
5573442, the timetable is estimated in the Slovenian Presidency Update, supra note 378, at 11. 
 381. COM (2003) 113, supra note 189. See also id. at 7–17.  
 382. Erika Szyszczak, Modernising State Aid, in EUROPEAN CURRENT LAW lvii, lix (John Porritt 
et al. eds., 2005).  
 383. Id. at lix, lxii. 
 384. EC Treaty arts. 87–89. 
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that a preferred procuring entity could acquire products at artificial, non-
market prices and then use them to cross-subsidize civil production.385 The 
inherent problem of monopsony, with the state the sole buyer of a good 
that can be produced by several different suppliers, is that it renders 
market pricing difficult, and long-term competition among suppliers 
nearly impossible. Dependency easily develops between buyer and seller, 
and state aid is often the result.386 
Article 87EC387 prohibits the granting of State aid which could distort 
competition by favoring certain firms or backing the production of certain 
items. The Court of First Instance in Fiocchi Munizioni SpA v. 
Commission388 permitted derogation from Article 88EC notification and 
examination procedures based on “essential interests of its [internal] 
security.”389 Competition rules did not apply to state aid grants to an arms 
production undertaking, producing goods from The List.390  
Note however, that the Commission is drawing distinctions. For 
example, it is still reviewing state aid to the Greek company ELVO—
which produces dual-purpose goods not entirely covered by Article 296—
to ensure that state aid instruments, such as debt write-offs, are not applied 
to the civilian portion of ELVO’s output.391 The Commission will block an 
Article 296 exemption when it is invoked as a pretext for illegally 
applying state aid to civilian activities.392 
 
 
 385. Alik Doern, The Interaction Between EC Rules on Public Procurement and State Aid, 
P.P.L.R. 2004, 3, 97–129, 121–22. Doern discusses the relationship between Article 87EC and Article 
296. Though outside the detailed scope of this Article, he notes, at 129, that the relationship between 
these two provisions will become increasingly important as the Commission refines its data and policy 
on cross-subsidization. See also comment, supra note 50. 
 386. European Monitoring Centre on Change (EMCC), Sector Futures: Defence Industry: 
European Defence Industry-What Future? 5,  http://www.emcc.eurofound.eu.int/content/source/ 
eu06019a.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) (updated July 12, 2006) (discussing peculiarities of the 
defense industry). For the success of European defense industries, “the outcome will particularly 
depend on the role of individual governments, European collaboration and European-US cooperation.” 
Id.  
 387. EC Treaty art. 87. 
 388. Case T-26/01, 2003 E.C.R. II-3951. 
 389. Id. ¶ 58. 
 390. Id. ¶¶ 58–59, 63–64, 74. 
 391. State Aid: Commission Investigates Support to Greek Vehicle Producer (Dec. 8, 2005), 
available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, reference 
“IP/05/1549”). 
 392. Id. See Notice from Commission to Greece, State Aid C 47/2005 (ex NN 86/2005 and CP 
76/2002) Greece ELVO (Hellenic Vehicle Industry S.A.), D (2005) 4680 (Dec. 7, 2005), 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/register/ii/by_case_nr_c2005_0030.html (select 
hyperlink for “C 47 / 2005”); Invitation to Submit Comments Pursuant to Article 88(2) EC Treaty 
2006/06, 2006 O.J. (C 34) 24. The Commission will conclude the case after all measures are clarified; 
this was anticipated to happen by the end of 2007. E-mails from Novotna, European Comm’n, to 
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Alik Doern references Spain,393 offering perspective on ECJ limits to 
the application of the proportionality principle on matters of domestic 
necessity, essential needs, and national security. The key danger of ECJ 
overextension for Doern is that “a strict application of the proportionality 
test would render Art. 296(1)(b)EC superfluous since it would be no 
different from Art. 30EC.”394 Other initiatives on cross-subsidies are also 
underway.395 The Commission considers the economic angle to state aid 
reform a crucial tool of its success and is refining economics as per its 
State Aid Action Plan.396 Mature markets and procurement environments 
in other Member States can also move this process forward.  
XVI. COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT—THE UK EXPERIENCE 
The UK has a well-established competitive defense procurement 
regime to mentor Member States towards establishing EDEM. In its 
Defence Industrial Strategy Paper, the UK examined “essential interests,” 
finding it unnecessary to exempt all defense procurements from open 
competition even when they may qualify for national interest exemptions, 
as “no country outside the US can afford to have a full cradle to grave 
industry in every sector . . . .”397 Capabilities such as nuclear technology, 
biochemical and radiological warfare and other counterterrorist measures 
are most likely to be retained,398 as are capabilities for building complex 
ships and submarines,399 which are considered a fragile industry requiring 
a highly specialized labor force. As a policy, the UK will analyze and 
retain capabilities to assure continued and consistent equipment 
performance, to retain its “[s]trategic influence (in military, diplomatic or 
industrial terms),” and to consider potential technology benefits for those 
 
 
author (Dec. 20, 2007, and July 26, 2007) (on file with author). However, it has not yet been 
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 393. Doern, supra note 385, at 122.  
 394. Id. at 123. Case 74/76, Iannelli & Volpi S.p.A. v. Ditta Paol Meroni, 1977 E.C.R. 557, ¶¶ 12–
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 395. Neelie Kroes, European Comm’r for Competition Policy, The Refined Economic Approach 
in State Aid Law: A Policy Perspective (Sept. 21, 2006), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
searchAction.do (search complete database, reference “SPEECH/06/518”). 
 396. Commission, State Aid Action Plan (Consultation Document), COM (2005) 107 final (June 
7, 2005). See also id. ¶¶ 8–9, 18–19, 21–22. 
 397. UKMoD, DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY, DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 21 (Dec. 2005) 
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with wider value.400 Notwithstanding, the UK Defence Industrial Strategy 
remains committed to competitive procurement and intends to participate 
in global procurement, even where certain industrial capabilities could be 
sustained in the UK for strategic reasons.401 
While this Article is not meant to address EU procurement in the global 
context, the UK’s own global strategy offers parallels to EU cross-border 
procurement. The UK strategy highlights that the UK Ministry of Defence 
(UKMoD) has thoroughly considered defense procurement in light of 
domestic industrial loss. It considered important overlapping security of 
supply and technology innovation issues,402 concluding that a default to a 
closed market is inefficient; competition is the only way to achieve and 
maintain value-for-money acquisitions. With respect to monopsony, there 
is also a broader range of suppliers in a wider market.  
Other Member States may not share the UK’s confidence in applying 
or defining “essential interest.” One could plausibly argue that the UK has 
more industries and faces less overall risk and more potential benefit by 
expanding defense procurement options. Europe relies heavily on the UK 
for protection given the UK’s ranking as the second largest defense 
industry. Yet the UK market is vulnerable and political risks are therefore 
considerable. UK investment commitments are massive, its global 
networks and procurement environment are well-established. Furthermore, 
the UK offers vast procurement resources for Member States to study and 
leverage. In addition, it has heavy responsibilities within NATO and the 
EU, as well as a considerable stake in EDEM. Objectively, in some 
respects, the UK’s risk in opting for open defense markets may actually be 
higher than that of other Member States.  
An open defense market in the UK advances cross-border competition 
in the EU’s defense procurement regime. The UK “classroom” is a hands-
on laboratory in which Member States may consult and experiment with 
ways to reduce automatic reliance on Article 296 exemptions, and yet still 
 
 
 400. DIS (2005), supra note 397, at 7. See also 8–11, 17, 22. It will also seek to retain 
“operational sovereignty” on technology bought in. See for example the arguments with the United 
States over the purchase of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter. Justin Wastnage, Breakthrough as UK Signs 
Technology Transfer Deal with USA (F-35 JSF Purchase), FLIGHT INT’L ONLINE, at 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1752274/posts (last visited June 10, 2008). See also Lord 
Drayson: Joint Strike Force Operational Sovereignty is Vital for UK Defence Interests, Mar. 14, 2006, 
http://www.britainusa.com/sections/articles_show_nt1.asp?d=0&i=41062&L1=&L2=&a=41390 (last 
visited June 10, 2008). 
 401. DIS (2005), supra note 397, at 2, 6, 9, 21, 26, 42. See id. at 66–67 (noting intention for 
international R&T collaboration); id. at 104–05 (the sustainment strategy).  
 402. UKMoD, DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY, supra note 216, at 11–13. See also UKMoD, 
DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY, supra note 397. 
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appropriately focus on their interpretations of essential interests for their 
unique needs. The UK is skilled at evaluating production costs and value-
for-money. Furthermore, if the UK subjects its own sensitive technologies 
to the Internal Market’s rules—thus setting an example by following 
Commission guidance pursuant to the Interpretative Communication on 
296403—this supports the aims of the Defence Package, and makes it 
difficult for other Member States to exclude less sensitive procurements 
from the potential procurement participation of their EU allies absent a 
compelling justification.  
XVII. DEFENSE 2007 AND BEYOND  
Defense procurements outside 2004/18/EC are invariably opaque 
transactions undertaken in part for political reasons, which seemingly 
condone national protectionism and facilitate back-door negotiations.404 
Therefore, lack of transparency remains a key impediment to EDEM. 
However, the Commission continues its efforts in this regard.405  
The Commission’s 2007 Work Programme encourages competition in 
the defense sector by addressing its unique needs. It will address 
commercial deficiencies with defense integration and will target 
fragmentation in “defence industries and markets,” citing the “need to 
respect the demands of national security,” which has “kept these industries 
apart from the competitive rigours of the internal market.”406  
Additional Commission commitments are included in initiatives 
outlined in FP7, which has earmarked billions of euros to fund innovation 
along four themes: Cooperation, Ideas, People, and Capacities in areas 
such as nanotechnology, nuclear energy, transportation (including 
aeronautics), space, and security.407 Research and innovation benefits from 
FP7 will be directly applicable to certain defense capabilities, especially 
through the development of dual-use technology. These developments will 
strengthen defense, and are consistent with publicized EU efforts to place 
 
 
 403. When the UK needs to invoke Article 296, relevant justifications will be compatible with the 
December 2006 Interpretive Communication. E-mail from Sandra Docking, UKMoD, to author (Jan. 
8, 2007) (on file with author). 
 404. See Wilson supra note 46, at 3.  
 405. Siim Kallas, Vice-President of the European Commission Responsible for Admin. Affairs, 
Audit and Anti-Fraud, European Transparency Initiative (Jan. 18, 2007), available at RAPID, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, reference “SPEECH/07/17”).  
 406. Defense is prominently featured in the EU’s current working agenda. See Commission 
Communication, Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2007, COM (2006) 629 final 5 (Oct. 
24, 2006). See also id. at Annex, 15–16 (Strategic Initiative #18).  
 407. CORDIS, Understand FP7, supra note 32. 
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defense within the Internal Market through the 2007 Work Programme. 
The 2007 Programme also fosters the initiatives toward public-private 
partnerships in defense, changes in public procurement, the Interpretative 
Communication, and the upholding and clarification of ECJ case law.408 
Movement is expected in these areas during the course of the French 
Presidency rotation.409 In addition, there is the economic “spin-off” effect 
that occurs, especially in defense, as the civilian sector recoups massive 
research and innovation costs through procurement and secondary 
innovations deriving from government-sponsored research.410  
Bolstering this positive progress requires stronger instruments to clarify 
the relationship between competition policy and defense procurement. The 
EDA’s Voluntary Code of Conduct, which had a successful first year, 
reflects Community support and cooperation toward trade-barrier removal, 
on a voluntary basis.411 The principles of free movement will pressure the 
retooling of—or mergers between—obsolete or depressed industries, 
artificially kept alive through national protectionist measures and Article 
296.412  
The Commission is taking a harder line and encouraging Community 
cooperation in research innovation to avoid harmful gaps and unnecessary 
duplication from national efforts that are neither conducted nor tracked 
through any central EU mechanism.413 Mr. Solana believes the only way 
forward in defense innovation is to spend more, spend better, and spend 
together.414 Big spenders like Spain believe a proper procurement regime 
is an essential precursor to an open defense industrial market.415 Current 
instruments to date (i.e., legislation and Article 296) have been ineffective 
at balancing the peculiarities of defense with the multiple stakeholders, 
national sovereignty, and long life-cycle of defense systems.416 EDEM 
offers vast unexplored commercial potential.417 Strengthening cross-border 
 
 
 408. COM (2006) 629 final, supra note 406. 
 409. See supra note 30. 
 410. COM (2004) 590 final, supra note 205. 
 411. EDA, The Code of Conduct, supra note 304. 
 412. CSIS, CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 266, at 10–11.  
 413. CORDIS, Verheugen Calls for Increased Cooperation in European Security Research (Feb. 
10, 2006), http://www.cordis.europa.eu/fetch?CALLER=EN_NEWS&ACTION=D&DOC=3&CAT= 
NEWS&QUERY=0119df34780f:79efcebc&RCN=25191. 
 414. Id. See also Solana Speech, supra note 243, at 1. 
 415. See generally SPANISH MOD ANSWERS, supra note 292, at 3. 
 416. Id. 
 417. Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy: Commission Proposals (Mar. 11, 2003), 
available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, reference 
“IP/03/355”) (last visited June 8, 2008). 
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defense procurement within the Internal Market will increase competition 
and allow that potential to be exploited.418  
Defense procurement has come “under the spotlight” in an effort to 
defend and widen the single market. “If the EU really wants to punch its 
weight in world affairs, the ultimate test will be its willingness to boost its 
defence capability.”419 Hard defense decisions cannot be taken through 
isolation; politically, no superpower can afford to operate alone.420 The 
defense decision-making culture must change. Strengthening EU defense 
industrial capacity will require weighted input by economic analysts in 
areas like state aid sustainability. Public scrutiny of enormous defense 
expenditures also plays a role, as support for defense is stronger when 
economic incentives like employment touch citizens personally, or 
through humanitarian applications to which the public can relate.421  
Safeguarding the economic strength of the EU’s economy is itself a 
step towards security of defense. Legal certainty for predictable cross-
border commercial procurement opportunities and procedures will 
facilitate the success of FP7 objectives toward research and innovation. 
Stronger measures to open defense procurement to the Internal Market 
could foster e-procurement, facilitate economic interdependence, and 
enhance political will among Member States, the Institutions, industry and 
the public to benefit from a more competitive defense market.  
Recently, the Defence Directive discussed in 2006422 was finally 
unveiled, and is now a pending proposal awaiting co-decision approval by 
the European Council and Parliament.423 As mentioned, there can be no 
doubt that such a Directive will be helpful, notwithstanding its 
deficiencies. Stakeholders and scholars support this legislation for many 
reasons.  
Firstly, it will facilitate procurement of dual-use items caught between 
defense and security needs categories, and would “diffuse the issue of 
 
 
 418. The UKHC supported the Commission’s position and proposals, recognizing the need for the 
EU to “create for itself a more robust, internationally competitive, Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base.” See UKHL, An EU Defence Equipment Policy (23d Report of Session 2002–2003), 
¶ 22.5.  
 419. José Manuel Barroso, Does Europe Really Mean Business 5 (Sept. 12, 2006), available at 
RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, reference “SPEECH/ 
06/489”). 
 420. DIS (2005), supra note 397, at 21. 
 421. See Wagner, supra note 190, at 11–15, Eurobarometer, supra note 192, and other sources at 
supra note 201.  
 422. IC296, supra note 5, at 9. 
 423. See Defence Directive supra note 8. See also the Defence Package documents, supra note 6, 
and Parliamentary Procedure File, supra note 380. 
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choosing between Community rules and Article 296.”424 Secondly, Aris 
Georgopoulos sees this as a move towards a common approach that would 
enhance global competition opportunities for the Community; it is an 
opportunity that should not be missed by Member States.425 Arrowsmith 
appears skeptical that a single body of rules will suit all Member States, 
and that it may be beyond Community competence.426  
Siding with Georgopoulos, however, given the anticipated future 
reliance on dual-use items and/or technology that can be integrated into 
defense applications, and which frequently use sensitive technologies, 
Member States would be better served if they had legislative guidance on 
which they could rely. Further, consistent application of expressed 
guidelines creates precedent, which, in turn, establishes legal certainty of 
the type that has facilitated the maturity and success of the EU’s Internal 
Market to date.  
Consider the dual security-defense use of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) that can be equipped with border cameras for security, or missiles 
for defense. Another dual-use example is software-defined-radio.427 
Targeted legislation contemplating such developments is a practical 
necessity to guide Member States towards EDEM, while reinforcing the 
message delivered earlier by the Interpretative Communication on Article 
296.428 The process is quickly moving forward and stakeholders appear 
anxious to leverage momentum.  
The role of the ECJ will also be critical. One cannot credibly claim that 
the ECJ is comprised of “unspecialist judges” who do not understand the 
practicalities of procurement, implying that they make biased 
determinations.429 This was the same jaundiced rhetoric used by critics of 
antitrust modernization. The judiciary—adept jurists who routinely handle 
complicated issues—has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to expand 
its expertise consistent with dynamic Treaty responsibilities. The 
Commission’s confidence in the Court is evident from the integration of 
ECJ rulings throughout secondary legislation. Commercial aspects of 
defense are based on foundations of free movement and competition that 
are well within the ECJ’s intellectual capacity, not to mention within its 
mandated Treaty oversight role. In fact, because commercial policy is the 
 
 
 424. COM (2005) 626 final, supra note 213, at 7. 
 425. Georgopoulos, supra note 298, at 571–72. 
 426. Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 383–84. 
 427. EDA, Background on Software Defined Radio, http://www.eda.europa.eu/webutils/ 
downloadfile.aspx?fileid=51 (last visited June 8, 2008).  
 428. FAQs, supra note 325. An impact assessment is currently underway.  
 429. Arrowsmith, supra note 45, at 383.  
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most mature of all the policies in the acquis, the Court has a vast arsenal 
of its own well-established precedent from which to draw in addressing 
and shaping cross-border defense industrial policy.  
XVIII. COMMENTARY: THE TREATY OF LISBON 
The final section of this Article is dedicated to the Treaty of Lisbon.430 
On June 13, 2008, after eighteen (of twenty-seven) Member States had 
already ratified the Treaty in what seemed like a smooth exercise, Ireland 
announced the results of its June 12 referendum; approximately one 
hundred thousand Irish nationals rejected the Treaty of Lisbon, a result 
that prevents the process of institutional reform from moving forward.431 
Ireland’s voters are testing the relationship between EU Member States, 
Institutions, and citizens.  
On June 19, 2008, the UK officially parted ways with Ireland when the 
UK Parliament’s vote in favor of approving the EU Amendment Bill 
received Royal Assent and thus became UK law, making the UK the 
nineteenth Member State to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon,432 notwithstanding 
 
 
 430. Lisbon Treaty, supra note 1. The Lisbon Treaty is in limbo and must be ratified by all 
twenty-seven EU Member States before it can take effect. As of June 20, 2008, nineteen Member 
States had ratified it, a process that went smoothly until Ireland held a referendum on June 12, 2008 
(as required by its constitution), and Irish voters rejected the Treaty, prompting speculation that the 
Treaty ratification process would end. However, in the aftermath of the Irish referendum, the European 
Council met in Brussels on June 19 and 20, 2008, and declared that Ireland must be given time to 
examine the situation and decide on a course of action. Therefore, the Council will stay decisions on 
the Treaty’s future until it next meets on October 15, 2008. See EUROPA, Ratification Situation, 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/nice_treaty/ratiftable_en.pdf; COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS OF THE BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 11018/08, CONCL 2, at 1, 
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/101346.pdf 
[hereinafter “June Council Conclusions”]. See European Council to Analyse Further and Return to 
Lisbon Treaty in October; Meanwhile, Ratification Continues, June 20, 2008, 
http://www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/Press_ Releases/June/0620EC_LisbonTreaty.html. 
 431. Ireland’s population is 4.4 million (.888%) of the EU’s half billion. See EUROSTAT, Total 
Population Table at January 1 (2008), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table& 
init=1&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=caa10000; EUROSTAT, National Population: Share of EU-
27 Population (%), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,39140985&_dad= 
portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=detailref&language=en&product=Yearlies_new_population&root
=Yearlies_new_population/C/C1/C11/caa12560. Poor turnout by Irish voters as indicated, supra text 
accompanying note 261, was more than sufficient to block the Treaty from taking effect. The vote was 
53% to reject and 46% in favor. McDonald & Stratton, supra note 261. 
 432. It was said prior to the summit that Irish “Prime Minister Brian Cowen, faces certain 
embarrassment and possible isolation” by EU Officials for what will certainly be perceived by the 
collective as a political failure. Ireland’s Veto of EU Treaty Poses Union Roadblock, 
DAILYPRESS.COM, June 14, 2008, available at http://www.dailypress.com/topic/ny-woire 
l145726795jun14,0,6738536.story. See also supra note 443. Notwithstanding the united front 
conveyed to the public by the Council, there are reports of finger-pointing and less cohesion on 
summit margins. See Jenny Percival, Lisbon Treaty: Brown Defends Mandelson After Sarkozy Blames 
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the Irish rejection. The nineteen Member States voting in favor of 
ratification were Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, and the United 
Kingdom.433 
It can certainly be said that Ireland’s rejection of Lisbon has raised 
concerns about the strength and credibility of the collective, and that the 
result could torpedo the Treaty. However, contrary to media 
representations, even if this did occur, it is not a fatal situation.  
For one thing, certain concepts reflecting the collective’s desire to 
move the Institutions towards transparency and democratic principles in its 
operations will continue to drive EU institutional policymaking. Such 
concepts are already being integrated and are observed and enforced in 
Commission operations—notably in the area of procurement.434  
It must also be remembered that the Irish “no” is hardly the first time in 
EU evolution that a Treaty has been rejected. For example, the French and 
the Dutch rejected the Constitutional Treaty in 2005—an event that was 
the very genesis of the Treaty of Lisbon. In 2001, Ireland itself rejected the 
Treaty of Nice by 54%, only to hold a second referendum in 2002, 
approving it by 63%.435 Thus, looking at the events from a historical 
perspective, it is difficult to believe the Treaty is dead at this point in time.  
To the contrary, the European Commission and the Council have 
officially announced that the ratification process for Lisbon will continue 
through the end of the year to allow the Member States and the Institutions 
to evaluate support, and plan their options accordingly.436  
If Ireland remains a hold-out and refuses to ratify the Treaty, it may 
find itself uncomfortably isolated from the other Member States (and 
unpopular among other EU citizens). The Czech Republic will be 
watching this carefully, too, since its own Constitutional Court must 
 
 
Him for Irish “No” Vote, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, June 20, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/ 
jun/20/eu.mandelson. Either way there promises to be a cooling off period to allow Ireland time to 
reflect. Jim Brunsden, Ireland Given “Time and Space,” EUROPEANVOICE.COM, June 16, 2008, 
available at http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/06/1622/ireland-given-%E2%80%98time-
and-space-/61219.aspx. 
 433. The UK’s ratification after the Irish referendum is a strategically symbolic demonstration of 
support for the legislation. See Lisbon Website, supra note 1.  
 434. See generally the proposed amendments in Lisbon’s Article 1(12) (Title II Provisions on 
Democratic Principles) and discussion supra Part VI. 
 435. See EUROPA, Ratification Situation, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/nice_treaty/ratiftable_en.pdf.  
 436. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council (June 20, 2008), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/101346.pdf. See Statement 
by President Barroso Following the Irish Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon (June 13, 2008), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/statement_20080613.pdf.  
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deliver a positive opinion that the Lisbon Treaty accords with the Czech 
constitutional order, in order for ratification to occur there.437 
There has been post-referendum backlash against Ireland for holding 
up institutional reform suggesting that work on EU priorities cannot wait 
for the Irish when there are millions of other EU citizens to consider. In 
addition, some measure of optimism has been glimpsed from Commission 
statements that reflect a hope that the Irish should vote again and may 
eventually support the legislation. Institutional reform is badly needed; 
further enlargement cannot take place under the current framework, which 
is already stretched to its limits. 
Innumerable media reports on Lisbon438 describe the outcome as 
nothing short of catastrophy, chaos, and a slew of other negative adjectives 
prompting images of doom and the demise of the collective altogether.  
To read such accounts, one would think that the Commission is 
paralyzed; its staff members—constructively discharged—packing their 
desks to become job seekers themselves. This author believes that any 
account that paints such a portrait is highly exaggerated. 
Of course, it is a valid question to ask “what will happen to the EU?” In 
the short-term, the answer is “not much.” While there is no doubt the Irish 
“no” caused a hiccup in the evolution of the institutional framework, one 
can hardly expect the EU to close for business as a result. The EU didn’t 
collapse when the Irish rejected the Treaty of Nice in 2001,439 or when the 
French and Dutch rejected the Constitutional Treaty for Europe in 2005.440 
The normal business of the Commission continues in most areas so the 
daily lives of citizens will not really be affected at this point.441 In 
addition, though existing mechanisms are cumbersome, they are still in 
place.  
The Lisbon Treaty is intended more as an exercise in institutional 
reform—an effort to streamline governance of five hundred million people 
who are currently subject to a bureaucracy which operates under an 
 
 
 437. See June Council Conclusions, supra note 430. 
 438. Apart from the reports cited in this Article, a simple “google” search of the “Irish 
Referendum for the Lisbon Treaty” produces scores of on-point hits too numerable to include herein.  
 439. See, e.g., Ireland Rejects EU Expansion, BBC NEWS, June 8, 2001, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1376379.stm (last visited June 28, 2008); EU “to Proceed with 
Enlargement,” BBC NEWS, June 11, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1382163.stm 
(last visited June 28, 2008). 
 440. See Dutch Say “No” to EU Constitution, BBC NEWS, June 2, 2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4601439.stm (last visited June 28, 2008). 
 441. According to Julia Bateman, the head of the Law Society’s joint Brussels office, it is 
“business as usual in Brussels.” Julia Bateman, Irish “Ayes” Not Smiling, LAW SOCIETY GAZETTE, 
June 26, 2008, at 12.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] CROSS-BORDER COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 447 
 
 
 
 
obsolescent framework, unsuitable for the task of governing the EU at its 
current size, and certainly not suited to accommodate further expansion.  
So for now, the existing Treaties, most recently amended by the Treaty 
of Nice, remain the law. This will only change if an official decision is 
made to either end the process and initiate new options, or suggest and 
negotiate a compromise acceptable to Irish voters (and any other 
governments that might still reject the Treaty of Lisbon) before the 
ratification period runs out or before the remaining Member States have 
officially endorsed or rejected it.  
Current media reports mainly attribute the Irish rejection to a lack of 
understanding of the Treaty,442 and to job seekers from other Member 
States taking Irish jobs, among other reasons.443 This explanation clearly 
signals dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Brian Cowen and the Irish 
economy, and caused the Prime Minister considerable embarrassment over 
his inability to get the message of the Treaty to his constituency. Yet 
considering that less than half of Irish citizens voted in the referendum, 
one cannot easily accept that the result was an outright blanket rejection of 
Lisbon’s provisions and principles.444  
As previously mentioned, the ratification process will continue for 
now. It is even possible that the Irish will hold a second vote later this 
year, or that another Member State will fail to ratify the Treaty. Some 
commentators have suggested that the Member States will consider 
separate protocols for Ireland (or any others who may not ratify the 
Treaty), or a two-track progression by some Member States.445 Others 
 
 
 442. “Nearly a third of respondents told The Irish Times that they did not know what they were 
voting for . . . .” Will Irish Voters Put Europe to the Sword over Lisbon Treaty?, TIMES (LONDON), 
June 12, 2008, at 40, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article 
4116653.ece. 
 443. Shawn Pogatchnik, Irish Voters Veto EU Treaty, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 14, 2008, 
available at http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jcOuUAmav6-7wKlhwZljN3F1mqIQD919EJ200 
(last visited June 15, 2008). 
 444. McDonald & Stratton, supra, note 261; Ireland Set to Throw out EU Treaty, THE 
INDEPENDENT (LONDON) ONLINE, June 13, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ 
ireland-set-to-throw-out-eu-treaty-846621.html.  
 445. It has been suggested that “the scope of the treaty could be limited to the other 26 member 
states and that Ireland could be offered some other type of legal arrangement.” Ralf Beste, Hans-
Jürgen Schlamp & Stefan Simons, EU in Chaos After Ireland’s ‘No’ Vote, SPIEGEL ONLINE, June 15, 
2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,559730,00.html.  
 Three options appear to be currently on the table. Firstly, a small group of the more 
ambitious countries could move forward in the form of reinforced cooperation. In case no 
common solution can be found with Ireland, this approach is favoured most notably by 
Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker and is likely to gain the support of 
Germany and France. 
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have even suggested that Ireland withdraw altogether.446 The point to be 
made is that there are in fact other avenues to move the collective forward 
and though there is some measure of resentment that Ireland did not own 
up to its responsibilities as a member of the team, this shall pass.  
However, as previously stated, to suggest the imminent demise of the 
EU is a gross exaggeration.447 It is worth noting, for example, that the 
Lisbon rejection was seemingly the priority of the EU Summit, yet the 
meeting commenced with a discussion of the accession of Slovenia to the 
Eurozone and not the Irish referendum.448 
In light of this, some commentary with respect to the Treaty’s aim 
within the context of this Article is warranted.  
The Lisbon Treaty would add a unique footprint to the acquis by 
modifying defense and security dimensions of the EU’s Internal Market. 
Though the current situation precludes a comprehensive review of the 
Lisbon Treaty here,449 some of its essential points are noteworthy.  
First, The Lisbon Treaty aims to establish a more democratic and 
transparent Europe by giving the EU Parliament, and EU citizens, a 
stronger role in policy-making.450 The second aim is to improve 
institutional efficiency by providing consistency and mechanisms to 
 
 
 But it is also certain to be opposed by small and new member states, which are against a 
“core” or “two-speed Europe.” Spain’s Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 
dismissed talks on this issue as “premature” at this point. 
 A second option would be to apply the treaty only to 26 countries, with a special statute 
for Ireland. This view was voiced by Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
who even considered the option of Ireland temporarily exiting the integration process. 
 The last option would have Ireland vote again on a revised text after the ratification 
process is completed in all other member states. This revised text might grant the country 
certain opt-outs and assurances as was the case for Denmark, which said “yes” to the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 after an initial referendum had failed. 
EU Ministers: Treaty “Not Dead”, “Emergency Plan” Needed, EURACTIV.COM, June 17, 2008, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/eu-ministers-treaty-dead-emergency-plan-needed/article-173383 
(last visited June 17, 2008). 
 446. See, e.g., Patrick Smyth, Dane Urges Ireland to Pull out of EU, IRISH TIMES, June 20, 2008, 
at 8. 
 447. See also Treaty “Not Dead,” supra note 445. 
 448. See Janez Janša, President of the European Council, Slovenian Presidency Summit Invitation 
(June 17, 2008), http://www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/download_docs/June/0619_EC1/ 
040PMinvitation.pdf. 
 449. The specific elements will not be discussed in this Article. The reader is referred to the 
Lisbon Treaty Website, supra note 1, which has links to all Lisbon Treaty information including the 
full Treaty text.  
 450. Lisbon Treaty, supra note 1. See generally the proposed amendments in Article 1(12) (Title 
II Provisions on Democratic Principles). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] CROSS-BORDER COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 449 
 
 
 
 
facilitate decision-making and simplify voting on legislation.451 In 
addition, the Presidency of the Council would become an elected position 
for a two-and-a-half year term,452 providing for greater leadership 
continuity. The Lisbon Treaty will hopefully improve the quality of life of 
Europeans by providing a legal basis for action in several policy areas 
such as freedom, security and justice, terrorism, or crime.453 Third, 
European rights and values, freedom, solidarity, and security would be 
emphasized through recognition of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
within the framework of EU primary law.454 Finally, the Lisbon Treaty 
would give the EU legal personality, which would define it as a global 
actor, resulting in greater cohesion with respect to EU external relations.455  
Of the specific themes outlined in The Lisbon Treaty,456 several are 
linked to the security and defense themes raised throughout this Article.457  
The establishment of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy is perhaps the most significant change. The High 
Representative will not only become a Commission vice-president, but 
will in effect become the EU’s foreign minister,458 a move that will 
facilitate continuity and establish credibility in the development and 
implementation of external policy. Changes to proposed Chapter 2, 
Section 1 TEU guide “[t]he Union’s action on the international scene” 
with respect to its Common Foreign and Security Policy.459 A new Section 
2 has been proposed to deal with the common security and defense policy 
 
 
 451. Id. See generally id. art. 1(13) (Institutions) and proposed Title III, Provisions on the 
Institutions. 
 452. Id. art. 1(16), art. 9(13)(5). But cf. supra note 26 (discussing the current state of the Council 
Presidency). 
 453. There are innumerable references to this throughout the Treaty text. See Conference of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Declaration by the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Article 61 H of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (Dec. 3, 2007), available at http://www.reformtreaty.ie/eutreaty/Reform-Treaty-03-Dec-07-
CIG-14-07-cg00014.en07.pdf. 
 454. See, e.g., Lisbon Treaty, supra note 1, proposed art. 6 and Protocol on the Application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom. 
 455. Lisbon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1(55). Efforts to establish a global role for the EU will likely 
move forward.  
 456. José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission: The European Union 
After the Lisbon Treaty (Feb. 4, 2007), available at RAPID, http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do 
(search complete database, reference “SPEECH/07/793”). See also Commission Welcomes Signature 
of the Treaty of Lisbon and Calls for Its Swift Ratification (Dec. 13, 2007), available at RAPID, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search complete database, reference “IP/07/1922”).  
 457. Special thanks to Ms. Stacy Ferraro and Wg Cdr Paul O’ Neill for lively debates on defense 
within the context of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 458. Lisbon Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 1(19) (proposed Article 9(E) TEU), 1(30) (proposed Article 
13(a)), 1(38)(b)(ii) (proposed Article 19(2) TEU). 
 459. Id. art. 1(26). See generally id. art. 1(25). 
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aspects.460 Here, the specific inclusion of the EDA within the Treaty 
provisions defining the EDA’s obligations—such as those proposed by 
Articles 28 A(3) and 28 D—suggests a higher prominence for the future 
EDA, in which it could become a main channel of participation in a 
permanent structured cooperation rather than a forum for voluntary 
participation as it presently exists.461 This seems to be what is suggested 
by granting authority to the EDA to determine whether Member States’ 
military capabilities satisfy the higher criteria required by permanent 
structured cooperation.462  
The Lisbon Treaty provisions modernize the Petersberg Tasks on 
peace-keeping, disarmament, and conflict prevention463 allowing their 
application to more challenging military missions, thus necessitating 
greater military capabilities and enhanced interoperability amongst 
forces.464 This strengthens the arguments for a genuinely open market in 
defense matters where European cooperation in armaments satisfies both 
economic and military imperatives. The role of civilian crisis-management 
capabilities is also underscored,465 suggesting a broader definition of 
security that would encompass combating terrorism, working towards 
mutual defense, ensuring energy security, and strengthening links with 
development policy and humanitarian aid.  
While Lisbon reflects Member States’ efforts to evolve their pooled 
sovereignty into a contemporary institutional framework supporting the 
emergence of a Common European Security and Defence Policy with a 
robust base in the defense industry, it is too early to tell where all this will 
lead. Members of the UK House of Commons raise important questions 
 
 
 460. Id. art. 1(48). 
 461. Id. at Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation Established by Article 28A of the 
Treaty on European Union.  
 462. Id. art. 1(49)(c)(6) (proposed Article 28A TEU). 
 463. The Petersberg Tasks are integral to ESDP and were explicitly included in Article 17(2) 
TEU. The Western European Union (WEU) Member States declared their intention to strengthen the 
Atlantic Alliance and define “missions, structures and means” to strengthening WEU’s operational 
role in European security. Petersberg Declaration—Bonn Section II (June 19, 1992), 
http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/key/declaration_petersberg.php (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2008). WEU States declared “their readiness to make available to the WEU, but also to 
NATO and the European Union, military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed 
forces.” EUROPA Glossary: Petersberg Tasks, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_ 
en.htm. These tasks were originally set forth in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial 
Council of the WEU, Bonn, June 19, 1992. They cover: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping 
tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Petersberg 
Declaration—Bonn Section II (June 19, 1992), http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/ 
sessions_ordinaires/key/declaration_petersberg.php (last visited June 8, 2008).  
 464. Lisbon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1(49)(c)(6) (proposed Article 28A TEU).  
 465. Id. art. 1(50) (proposed Article 28D TEU). 
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about how seriously the provisions could ever be implemented if the 
Lisbon Treaty is ever ratified. Given the UK’s importance to European 
defense, the questions raised by knowledgeable stakeholders in the UK are 
not to be shrugged off. The debate, however, will be ongoing for some 
time,466 especially since the provisions do not offer much substance with 
which to develop an aggressive implementation strategy. Therefore, the 
discourse through the ratification process should be most illuminating. 
XIX. CONCLUSION 
Simplified, non-discriminatory and transparent procurement policies, 
clear guidance from the Commission and the ECJ, and cooperation among 
Member States’ competition authorities are long overdue in the EU’s 
public procurement regime. Procurement procedures must be streamlined, 
must maximize transparency, and must facilitate participation among the 
widest range of potential providers to foster a technologically advanced, 
cost-effective, European-based procurement market. Achieving these goals 
depends both on policy measures to open the market and on operational 
measures to enhance it.  
European economic conditions are becoming increasingly hospitable to 
cross-border procurement. Technology has enhanced tendering procedures 
and the computer revolution has lowered the costs of handling information 
to the extent that there exists a nearly “frictionless” market, the economic 
ideal. Data are more accessible and quantifiable.467 Principles of equal 
treatment, recently affirmed by Fabricom,468 will be applied whenever 
possible. EU Institutions and Member States can capitalize on this, sharing 
industrial strategies and leveraging existing research to increase cross-
border competitive capacity.  
The defense sector’s potential commercial contribution to the Lisbon 
Agenda is clear. Concerning defense procurement, however, it must be 
remembered that a tender only becomes a defense procurement eligible for 
special handling when exempted by Article 296. Otherwise, it is simply 
public procurement subject to 2004/18/EC, and potentially, the 2007 
 
 
 466. UK PARLIAMENT, FOREIGN AFFAIRS—THIRD REPORT § 7 (Session 2007–08), available at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/120/12002.htm (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2008). One example, “the somewhat cumbersome procedures involved in establishing 
and operating ‘permanent structured co-operation’ . . . [which] might prove to be a little-used device.” 
Id. 
 467. And becoming more so as the EDA becomes a dependable source of annual commercial 
defense statistics.  
 468. Joined Cases C-21 & 34/03, 2005 E.C.R. I-1559. See supra notes 71–72. 
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Defence Directive. To date, the Treaty, Public Procurement Directives, 
and case law have not coherently addressed the unusual features of 
defense, armaments and national security industrial sectors. In addition, 
the pending Defence Package has yet to pass Council and Parliament, or 
be tested against public scrutiny. Until that occurs, the EU’s defense 
market thus remains fragmented, and largely exempt from Internal Market 
rules; it lacks standardization, is characterized by artificially high prices, 
and most importantly, results in reduced defense capabilities. Though 
Article 296 abuses have long exploited this situation, the Commission and 
the ECJ are finally headed towards a common approach to correct the 
aforementioned defects by restricting Article 296 exemptions, and 
attempting to provide clearer guidelines.  
This Article does not suggest that Member States should be required to 
cede authority over their essential national interests to EU Institutions. 
Rather, it concludes that Member States’ responsibilities to the collective 
require careful consideration of exemptions in light of the Treaty and the 
Internal Market obligations they have willingly accepted. In the 
Community’s best interest, derogations must be parsimoniously granted; it 
has been shown herein that essential security interests can be effectively 
protected notwithstanding Internal Market obligations. Although value-
for-money, transparency, and equal treatment should drive all government 
spending, achieving transparency in tender awards and Article 296 
exemptions will be difficult in a national security context, as recently 
illustrated by the BAE-Saudi and Czech truck procurements.469 The ECJ’s 
role will be vital in this regard.  
Cross-border procurement should increase as ineligible tenders are 
stripped of Article 296 protection and become subject to Internal Market 
rules, signaling that any procurement strategies aiming to receive special 
treatment must be defensible and backed by solid justification.  
Admittedly, for the foreseeable future, the defense sector will remain a 
quagmire of conflicting initiatives since commercial aspects of EDEM are 
still immature and are consequently unable to benefit from the 
procurement advances operating in more established commercial sectors. 
This would be the case whether or not the Treaty of Lisbon is ratified this 
year. In fact, it seems clear from an examination of Commission initiatives 
that the Commission has avoided framing its initiatives in the context of a 
ratified Lisbon Treaty. “Naval gazing” will not be the way forward; 
important policy decisions are pending in many other areas and cannot be 
 
 
 469. See supra notes 231, 323. 
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delayed. Therefore, the practical consequences of the rejection will be 
minimal in the short-term, but institutional reform must occur at some 
point.  
The 2007 Work Programme and FP7 will still promote both common 
and defense procurement liberalization, however, by engaging private-
sector participation and expertise that identifies opportunities, presses for 
access, executes procurements, and objects to inappropriate dealings. 
The Interpretative Communication on Article 296 was a solid first step 
and a welcome initiative in 2006. The completion of the Defence Package 
in 2007 was a necessary deliverable to underscore that the Institutions and 
stakeholders have the political will to tackle the prickly defense 
procurement minefield. Although the Package’s impact will be unclear for 
some time, its objective is clear even though it still requires substantive 
development. Member States have been invoking Article 296 for decades 
with little consideration for its affect on the Internal Market, in which 
defense and dual-use is of rising importance. Henceforth, abusive 
application of Article 296 will likely diminish given that the ECJ is poised 
to strike justifications when they are based on overriding political 
interests, rather than essential security or defense interests. Bovis appears 
to be on target regarding the ECJ’s broadened competence to interpret the 
Treaty; it is less the Directives alone that will change the approach, and 
more the threat of jurisprudence that will define procurement evolution.470 
That being said, a Defence Directive will make the Institutions’ tasks 
much easier by offering clearer guidance to the Commission. Any 
improvements toward institutional coherence, consistency, and efficiency, 
whether by Lisbon or some other future initiative, will only facilitate 
efficiency in all areas of EU operations—especially those that touch on 
defense, whether directly or peripherally.  
Ultimately, collaboration—whether voluntary or forced by more 
limited Article 296 interpretations—and legislative guidance—will reduce 
confusion and fragmentation of the defense market, allowing consolidation 
of underperforming industries, and reducing duplication in research that 
wastes precious euros. This will better leverage shrinking defense 
spending.471 Furthermore, the UK experience has shown that it is possible 
 
 
 470. Bovis, supra note 90, at 631. 
 471. “[C]onsolidation of demand will drive price pressure, which in turn will drive consolidation 
of overcapacity, which in turn will create a lower cost structure . . . [which] is a crucial step in 
generating new and improved capacity in the European industrial base supporting defense.” CSIS, 
EUROPEAN DEFENCE INTEGRATION, supra note 201, at 74. 
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to develop a national defense market consistent with limited Article 296 
exemptions for defense and security procurement needs. 
Better cross-border competition and enforcement results in legal 
certainty, establishes precedent, and creates economic credibility—an 
environment that invites investment. Economic benefits naturally derive 
from markets providing the best value-for-money in producing the highest 
quality equipment and services among the most highly skilled workers and 
competitive industries. Industry requires a competitive cross-border 
environment to perpetuate strategic planning and to assess long-term 
government needs for public-private partnerships.472 This can be said for 
both defense and general procurement experiences.  
The ongoing protection of vested interests will actually increase the 
EU’s international vulnerability, both commercially and with respect to its 
common security (not to mention the risk to the lives and well-being of its 
protection forces). If Member States lower the scope of domestic industrial 
protection to permit attainment of larger Treaty objectives, they will 
realize benefits for domestic markets and the Internal Market, as well as to 
the Community’s overall essential security interests.  
Article 296 is not solely about traditional notions of sovereign defense. 
It concerns the unique role of defense in the Internal Market. There, it 
protects the core physical integrity of the Member States, and thereby 
defends cross-border movement of goods and establishment of services, 
and consequently, economic unity and competition. Effective collective 
defense, therefore, can only be assured by intra-community cooperation 
and cross-border competition in all areas—which could be facilitated if the 
Lisbon Treaty or a future iteration enters into force someday. The previous 
cloak over unjustified national security exemptions is being lifted and will 
hopefully disappear. It would be advisable for Member States to coalesce 
through solid proposals aimed to show their global allies that they are in 
synchronized step, are ready to “punch [their] weight in world affairs,” 
and can pass “the ultimate test [of boosting their] . . . defence 
capability,”473 in the name of the Treaty and for the EU common good. 
 
 
 472. UKMoD, DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY, supra note 216, at 20–22.  
 473. Barroso, supra note 419, at 5.  
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